WH6501-02-6725

The recording starts after the conversation has begun.

President Johnson: You said something about the other day you wanted me to call you ahead of time.

George Smathers: Yes. I appreciate it.

President Johnson: That's number 1. Now, let me see [what] is number 2 . . . Oh yeah, on the ambassador, I've asked them to see if they can't bully through on the agrément and we'll see what we hear from the Irish  and I'll let you know.1 And he ought to by all means, though, get his two senators to go and talk to every man on Foreign Relations [Committee], and you ought to.

Smathers: Right.

President Johnson: So that  they don't get into a lot of questioning of him.

Smathers: Right.

President Johnson: And they ought to--[Robert] Byrd^∇ ought to go and tell all the Republicans that this is a man he wants and he ought tell [J. William] Fulbright^∇ he is a wonderful man and he ought to just say him and so forth.

Smathers: Right. [Unclear.]

President Johnson: You get that on it. That ought to be done the [in] next two or three days while this agrément coming in--

Smathers: Right.

President Johnson: So they can say it. And just say he's [Winston] Churchill's nephew.

Smathers: Right.

President Johnson: And I wouldn't say anything about the race horses.

Smathers: Right. I won't.

President Johnson: And--

Smathers: I told him to get ahold of Willis Smith's best friend--I mean Willis Robertson's best friend and get him to  get letters to Willis immediately, and he said he would.2

President Johnson: OK. All right. Well, Byrd came down here with him, and Byrd was strong for him. But Byrd is lazy and you have to get him to do things with that committee all year, on tax bill, I remember.

Smathers: Right.

President Johnson: So what you do is get him to come and get Byrd and make Byrd go and check them off.

Smathers: Right.

President Johnson: And you just look at the ones--Russell Long's on there--

Smathers: Right.

President Johnson: --and go over and get them to say all of them just don't amount to anything and then just get him to poll them, report them out. He'll have a good FBI^∇.3

Smathers: Right.

President Johnson: OK.

Smathers: We'll do it. Thank you very much.

President Johnson: Bye.

Smathers: Bye. 

• 1. Agrément refers to a diplomatic protocol whereby a government, prior to dispatching a diplomatic envoy or ambassador, seeks approval from the receiving state that the envoy is acceptable. It usually comes in the form of a diplomatic note.
• 2. Willis Robertson was a Democratic Senator from Virginia and chairman of the Senate Banking Committee.
• 3. Johnson is presumably referring to the regular FBI background check, a requirement for any diplomatic appointment.

WH6502-04-6852

• 1. General Andrew Goodpaster had been White House Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer to Eisenhower during his presidency.
• 2. For General Andrew J. Goodpaster's account of the 17 April Eisenhower meeting, see "Memorandum of a Meeting with President Johnson," FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 2: Vietnam, January-June 1965 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), pp.298-308.

WH6503-04-7043

Edward Kennedy: Sorry to call you at this hour. This afternoon, I am speaking for the first time up in the state to the legislature tomorrow. And I’ve been working on a speech for the legislature, and I haven’t been completely satisfied with the way that this has sort of developed. And one of the things, that of course, that I have been thinking about for some time, that I've spoken to you about, was our—was our regional development program up here. And I was wondering whether it would be appropriate at all to mention anything about that tomorrow to the legislature. Now, I realize that some of the problems that you have with this and—but if I could give some kind of indication of the, sort of the kind of a commission that might be forthcoming, I think there would be a great deal of interest in it and—

President Johnson: Well, I think I’d say that President [John F.] Kennedy went in for a unique experiment in area and regional rehabilitation-development, and that one of the most difficult sections of the country was the Appalachian area because coal had been king and other fuels had replaced it and come in.1 And that he tried to bring some twentieth century insight into that area. And that President Johnson, along with the Congress, picked up the torch. And that we’re signing the bill tomorrow that will launch that experiment.

We have every reason to believe that it is a good approach and a proper approach and a successful approach. That there are other regional areas in America that want to follow and improve their lot. Now, one of them is New England, and as a son of New England and—that you have tried to watch this yardstick as it has developed in the hope that you can apply whatever learning and whatever we gain from it to your own region, and that you’ve talked to the President about it. You talked to him last night about it, and that he realizes that in this modern day, there are shifts that have taken places, and there are dislocations and there are moves here and there brought about by foreign trade and by imports and by a lot of other problems, but that our people come first. And that you hope, when he gets through signing this bill tomorrow, that you can sit down and try to evolve some kind of a practical, reasonable, far-sighted, modern approach to the problems of your area. And that you’re not just concerned with Massachusetts, although that’s an important thing. But you’re concerned with all of New England and that you know that he is. That it’s . . . as a matter of fact, he cared more of New England than he did of his South, his native South. And he feels very close to them, and he’s told you that he would just sit with you any time and try to evolve a program. We’ve got the first one out of the way as soon as we sign it, and we’ve got to set it up and start administering it. And if any success flows from it that we can learn from, we will learn and adapt it to our own area.

Kennedy: Now, would it be appropriate to suggest that a commission might be forthcoming, which would at least consider the problems of New England, similar to the commission that was [unclear]?

President Johnson: Yeah, sure. Sure. Sure. I’d just say I’m introducing one, or have, or would, or propose it, or anything. Yes, I think so. I think that we’ll probably be run over with Mid-Western and New England and Southern and all of them. In the area of redevelopment, we’re going to try to include a lot of aid along that line.

Kennedy: Right.

President Johnson: But if you want to, and if you think we can justify it in the hearings, well, I’m prepared to take a good long look and try to find justification for it in New England, just like we did in Appalachia. I inherited Appalachia.2 I’m taking it just as it was. All I’ve tried to do was carry it along. Now, as far as New England is concerned . . .

Kennedy: Well, I think it’s—

President Johnson: They are my babies. You have no idea. You just don’t understand it. You don’t know how much I love them because when the chips were down, when I came to Boston, and when I went to New Hampshire, and I went into Maine, and I went into Vermont, by God, they were not found wanting. And I’m a sentimental fellow that believes in the doctrine of reciprocity.

Kennedy: Well, now, would it be—I realize that you have all these other parts of the country that are going to be interested. And they see you—I mean, I realize the great, you know, the feeling you have for New England and the feeling that New England has for you, and I know that it’s awfully difficult to just say, “Well, for this part we'll do something special.” What I'd hope--and if we can’t measure up, I fully realize that we can’t justify it and it doesn’t make a great deal of sense--but what I would like to see if it would be possible to mention tomorrow is the possibility of . . . can we say that the President has told me that legislation would be forthcoming under which regional development approach and programs would be considered?

President Johnson: No, I wouldn’t want to say that I am inaugurating them, although I wouldn’t hesitate to say that, “I have talked to the President, and I am going to introduce legislation, which will . . . upon which he and the administration will look with favor that would follow this approach.”

Kennedy: Mm-hmm.

President Johnson: In other words, I don’t want the responsibility for initiating it and inaugurating it placed on me for New England. Otherwise, they’ll have me in the Iron Range and they’ll have me in the South and they’ll have me out there, and so on and so forth.3

Kennedy: Sure.

President Johnson: But I wouldn't hesitate a bit to say, "President Kennedy started for Appalachia and Ted Kennedy says New England is equal in its need and he can establish it. And if can and does then I'll support it, period."

Kennedy: The--

President Johnson: And I think it would be better for you. Just say that--

Kennedy: Sure. Well, I don't--I understand, Mr. President, you can't possibly say at this time, until we get the facts out, you know, that there is a need up here. And this I respect completely and I mean, and I can understand it. And--

President Johnson: I rather think there is. And that textiles and the problems that they've had, the watches and the textiles and the shoes and everything else. I think there is, and I want to be helpful.

Kennedy: That's why--

President Johnson: [with Kennedy acknowledging] I just don't want to promise more than I can deliver. And then, besides, I'd just as soon you inaugurate it. I think that you could say that, "I have talked to the President and the leaders of this administration, and I'm going to ask that we make a thorough, modern-day study that will, I believe, result in the same action as taken place on Appalachia."

Kennedy: Well, I--that's--and as far as obtaining those facts, now they're already in existence of funds that are in ARA, for example, with technical [unclear] of study, that type of thing. Would the sequence to that be proposing maybe the states could put up some funds? That we could have [unclear]--

President Johnson: [with Kennedy acknowledging] I really don't know the technicalities, but I know this: that there's not a member of the Senate that I'd go as far to meet as I will you, because I just think that you've been fair and decent and fine as anybody, and I think your area has. And you can just count me in. And if you quote me a little bit too far, I'll stand up and say, "Yes, sir."

Kennedy: Well, I won't do that. [Unclear.]

President Johnson: Well, fine. I just--I want to make clear my position to you.

Kennedy: I understand. OK. Well, that's awfully kind, and I--listen, I'm sorry to bother you--

President Johnson: This business about my being at crossways with the Kennedys is just a pure lot of crap.

Kennedy: Yeah. Yeah. Well, I--

President Johnson: The--I started out here to keep faith, and I'm going to do it. And I think that New England is next in line, and I want to do anything that I can for it. And I think you know something about how I feel about you. And I have no antagonisms and no antipathy and no wars to settle with anybody else.4

Kennedy: Well, I--

President Johnson: And I just don't want you to let the damn press do that.

Kennedy: Yeah.

President Johnson: And there's not anything else I want. I've got everything, more than I can take care of right now. All I want to do is do what's right. And I think that--

Kennedy: Well, I--

President Johnson: --we can do it here. And I think we can do it through you. And you just go on and make your speech and write your ticket, and I'll do my damndest to make good on it.

Kennedy: Well, I appreciate it, Mr. President. I want to thank you. I--sorry to bother you [unclear]--

President Johnson: No, you don't bother--don't you ever--I've told you [to] call me anytime you want to, because I want to be true to the trust that's placed in me.

Kennedy: We've had some good hearings on the immigration.5 They're going--

President Johnson: Yes, you have. And I heard Bobby [Kennedy] made a hell of a good statement the other day, and that it looks like it might be a possibility to get it out of both houses.6 Do you think so?

Kennedy: It's--Well, I think in the Senate we're in better shape over, than that House. That [Michael] Feighan is-7

President Johnson: Well, we've got to work on him a little bit.

Kennedy: Yeah. Yeah. He's a tough cookie.

President Johnson: But you've troub[le]--

Kennedy: I think it's coming along. And we've had some good hearings over there.

President Johnson: How's my girlfriend, my blonde? Is she still living with you?8

Kennedy: Yeah, she sure is.

President Johnson: Give her my love.

Kennedy: We're keeping her out of trouble. We've brought her on up here. We--

President Johnson: Well, give her my love.

Kennedy: I certainly shall.

President Johnson: Tell her I'm sorry I wasn't looking at you in the picture when I went to visit you in the hospital as I had my eyes--[both laugh]

Kennedy: Well, she's forgiven. But I shall do. Well, you're awfully kind, Mr. President. And I won't--I really appreciate you [unclear].

President Johnson: Don't you ever feel the slightest reluctance, my friend, to call me, and I'll try to do whatever I can that'll be helpful.

Kennedy: Thank you very much.

President Johnson: Good night. Give your mom and daddy my love.

Kennedy: I certainly shall.

President Johnson: Please do, because I don't see them or call them more, but I don't.

Kennedy: Well, you've been very kind, and I certainly shall.

President Johnson: Good night. Thank you.

Kennedy: [Unclear]--

• 1. The Congress had recently passed legislation authorizing the spending $1.1 billion for highway construction, vocational education, conservation, mining rehabilitation, and water resource planning for the Appalachia region.
• 2. Johnson is referring to the administration's Appalachia program.
• 3. The Iron Range is an iron mining region in Minnesota.
• 4. By "anybody else," Johnson is obliquely referring to Edward's brother, Robert. The topic had been a staple of press reports since John Kennedy's assassination and had reached a crescendo the previous year during the election campaign, especially with Johnson's decision not to choose Robert Kennedy as his vice presidential running mate.
• 5. The Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee was holding hearings into administration proposals to modify immigration laws, particularly by revising the national quota system of awarding visas. Kennedy was serving as acting chairman of the subcommittee.
• 6. On 4 March, Senator Robert Kennedy had testified before the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by his brother Edward, and urged that the Senate pass the administration's proposals to revise the immigration laws. He said that the existing quota system, adopted in 1924, was rife with "follies and random cruelties" and that the administration's proposals "will eliminate from the statue books a form of discrimination totally alien to the spirit of the Constitution." "Immigration Changed Urged by Kennedy," Washington Post, 5 March 1965, p.A5.
• 7. Representative Michael Feighan, Democratic of Ohio and chairman of the House subcommitttee on immigration and nationality, was critical of the administration's immigration proposals and had made his own counter-proposal. Mary Pakenham, "Feighan Urges Immigration Law's Repeal," Chicago Tribune, 5 February 1965, p.A13.
• 8. Kennedy's wife, Joan, was a former model. They had been married since 1958.

WH6503-13-7156

President Johnson: I am going to have Dean Rusk^∇ and the Chief Justice [Earl Warren] are going to be at Runnymede where the Magna Carta was signed, and they are dedicating a portion of it to President [John F.] Kennedy.1

Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy: Uh-huh.

President Johnson: And I understood that Ms. [Jacqueline] Kennedy might go. I am going to notify her, and I wanted to notify you. I don’t know how to notify [Robert] Bobby [Kennedy]. But one of the [Boeing] 707s that we have on the Presidential planes would be available to her and her party.2 And I thought I would ask—she could take any members of the family that she desired or whoever she wanted, but I thought I might also ask you and Bobby to represent me, the President, with the Chief Justice and the secretary of state if you thought it was all right. I don’t know what you want to do about it. You could do anything you wanted to, but I attempted to call her and tell her--she's flying--and I’ve got a request here about it. And I thought that if she wanted to, she could do it; if she didn’t, she didn’t need to. Now, do you have any reaction to it, one way or the other?

Kennedy: Well, I—I think she was—it was sort of up in the air. When I talked to her probably two weeks ago, I know she was planning to go, and it was a question whether Bobby or myself—we thought we'd probably just talk with her and find out what her feeling about it was. I can—I’ll talk with her about it and—to get some kind of feeling. I hadn’t really sort of thought ahead that far. I knew May 21 was the date and I had had it in the back of my mind, but I just hadn’t reached the point where we had sort of made a decision on it. But I’ll be delighted to talk with her, and I know she’ll appreciate your thoughtfulness. I’ll mention it to Bobby. And then, if I could, get back to you.

President Johnson: You do that. I have a call in for her. I imagine she’ll be answering. They told me New York they’d get her. Then they came back and said she is enroute to Florida—

Kennedy: Yes, she heads down--

President Johnson: —and that she’ll be there about three [o'clock] something and they would have her report. Now, when is Bobby coming back?

Kennedy: He ought to be back tonight.

President Johnson: Well, I’ll call him tomorrow, but you tell him too. I wanted to call him, and—

Kennedy: He’s in that remote area, as you probably know. [both laugh] I sent a message up to Bobby the other day.

President Johnson: I saw that. I saw that on television.

Kennedy: [Laughs.] I didn’t know whether—

President Johnson: I thought it was—

Kennedy: —that was a little fresh or not. [laughs]

President Johnson: I thought it was a little bit fresh. I thought you’re being a little rough on him. You’re going to get whipped if you keep taking on him. You’re going to have to be like old Sam Houston.3 You’ll have to use your cane on him, because he can whip you.

Kennedy: [laughing] He can now.

President Johnson: [laughing] Well, anyway, all I want—I don’t want to impose on you or to urge you to do anything. I just wanted to—since I knew that she—this is going to be done, I thought it would be a good thing to have the—

Kennedy: When would they go over, Mr. President, [unclear]?

President Johnson: Whenever she wanted to go over. Rusk is going to be there on NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or something, and the Chief Justice has already agreed to go, not as my representative, but as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; the Magna Carta deal or so forth. And I was going to ask the two of them to represent me with the two Kennedy brothers.

Kennedy: Yeah.

President Johnson: Which I thought would be pretty good company: Rusk and Chief Justice and Robert Kennedy^∇ and Teddy Kennedy. And I was going to say that I had asked Mrs. Kennedy to use one of the presidential planes for her and her party, and I’d ask the two brothers to join the secretary and the Chief Justice in representing me.

Kennedy: Well, that’s very thoughtful and I—if the first of the week, if I could get back to you, Mr. President, or soon after I get a chance? I can give you—I’m sure you’ll get in touch—Jackie will give some feelings of—

President Johnson: All right.

Kennedy: I’ll—

President Johnson: You talk to Bobby and I’ll call him too.

Kennedy: Good.

President Johnson: Thank you. How are you doing? All right?

Kennedy: Oh, real well.

Presidnet Johnson: Where is my immigration bill?4 Goddamn it, you—I believe you represent—

Kennedy: [Unclear] we're getting here into that Voting Rights [bill] all morning, and it’s coming along.

President Johnson: [Nicholas] Katzenbach^∇ doing a good job?

Kennedy: Very good. He’s really first class. I mean his [unclear].

President Johnson: I wish you’d comend me on some of my appointments. [laughs]

Kennedy: [laughs] That was a good one.

President Johnson: All right.

Kennedy: Thanks very much.

President Johnson: All right.

• 1. Runnymede is located in the county of Surrey, England.
• 2. At the time of this call Senator Robert F. Kennedy [D-New York] was climbing Mount Kennedy, a mountain in Canada that had been named for former President Kennedy following his assassination.
• 3. Sam Houston Johnson was Lyndon Johnson's younger brother.
• 4. The Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee was holding hearings into administration proposals to modify immigration laws, particularly by revising the national quota system of awarding visas. Kennedy was serving as acting chairman of the subcommittee.

WH6505-07-7623

Senator Edward Kennedy calls Vice President Hubert Humphrey to discuss a possible compromise on his Poll Tax amendmant to the Voting Rights Bill.

Edward Kennedy: Hello? Mr. Vice-President?

Vice-President Humphrey: Yes, Ted?

Kennedy: Hello, how are you?

Humphrey: Fine.

Kennedy: Sorry to interrupt you.

Humphrey: It’s all right.

Kennedy: Listen, I’m in my office now with Senator [Philip] Hart and Joe [unclear], the members of the Council of Churches and some of the members of the AFL-CIO.1

Humphrey: Yeah.

Kennedy: We’ve been talking this morning. I know we’re in—we’re moving into about the last 50 minutes—

Humphrey: Yeah.

Kennedy: —before we go on the floor. It’s the feeling that they’ve reached some decision on this and wanted to see whether this would be—that the—whether the leadership would be willing to consider this position.

Humphrey: Yes, sir.

Kennedy: Would you be interested in at least exploring it? Or—

Humphrey: I surely would. In fact, I’m sitting here talking with the President and others here right now about it.

Kennedy: Fine. Well, now, this would be the declaration and a finding, and the Attorney General’s provisions. So it would be section A and section 3 with the elimination of the ban.

Humphrey: Yeah.

Kennedy: It would also include the reestablishment of the poll-watch provisions and also the state-registrars. The—not—going to the state reg[istrars]—going to the federal registrars rather than the state registrars. This was an amendment which was introduced in the committee and passed, and it was changed again in the “Mansfield^∇-Dirksen substitute.”2

Humphrey: I got you.

Kennedy: That would be the tacic—

Humphrey: Yeah.

Kennedy: —situation. And then they’re going to have roll call votes on those other two anyway.

Humphrey: Yes.

Kennedy: This is—if they could work this out, then I’d—what we’d like to do, see if we could—at that time, if this was—the leadership would be acceptable, then at that time, we’d like some time to see whether we could possibly convince the—our friends in the leadership conference to be willing to go along on this.

Humphrey: Yeah. Now, let me just get it again. The declaration and finding, and then, skip B and then come to C, which is the Attorney General—

Kennedy: Yeah.

Humphrey: —Justice. And then your D is the provision in case—that is sort of a saving clause there, isn’t it? You’ve got about—

Kennedy: Yeah, that’s the—that would . . . that probably wouldn’t be necessary without the ban in there.

Humphrey: Yeah.

Kennedy: The only trouble is, it’s—the last part of the savings clause, Hubert, it's got that 45 day payment—

Humphrey: Well, I think we might want to have all of that.

Kennedy: You’d like—we might like to have it, but—

Humphrey: Yeah.

Kennedy: —you know, we’re not—but it’s—it’d be the—our finding, our C—you take out the ban—

Humphrey: Mm-hmm.

Kennedy: —the part about the—the savings clause, you know, can go either way.

Humphrey: Yeah.

Kennedy: And the 45 days is helpful, but the—the other aspect of it isn’t necessary. The second point is on the registrars . . .

Humphrey: Mm-hmm.

Kennedy: . . . that we—I mean, on the poll-watchers to reinstitute the possibility for poll-watchers without going through the court procedure.

Humphrey: Did you have that in your bill?

Kennedy: Yes, we did.

Humphrey: And that was dropped?

Kennedy: That was dropped.

Humphrey: Mm-hmm.

Kennedy: And the other part, the deal of going—not having to go to a state registrar before you go to a federal registrar, we had that part changed so that they could just go to a federal registrar.

Humphrey: Mm-hmm.

Kennedy: It was reinstituted in the Mansfield—

Humphrey: Mansfield-Dirksen.

Kennedy: Yeah.

Humphrey: Well, listen. I’ll be on over there immediately, and I’ll try to get some support here on this and come on over.

Kennedy: OK.

Humphrey: And I’ll be with—I’ll call you just as soon as I get in over at the other office.

Kennedy: Right.

Humphrey: You bet.

Philip A. Hart: [Unclear] Vice-President?

Humphrey: Yes?

Hart: Phil Hart.

Humphrey: Yes, Phil?

Hart: I’ve been on this call, and Ted is . . . behaved magnificently and . . .

Humphrey: I should say.

Hart: . . . his conference with the—Joe [unclear] and [unclear] and others—

Humphrey: Yes.

Hart: —we’re running out of time

Humphrey: I know that.

Hart: So that we’ll simply have to stand and wait.

Humphrey: Well, I’ll be there in a few minutes.

Hart: All right.

Humphrey: I’ll see what I can do. We'll get ahold of Nick [Nicholas Katzenbach^∇], too.

Hart: Good.

Humphrey: All right.

Hart: Yes. Yes.

Humphrey: You bet.

Kennedy: Thanks.

Humphrey: Bye-bye.

• 1. The acronym AFL-CIO stands for American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations.
• 2. Senator Kennedy is referring to successful efforts by Senator Michael J. Mansfield [D-Montana] and Senator Everett M. Dirksen [R-Illinois] to eliminate the ban on poll taxes from the proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965 on 11 May 1965.

WH6506-06-8180

Truman's side of the conversation is difficult to hear.

President Johnson: Mr. President?

Harry Truman: Yes, Mr. President.

President Johnson: How you feeling?

Truman: Well, I’m feeling pretty good, and I hope you are.

President Johnson: Oh, I’m just catching hell, you know, from daylight to dark, and I can’t find anybody that ever says anything good about me. But I guess that’s what's—that goes with the job. Doesn’t that go with the job?

Truman: You’re talking to [unclear].

President Johnson: [laughs] How early do you get up in the morning?

Truman: Oh, about 5:00 [A.M.].

President Johnson: I thought I might invite myself out to see you. I’ve got to make a Democratic speech here Thursday and go to San Francisco to the United Nations, and I remembered how much you did for them and how you saved them in Korea and everything else.1 And I thought that I would, after I get through that Democratic speech Thursday night, that I would just fly out to Kansas City and stay all night, get a little tourist [motor] court there close to the airport. And if you would and could and felt like it, and it didn’t get you up too early, [unclear comment by Truman] come down and have breakfast with me about 7:00 [A.M.]. They want me to take off about 8:30 [A.M.].

Truman: I’ll be there at 7:00 [A.M.] [unclear].

President Johnson: All right. Now, that’s Friday morning. And I’ll have my secretary call your secretary.

Truman: That's at the Meuhlbach Hotel?

President Johnson: Well, I thought I would try to get a place as close to the airport as I could. They—

Truman: That's about the closest that you can get.

President Johnson: All right.

Truman: It's the best hotel. 

President Johnson: All right. Is there—there’s a motor court there that’s pretty good close to the airport, but I’ll check it, and I’ll have them call you back.2

Truman: I think you'd be better at the Meuhlbach Hotel. 

President Johnson: OK. All right.

Truman: That’s my honest opinion.

President Johnson: All right. We’ll see you there at 7:00 [A.M.].

Truman: 7:00 on Friday.

President Johnson: OK.

Truman: I’ll be there.

President Johnson: Thank you.

Truman: [Unclear.]

President Johnson: Give my love to Mrs. Truman.

Truman: All right.

President Johnson: Here’s a friend of yours that wants to say hello to you, the Supreme Court Justice.

Truman: Oh, all right.

Arthur Goldberg^∇: Mr. President?

Truman: Yes.

Goldberg: This is Arthur Goldberg.

Truman: Well, how are you?

Goldberg: How are you, Mr. President?

Truman: Well, I’m all right.

Goldberg: Well, you sound fine.

Truman: Good job.

Goldberg: Do you feel peppy enough to seize the steel industry again if they act up against the President here?3

Truman: I’ll do anything that the President wants me to do.

Goldberg: OK. Stay well, and say hello to Mrs. Truman, will you?

Truman: I’ll sure do it.

Goldberg: Yes nice to talk to you. Bye.

• 1. The United Nations was founded during Truman's presidency in San Francisco; the gathering in San Francisco at which President Johnson intended to speech was to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations' founding. When Truman ordered United States intervention in the Korean War in June 1950, he did so under the auspices of the United Nations.
• 2. Motor court was an old name for a motel. It was distinct from a hotel, which was usually a large building with mulitple rooms, in that it was usually small, low-lying buildings on the edge of a parking lot so that guests could park their cars adjacent to their rooms.
• 3. In a controversial move during the Korean War, Truman ordered the U.S. Department of Commerce to nationalize the steel industry to put down a widespread union dispute that threatened the supply of steel to the United States military. The move failed when the Supreme Court ruled that Truman's order was unconstitutional.

WH6507-08-8404

The operators connect the call.

President Johnson: Hello?

Harry Truman: Hello?

President Johnson: How are you our friend?

Truman: Well, how are you Mr. President?

Truman: Just doing fine. Are you feeling all right?

Truman: Yes, I’m feeling all right.

President Johnson: You playing any poker these days?

Truman: [laughs] Don’t have a chance.

President Johnson: Old Clark [Clifford] —

Truman: I would if I could.

President Johnson: Old Clark Clifford^∇ and I were talking the other night about when we used to go down on the boat with you on—have--

Truman: [laughs] We had a good time on the boat trips, didn't we?

President Johnson: We sure did. We enjoyed it.

Truman: And I lost money every time.

President Johnson: Do you feel like my coming out to see you anytime soon?

Truman: Any time you say.

President Johnson: I’ll give you a day’s notice, and I thought maybe I’d just fly out there sometime in the next week or ten days and—

Truman: Well, whenever you come I’ll be available.

President Johnson: All right.

Truman: You let me know a day ahead of time so I'll be sure to be here.

President Johnson: I will. Don’t you say a word about it until I call you.

Truman: Oh, I won't say a word about it—

President Johnson: I’ll call you, and I just want to come visit with you and have a little talk with you.

Truman: Whenever I’m in touch with the President he does the talking, I don’t.

President Johnson: God bless you. Well, I’ll be in touch with you in a few days.

Truman: All right.

President Johnson: Bye.

Truman: Whenever you’re ready.

President Johnson: Give my love to Mrs. Truman.

Truman: I’ll do that.

WH6509-07-8902

The American Bar Association opposed Morrissey's nomination on the grounds that he was unqualified, specifically charging that he lacked trial experience and that he lacked the intellectual capacity to cope with the antitrust, patent, admiralty, and other issues that routinely came before Federal judges. They pointed out that Morrissey had failed the bar examination twice and had only gained admission to the bar--and even then, with difficulty--after 12 years of trying.3 During Senate testimony, Morrissey himself admitted to using a "quickie" law diploma, a revelation that undermined his already unsettled nomination.4 Weeks of controversy, questions about the veracity of Morrissey's testimony, renewed FBI^∇ investigations, and intense lobbying by Morrissey's sponsor, Senator Edward Kennedy, ultimately resulted in Senator Kennedy abandoning the fight on 21 October by using a Senate procedure to let the nomination die.5

• 1. William Chapman, "Kennedy Clan Friend to Get Judgeship," Washington Post, 27 September 1965, p.A1.
• 2. "Dad's Gotten Sick," TIME, 29 December 1961.
• 3. John P. MacKenzie, "Bar Vows to Contest Naming of Morrissey," Washington Post, 28 September 1965, p.A3.
• 4. Fred P. Graham, "Morrissey Admits Using a 'Quickie' Law Diploma," New York Times, 13 October 1965, p.1; Fred P. Graham, "Law: Controversy Over Morrissey," New York Times, 17 October 1965, p.E8.
• 5. Fred P. Graham, "Edward Kennedy Drops His Fight for Morrissey," New York Times, 22 October 1965, p.1.

WH6501-04-6736

In responding to Dr. King's suggestion for the appointment of African American to a Cabinet-level post, Johnson laid out his priorities on racial matters, particularly in legislation and in Cabinet-level appointments. Johnson and King discuss the importance of the Voting Rights Act in the context of much broader legislation to help black Americans, especially poor black Americans.

Operator: Dr. King?

Martin Luther King, Jr.: Yes?

Operator: The President will be right with you. He's outside. We're getting him. Just a moment.

King: Thank you.

Pause.

President Johnson: Hello?

King: Hello?

President Johnson: This is Lyndon Johnson. I had a call--

King: [Unclear.]

President Johnson: --from you and I tried to reply to it a couple times--Savannah and different places--and they said you were traveling [chuckles] and I got to traveling last night. [Unclear comment by King] Just got down here to meet the Prime Minister of Canada this morning. And I had a moment and I thought maybe we better try to--I'd better try to reply to your call.

King: Well, I certainly appreciate your returning the call, and I don't want to take but just a minute or two of your time. First, I want to thank you for that great State of the Union message. It was really a marvelous presentation. And I think we're on the way now toward the Great Society.

President Johnson: I'll tell you what our problem is. We've got to try with every force at our command--and I mean every force--to get these education bills that go to those people [with] under $2,000 a year [of] income, 1.5 billion [dollars]. And this poverty [bill] that's a billion, and a half and this health [bill] that's going to be 900 million [dollars] next year right at the bottom. We've to get them passed before the vicious forces concentrate and get them a coalition that can block them. Then we have got to--so we won't divide them all and get them hung up in a filibuster. We've got to--when we get these big things through that we need--Medicare, education--I've already got that hearing started the 22nd in the House and 26th in the Senate. Your people ought to be very, very diligent in looking at those committee members that come from urban areas that are friendly to you to see that those bills get reported right out, because you have no idea--it's shocking to you--how much benefits they will get. There's 8.5 billion [dollars] this year for education, compared to 700 million [dollars] when I started. So you can imagine what effort that's going to be. And this one bill is a 1.5 billion [dollars]. Now, if we can get that and we can get a Medicare [bill]--we ought to get that by February--then we get our poverty [bill], that will be more than double what it was last year.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: Then we've got to come up with the qualification of voters. That will answer 70 percent of your problems.

King: That's right.

President Johnson: If you just clear it out everywhere, make it age and [the ability to] read about write. No tests on what [Geoffrey] Chaucer said or [Robert] Browning's poetry or constitutions or memorizing or anything else.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: And then you may have to put them in the post office. Let the Postmaster--that's a federal employee that I control who they can say is local. He's recommended by the Congressmen, he's approved by the Senator. But if he doesn't register everybody I can put a new one in.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: And it's not an outside Washington influence. It's a local man but they can all just to go the post office like they buy stamps. Now, I haven't thought this through but that's my general feeling, and I've talked to the Attorney General, and I've got them working on it. I don't want to start off with that any more than I do with 14-B because I wouldn't get anything else.

King: Yes. Yes. [Unclear.]

President Johnson: Do you--And I don't want to publicize it, but I want--that's--I wanted you to know the outline of what I had in mind.

King: Yes. Well, I remember that you mentioned it to me the other day when we met at the White House, and I have been very diligent in not . . . making this statement.

President Johnson: Well, your statement was perfect about the vote's important, very important. And I think it's good to talk about that. And I just don't see how anybody can say that a man can fight in Vietnam but he can't vote in the post office.

King: Yes. Right. Well, Mr. President, I'll tell you the main thing I wanted to share with you. This really rose out of conversations that I've had with all of the civil rights leaders--I mean the heads of civil rights organizations--

President Johnson: Yeah.

King: --as well as many people around the country as I have traveled. We have a strong feeling that it would mean so much, first, to help with our whole democracy but to the Negro and to the nation, to have a Negro in the Cabinet. We feel that this would really would be a great step forward for the nation, for the Negro, for our international image. And it would do so much to give many people a lift who need a lift now. And I'm sure that it could give a new sense of dignity and self-respect to millions of Negroes who--there are millions of Negro youth who feel that they don't have anything to look forward to in life.

President Johnson: I agree with that. I have not publicly shouted from the house top, but I have had them sit in with me. I--the first move I made was to put one [an African American] on the [National] Security Council.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: And to put one in charge of every bit of the information that went to all of the 120 nations and take him out of an important ambassador post.1 And I am trying my best to get the housing and urban and city problems [sic], which is the number one problem in America as I see it, made into a Cabinet post. I have a good chance of getting it done, unless I get tied in with the racial thing. I'm going to concentrate all of the executive power I can to get that done. I'm pretty half-way committed to putting in [Robert] Weaver^∇, who I consider to be a very able administrator and [who has] done a good job and who we respect pretty highly.2 And I'm trying to bring in others as assistants and deputies. I talked to them no longer than two hours ago about trying to get one in charge of, maybe, African affairs if [G. Mennen] Williams left. I don't know whether you know him or not, but I'm just giving consideration. I don't want to get it around, but it's this fellow [George] Carter that runs [the] African desk for the Peace Corps.

King: Oh, yes.

President Johnson: Do you know him?

King: I just--no, I don't know him well.

President Johnson: Well--

King: [Unclear.]

President Johnson: He's very, very able and we've got George Weaver over in the Labor Department, and I'm bringing them in just as fast as I can. I gave Carl Rowan the top job over [at the United States Information Agency] . . . I would guess that eight out of the ten people that I talked to felt like that I had problems there. But up to now, he's--he sits with the Security Council on everything. He participates just like the Secretary of State. And I'm going to--I don't want to make a commitment on it because I don't want it to get tied down in the Congress. But I'm going to shove as strong as I can to get the biggest department there--housing, urban affairs, city, transportation--everything that comes in that department that involves the urban areas of America into one department. And then if I can get that done without having to commit one way or the other, my hope would be that I could put the man in there and probably it would be Weaver because I think we have, more or less, a moral obligation to a fellow that's done a--

King: He's a top flight man.

President Johnson: He's done a good job, and he hasn't disappointed anybody. If we put somebody into a job and he fails, we lose three steps when we go ahead one.

King: Sure.

President Johnson: And I haven't had any of that, if you'll notice it.

King: No.

President Johnson: We haven't had any mistakes or any corruption or any scandals of any kind. And I've moved them in, I mean, by the wholesale the, both women and men.

King: Yes. Well, this--I--this is very encouraging and I was, as I said, very concerned about this and I know how others have been mentioning that--what this could mean; it would be another great step toward the Great Society.

President Johnson: I have seen where they considered Whitney for--Whitney Young--for a place with [a] top job with [Sargent] Shriver. He's running two shows, and maybe as a kind of associate director with Shriver with the poverty group. I thought that ought to get under way a little bit. I don't know what Shriver's said about it. I have a very high regard for Whitney. I like him. I don't feel--I honestly don't feel that with Roy Wilkins or with you or with [A. Philip] Randolph or with the man from CORE [James Farmer] that meets with us, I really don't think I have a moral obligation to any of them like I have to Weaver, who has been in there. And it's kind of like you being assistant pastor of your church for ten years with the understanding of your deacons that you would be--take over and then you--they lose and they don't get to make a pastor, and then you continue to carry on, and then finally when the good day comes, they say, "Well, you get back [and] sit at the second table." I just don't feel like saying that to Weaver.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: Now, Weaver's not my man. I didn't bring him in. He's a [John F.] Kennedy man, but I just think that there'd be a pretty revolutionary feeling about him. I--Carl Rowan's not my man. He's a Kennedy man. But he's got the biggest job in government, and it's a Cabinet job. He sits with the Cabinet every time. He sits with the [National] Security Council every time. And I did it the first month I was in office.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: I don't throw it around to cause him to be attacked by his appropriations [committees] because the Southerners handle them. [John] McClellan handles his appropriations. But after we get by pretty well this year and I can get this reorganization through, why, we'll not only have people like Weaver and Carter and undersecretary's places, but we'll have Rowan head there, and we'll have Weaver and perhaps some other folks on the order of Whitney and whoever you-all think's good.

King: Well, we think very highly of Whitney and--

President Johnson: I do, too.

King: --that he can play a role in--

President Johnson: [with King acknowledging] I do, too. You know, he's worked very closely in our Equal Employment [Office], and he's done a very good job in about 60 cities, where his people have branches on employment. And I rather think that there's been substantial progress--not enough--but I rather think there's been substantial progress with industry on a higher level. Don't you?

King: I think so. There's no doubt about it.

President Johnson: Every corporation I talk to--and I talked to 30 of them yesterday--they are looking for Negroes that can do the job that a George Weaver does or Carl Rowan does or a fellow like Weaver does. If we have some of them, and if you have some of them, and you get them to Hobart Taylor, we can find companies that will use men of that quality.3 Then we they get in, they can look after the ones below them like you're looking after your people.

King: Well, I think you're right, and we're certainly going to continue to work in that area. 

President Johnson: There's not going to be anything though, Dr., as effective as all of them voting.

King: That's right. Nothing--

President Johnson: That'll get you a message that all the eloquence in the world won't bring, because the fellow will be coming to you then instead of you calling him.

King: And it's very interesting, Mr. President, to notice that the only states that you didn't carry in the South, the five Southern states, have less than 40 percent of the Negroes registered to vote.4 It's very interesting to notice. And I think a professor at the University of Texas, in a recent article, brought this out very clearly. So it demonstrates that it's so important to get Negroes registered to vote in large numbers in the South. And it would be this coalition of the Negro vote and the moderate white vote that will really make the new South.

President Johnson: That's exactly right. I think it's very important that we not say that we're doing this, and we not do it just because it's negroes or whites. But we take the position that every person born in this country and when they reach a certain age, that he have a right to vote, just like he has a right to fight. And that we just extend it whether it's a Negro or whether it's a Mexican or who it is.

King: That's right.

President Johnson: And number two, I think that we don't want special privilege for anybody. We want equality for all, and we can stand on that principle. But I think that you can contribute a great deal by getting your leaders and you yourself, taking very simple examples of discrimination where a man's got to memorize [Henry Wadsworth] Longfellow or whether he's got to quote the first 10 Amendments or he's got to tell you what amendment 15 and 16 and 17 is, and then ask them if they know and show what happens. And some people don't have to do that. But when a Negro comes in, he's got to do it. And we can just repeat and repeat and repeat. I don't want to follow [Adolph] Hitler, but he had a--he had a[n] idea--

King: Yeah.

President Johnson: --that if you just take a simple thing and repeat it often enough, even if it wasn't true, why, people accept it. Well, now, this is true, and if you can find the worst condition that you run into in Alabama, Mississippi, or Louisiana, or South Carolina, where--well, I think one of the worst I ever heard of is the president of the school at Tuskegee or the head of the government department there or something being denied the right to a cast a vote. And if you just take that one illustration and get it on radio and get it on television and get it in the pulpits, get it in the meetings, get it every place you can, pretty soon the fellow that didn't do anything but follow--drive a tractor, he's say, "Well, that's not right. That's not fair."

King: Yes.

President Johnson: And then that will help us on what we're going to shove through in the end.

King: Yes. You're exactly right about that.

President Johnson: And if we do that, we'll break through as--it'll be the greatest breakthrough of anything, not even excepting this [19]64 [Civil Rights] Act. I think the greatest achievement of my administration, I think the great achievement in foreign policy, I said to a group yesterday, was the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. But I think this will be bigger because it'll do things that even that '64 Act couldn't do.

King: That's right. That's right. Yes, that's right.

Well, Mr. President, I certainly appreciate your giving me this time and I certainly appreciate getting your ideas on these things, but that I just wanted to share it with you, and I wanted you to know we have thisfeeling but we have not set on any particular person. We felt that Bob Weaver, Whitney Young, or Ralph Bunche, somebody like that [unclear]--

President Johnson: Every one of those people have my respect. And what you do is this: you just say to them that I'm not going to send a message to the Congress. And say that if you will give me this power, I will do this as a trade, because I think that would do us all damage. But if I can get my urban and housing affair[s] [bill], you know what my intentions are.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: And I've got a pretty good Cabinet. As far as I know, I'm going to keep them all, probably, except maybe the Secretary of the Treasury, perhaps. I don't know what's going to happen to the Attorney General. I've given a good deal of thought to folks like Abe Fortas, a good deal of thought to folks like Clark Clifford^∇, a good deal thought to [Nicholas] Katzenbach^∇, a good deal of thought to . . . all those folks are pretty liberal and they're right on our question. I've appointed John Doar in charge of the problem over there.5 But I think most of the others are planning to stay, and I need them on these big programs--health and education and defense and state. But the one thing we want to do is shove through our housing reorganization and put them in charge of the cities.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: Then New York City has got to come, sit down, and talk to these people. Chicago has got to come. New Orleans has got to come. Atlanta has got to come. If they don't, they just can't move.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: And then I think we'll have a good man who's trained that's come up through the ranks, that's married, that's not on account of color, not on account of anything else, but he'll be there.

King: Yes. Yes. Well, this is wonderful, and I certainly appreciate your--

President Johnson: The two things you do for us, now. You find the most ridiculous illustration you can on voting and point it up and repeat it and get everybody else to do it. Second thing is please look at that labor committee in the House and Senate. Please look at that health committee. Please look at that immigration committee. And let us try to get health and education and poverty through the first 90 days.

King: Yes. Well, we're going to be doing that. You can depend on our absolute support.

President Johnson: Whitney's group can go to talking to them and Roy's group can and your group can and they ought to tell [William F.] Ryan of New York and they ought to tell so-and-so in Philadelphia and they ought to tell so-and-so from Atlanta, "Please get this bill reported."

King: Yes.

President Johnson: Because I don't think you have any conception of the proportion of assistance that comes to your people in these bills. I haven't pointed that out. I haven't stressed it.

King: Right. Well, I know they will be--they have been and will be even more tremendous help and--

President Johnson: You can figure out though what $8 billion in education, what $1 billion in health, and what $1.5 billion in poverty will do if it goes to people who earn less than $2,000 a year.

King: Um-hmm.

President Johnson: Now, you know who earns less than 2,000, don't you? [chuckles]

King: That's right. Yes, sir. Well, it will certainly be a great movement. We've just got to work hard at it. [Unclear.]

President Johnson: And I'm part of this administration, but we talked about what we're going to do [for] three years and we had to do it the fourth. We passed 51 bills last year. Now, I've got those messages up there. [It is the] first time by January 15 any President has ever had a half a dozen messages before the Congress. Most of them don't even have their State of the Union until after the inauguration.

King: Yeah, that's right.

President Johnson: But they're there and they're ready for them to go to work, and we're not just going to talk. If they'll vote, I'm ready. We've got our recommendations. And we talked the first three years of our administration. We promised, and we held it up and people were getting to be pretty disillusioned, I think, when I finally beat the Rules Committee and got [the] Civil Rights [Act of 1964] out.

King: Yeah. Well, I know.

President Johnson: I think you might had a lot more revolution in this country than you could handle if we had had that Civil Rights [bill] stay in the Rules Committee under Judge Smith.

King: That's right. Oh, that's--that's such a disillusion [unclear].

President Johnson: Well, we talked about it [for] three years, you know. [Unclear comment by King] But we just did something about it. So that's what we got to do now, and you get in there and help us.

King: Well, I certainly will, and you know you can always count on that.

President Johnson: Thank you so much.

King: All right. God bless you. Thank you, Mr. President.

President Johnson: Bye. Bye.

• 1. Carl Rowan was Ambassador to Finland from 21 May 1963 to 8 February 1964 and in 1964 became Director of the United States Information Agency [USIA].
• 2. Robert C. Weaver became the first African American to be appointed to a Cabinet-level position in 1966 when President Johnson made him the first Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
• 3. Hobart Taylor, Jr., Special Counsel to the President's Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity during the Kennedy Administration and Director of the Export-Import Bank of the United States during the Johnson Administration.
• 4. President Johnson won the 1964 Presidential election in a landslide, carrying all but six states, five of which were in the Deep South (the sixth was Nevada)--South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
• 5. John Doar was Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. President Johnson likely meant hte Division of Civil Rights in the Justice Department.

WH6503-01-7006

 The rec ording begins while the conversation is already in progress.

President Johnson:. . .you need a rest, young fellow like you. Us old men, 56, we don’t—our backs—we can’t use them anywhere.1

Edward Kennedy: I wish I could keep that weight off. I’m going to have to find your secret sometime.

President Johnson: Yeah. I haven't got any.

[with Kennedy acknowledging throughout] Say, on this Appalachia thing, I know what your problem is and I’m sympathetic with it. I don’t know whether it will work at all. It’s not my experiment. It’s got these governors and the one representative from the federal government. It was proposed after a study, as you know. It is one of about four of the remaining Kennedy-Johnson administration proposals. The rest of them have enacted and pretty well wiped up. We’re very hopeful that we can see it through with the—the coffee agreement’s giving us some trouble, and the immigration thing is giving us some trouble. We’ve got the committees pretty well packed in the House, and I assume you all will take care of the Senate; that Senate is a lot easier. Appalachia, it looks like it’s within the dream. And I would hope that maybe by 60 days that we could get most of this thing behind us.

But I don’t know whether Appalachia is going to work or not. If it does, and if there’s any indication that it’s a good thing and if we can get any sentiment for it, and if the principal here and the formula is the answer, which a group that studied it thought so and this man [John] Sweeney over at Commerce and  Franklin Roosevelt and President Kennedy and others. I picked it up. I had nothing to do with it. I never heard of it, can’t even spell it. But if it works then I think it could very well go up your way and go any other place where it was essential. I think that he [President Kennedy] felt that maybe West Virginia and some of them were a little bit bad at the moment and maybe he had some obligations there.

I wanted you to know that I have no obligation in the nation more to any region than New England, period. And if you have any reason, just look at Maine and Vermont and New Hampshire and Massachusetts, where nobody ever got a vote like that and so forth.

But I am disturbed that a few of the boys that feel like we’re just going to deal with West Virginia and then we’ll let them go to hell and that we’ll take all their factories and all their jobs and everything else. So, I think now is the time, and particularly if we vote on it the next day or two, for you go to talking to some of your groups and say, “If a girl will go to bed with him in West Virginia tonight, well [she] may go to bed with us tomorrow night." And—or if it works there we’ve got our nose under the tent and the government has a kind of a responsibility to treat one state like another if the facts are comparable. And if this thing gets going pretty good, why then there’s no reason why, if it’s justified--it can go the same way.

I see where a Republican from New Hampshire, and that’s what caused me to call you, says, “One angry Republican”--it’s UPI^∇ 139; you may want to get it off the ticker--“lambasted the President’s Appalachia plan 'as an industrial job piracy bill.' Advocating a GOP proposal to aid pockets of poverty, Cleveland said the Appalachia program would be financed partly with New Hampshire tax money and that would be spent to lure away jobs and industries otherwise coming to New Hampshire." Well, everything you do is spending all the people’s tax money. If you’re doing it Sarge Shriver's poverty [program] or anything else. But I think that the Democrat’s in that area, it might not be a bad idea for you to get your Massachusetts delegation, if you’ve got some leadership, and say, "Now, I’ve got a deal working." And maybe other New England delegations--they are not many Congressmen from there--"but if this works out, I’m going to look after us and we’re going to come in with a proposal. And I have reasons to believe--it hasn’t been formulated and I don’t want to have any firm commitment--but I have reason to believe that [President] Johnson will be as sympathetic and considerate of New England as [President] Kennedy was of West Virginia.”

Kennedy: Well, I—

President Johnson: [Laughing] Maybe for the same reason.

Kennedy: I’d be—there’s a good of concern up there, just generally. We’ve got a—you know, you’ve got a situation where Eddie Boland, who’s your very good friend and great friend, he’s been fighting this thing. We’ve been over and had a great session with [Robert] McNamara^∇ last Saturday morning about the Springfield Armory.2 And McNamara when we finished up with him said he’s [unclear] down 659 bases and installations and this was the finest presentation he’s heard.

President Johnson: Well—

Kennedy: McNamara said that. And I mean [unclear]. But he said--

President Johnson: He told me that. He told me he'd spent two hours on it—

Kennedy: That’s right [unclear].

President Johnson: I called him; [he] stepped out of the meeting while you all were talking and that’s what he said.

Kennedy: And it’s—he has--like Eddie Boland said, "How can I, you know, vote for an Appalachia when their program and vote on that when I’m, you know, we’re going to talk about sending 2,400 people out on the streets up in here?"3 There’s just—he says, "I know, Ted, you’re interested in this New England regional thing, development. And I know that, you know, you’ve talked to the President on it." And then he says, "I wonder [unclear] help him out." And—but he said, you know, "We’ve got a lot of these—all these things that have been taking place, you know, it always seems that we’re getting the—it seems that we’ve had some of our problems up here." And he said that "I've got to—I’m dealing with a situation where the mayor up there in the newspapers making it difficult."

And I’ve—I had, you know, lunch with Eddie on Saturday, you know. Bob had called me and said you know if this thing happens that—some of the New England people are off, he said that going to affect us up there." He’s looking out after those 11 or 13 counties in New York. And he said, "That’s going to be rough on all those" and "can't you get after them." And—so I’ve been talking to some of them and I—

President Johnson: Well, I didn't know that. What I thought, I just saw this statement from this Republican. But I don’t know how in the hell Eddie is going to expect a guy from Oklahoma or Texas or somebody votes for the New England one if he’s voted against the West Virginia one.

Kennedy: Sure, I think that—

President Johnson: [with Kennedy acknowledging] —if he’s got any sense. And there everyday, I mean, John McCormick votes for a damn farm bill in Texas, but we vote for minimum wage and other things that really gut us. What we have to do is try to look at the overall picture, and this is--all I’m saying is this: "That you’ve got a little [unclear] to say to them if you want to use it that we’re not making any commitment [that] we are going to put one in the Midwest or we’re going to put one in New England. But if they can bring me the facts that are—that justify a step that President Kennedy took in West Virginia that I’d damn sure like to do it in Vermont and New Hampshire and Massachusetts, any other that part of the area, because I’m the only Democrat that ever carried all of them in one round. And I think the answer to them is, that is "Let’s see if the girl will sleep with Ted tonight and if she does starch it, maybe she will sleep with me tomorrow night!" [laughs]

Kennedy: Could we to get these—to get these facts, would we—would it be—could I say to them confidentially that at least as far as obtaining these facts in a limited kind of a study that would be made up there, that at least I have informal indications that this study would be made to ascertain whether we do have these findings? This--

President Johnson: Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Who made—did Congress have a resolution or something setting up the Appalachia commission?

Kennedy: That’s right. They—they—

President Johnson Tell them that you’re going to copy what they do there, and that I will do so far as  studying it's concerned, just exactly what Kennedy did on West Virginia and Ohio and Pennsylvania and the rest of the area, because I want to keep all of our economy prosperous, I want to help them all.

Kennedy: Sure. This gets—I thought—

President Johnson: But they’re a plain damn fool if they vote against the first Appalachia and then expect to pass the second one, because they’re against the whole principle and they’re against the idea.

Kennedy: That’s right.

President Johnson: And I don’t know, Texas as far as I know is not interested in an Appalachia but—

Kennedy: [Unclear]. [Laughs]

President Johnson: I hope not. But I hope that--this guy in New Hampshire is going to be in a mighty bad spot to get me to do anything for him in New Hampshire if he said it's bad to go all along.

Kennedy: Yeah, sure.

President Johnson: You see what I mean? So what—

Kennedy: If he can—if I can say to them that we’re going to at least have the same—you see, what they need is just some--what would come up with a hundred thousand dollars for a study.

President Johnson: Well, I’m for studying them, and on waterways, on rivers, on commissions of every kind in the world that will give us a program that will help people. And I will do—I want—

Kennedy: Sure. Yeah.

President Johnson: [with Kennedy acknowledging] —you don’t have to equivocate. You can say that whatever the resolution was that established the Appalachia study, that the President will approve so far as this is concerned. I wouldn’t get it in the paper. I would do it as you say confidential, because I don’t want to [Hubert] Humphrey of the iron range and 40 more. But let’s take one of them at a time. And my second one would be yours. And I’m not doing that for Eddie Boland; I didn’t know Eddie Boland’s against it. I never heard of it. I didn’t know you talked to Bobby. I just saw this ticker that came across the desk where a man in New England is raising hell and I remembered I told you at Palm Springs to go on make your speech and make your statement and get your nose under the tent. And if it worked all right here that we would give serious consideration to it there. Because I have a—

Kennedy: That’s all that, I mean, we could hope for. That’s entirely reasonable [unclear].

President Johnson: I have a—I have a moral obligation and I have a stronger feeling for the Massachusetts and New Hampshire and Vermont crowd than I do for Ohio. [laughs] And Rhodes because Rhodes gave them hell up out there and these boys were pretty wonderful to me and old Phil [unclear name], you know, in Vermont. Nobody ever thought you would carry those—that country.

So if anybody has got any troubles I want to help them. But you just—I’d just tell them, "It’s my own idea. And I think I know what I’m talking about. And I’m going to introduce this resolution--we’re going to do it--so let’s us don’t get off of the reservation on the principle and let’s make a success of this one and then they’ll help make a success of ours."

Kennedy: That’s fine. I’ll see what we can do.

President Johnson: It’s going to be troublesome, and I don’t know how many votes--they think they’ve got the votes to carry--but nobody in Massachusetts ought to be against this or any other place if they want it.

Kennedy: Good. All right, I’ll do it.

President Johnson: OK.

Kennedy: Thanks, Mr. President.

• 1. At the time of this call, Kennedy had recently turned 33 and Johnson was 56.
• 2. Springfield Armory in Western Massachusetts was the nation's oldest armory. http://www.nps.gov/spar/historyculture/springfield-armory-nhs-on-line-hi....
• 3. Boland was referring to people losing their jobs if the Springfield Armory closed.

WH6507-01-8307

In this call, President Johnson asks Judge Thurgood Marshall to be Solicitor General to replace Archibald Cox, who was planning to resign his post and return to his position at Harvard University's Law School. In 1961, President Kennedy had appointed, Marshall, at the time Chief Counsel for the NAACP, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Johnson said he had been considering the offer for weeks and laid out a number of reasons for it, among them that "I want to do this job that [Abraham] Lincoln started and I want to do it the right way" and that "I want to be the first president that really goes all the way." While also carefully clarifying that he was not making any promises about future positions, Johnson also made it clear that he wanted to groom Marshall for "something better," almost certainly a reference to the likelihood of a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Two years later, Johnson would indeed nominate Marshall to the Supreme Court to replacing the outgoing Associate Justice Tom C. Clark.

Johnson's persuasion worked. Marshall accepted the position on the spot and in August 1965 became the first African American Solicitor General of the United States.

In his 1969 oral history interview for the LBJ Library, Marshall recalled this conversation:

He called one day, around this time [July] I think, and I was up in the judges' dining room at the courthouse. My bailiff came up and tapped me on the shoulder. I said, "Fred, what in the world is wrong?" I mean, he's not supposed to bother us at lunch. He was as red as a beet. I said, "What's wrong, Fred?" He said, "The President wants to speak to you. He's on the phone!" I said, "The President of what?" "The President of the United States!" So he had held an elevator, and I went down. Sure enough he was on there. We chatted for about two or three minutes, and he said, "I want you to be my Solicitor General." I said, "Sir?" We chatted about it, and I said, "Well, Mr. President, I'll have to think this over." He said, "Well, go ahead, but don't tell a living soul." I said, "I assume that means nobody but my wife?" He said, "Yes, that's what I mean by nobody." He said, "Take all the time you want." I said, "Very well, sir." He hung up, and I hung up.

I went home and talked to my wife and we discussed the problems, because one was a lifetime job to trade in for a job at the beckoning of one person. Secondly, it was a $4500 cut in salary. Third, the living expenses in Washington would be twice what I was paying in New York. So she said okay. We kept thinking about it, and the next day the phone rang. He was on the phone again. I said, "Well, Mr. President, you said I had all Thurgood Marshall the time I needed." He said, "You had it." I said, "Okay." I went down the next morning, and I started telling him these things. He said, "You don't have to tell me. I can tell you everything including what you've got in your bank account. I'm still asking you to make the sacrifice." We talked for quite a while, and I said, "Okay with me."

B: Did he explain to you why he wanted you as opposed to just somebody else?

M: He said he wanted, number one, he wanted me in his Administration. Number two, he wanted me in that spot for two reasons. One, he thought I could handle it. Secondly, he wanted people--young people--of both races to come into the Supreme Court Room, as they all do by the hundreds and thousands, and somebody to say, "Who is that man up there with that swallow tail coat on arguing," and somebody to say, "He's the Solicitor General of the United States." Somebody will say, "But he's a Negro!" He wanted that image, number one.

Number two, he thought that he would like to have me as his representative before the Court. The other thing which goes through every conversation we had from then on--he would say at least three or four times, "You know this has nothing to do with any Supreme Court appointment. I want that distinctly understood. There's no quid pro here at all. You do your job. If you don't do it, you go out. If you do it, you stay here. And that's all there is to it."

B: He made it clear this did not mean that you would eventually get a Supreme Court  appointment?

M: Over and over again. He made the announcement in the East Room, and it was very funny when I went in. The press knew nothing about any of this. When I went in he first said that I would come behind Mrs. Johnson, and then he said, "You come and go in right side-by-side with me at the door." We went in together. A murmur went around the press boys, and I found out afterwards that the question they were asking was, "Who has resigned from the Supreme Court?" He made the announcement and then we had the swearing in, and that was that.1

Editorial note: Thurgood Marshall's side of the conversation is difficult to hear.

President Johnson: Yes?

White House Operator: Judge Thurgood Marshall in New York on 9-0.

President Johnson: All right, [unclear]. OK, take this, will you?

White House Operator: Yes, sir.

President Johnson: Hello?

Thurgood Marshall: Yes, sir?

President Johnson: Judge, how are you?

Marshall: Fine, sir.

President Johnson: I have a rather big problem that I wanted to talk to you about.

Marshall: Right.

President Johnson: I want you to give it some real thought because it's something that I have thought about for weeks and I think that we can't think of how it affects us personally. We've got to think about the world--

Marshall: Right.

President Johnson: --and our country.

Marshall: Yes, sir.

President Johnson: And our government. And then ourselves way down at the bottom of the list. I want you to be my Solicitor General.

Marshall: Wow.

President Johnson: Now, you lose a lot. You lose security and you lose the freedom that you like. And you lose the philosophizing that you can do. And I'm familiar with all those things.

Marshall: The number one [unclear].

President Johnson: Well, you won't lose any. And I want you to do it for two or three reasons. One, I want the top lawyer in the United States representing me before the Supreme Court--

Marshall: [Unclear]--

President Johnson: --to be a negro.

Marshall: Oh.

President Johnson: And be a damn good lawyer that's done it before. That's--so, you have those peculiar qualifiations.

Marshall: [Unclear.]

President Johnson: Number two, I think it will do a lot for our image, abroad and at home, too, that this is the man that the whole government has to look to to decide whether it prosecutes a case or whether it goes up with a case, or whether it doesn't, and so on and so forth.

Marshall: Yeah.

President Johnson: Number three, I want you to have the experience and be in the picture. I'm not discussing anything else--

Marshall: Yeah.

President Johnson: --and I don't want to make any other commitments--

Marshall: Yes, sir.

President Johnson: --and I don't want to imply or bribe or mislead you.

Marshall: Right.

President Johnson: But I want you to have the training and the experience of being there day after day for the next few weeks anyway.

Marshall: Right.

President Johnson: Maybe the next few months if you could do it. Now, I've talked to Ramsey Clark^∇, whose father is on the Supreme Court.2

Marshall: Yeah [unclear].

President Johnson: And both of them have a high regard for you. I've talked to the Attorney General, Nick Katzenbach^∇.

Marshall: Right.

President Johnson: I've talked to you. Now, I haven't talked to anybody else. I don't want to talk to anybody else.

Marshall: Right, sir.

President Johnson: Nobody will ever know I talked to you. If you decide that you can do it, I think you ought to do it for the people of the world. I just think it will be--you've got a great job, you've got lots of security, but I don't think you'll lose any by this. And after you do it awhile, if there's not something better, which I would hope there would be, that you would be more amenable to, there'll be security for you because I'm going to be here for quite awhile.3

Marshall: That's right. That's right.

President Johnson: But I want to do this job that [Abraham] Lincoln started and I want to do it the right way.

Marshall: Well, could I have a day or so?

President Johnson: Yes, yes. You can have all the time you want. And you think it over, and you evaluate it, and--

Marshall: Right.

President Johnson: This is a non-political job. It just determines what goes before that court and then you present it, at least all you want to and then have other people--Archie Cox will be going back to Harvard; he could stay. I could ask him to stay. But I want this man to . . . I think you could see what I'm looking at. 

Marshall: [Unclear.]

President Johnson: And I want to be the first president that really goes all the way.

Marshall: I think that's wonderful.

President Johnson: But I don't want anybody to be able to clip me from behind. I want to do it on merit.

Marshall: Right.

President Johnson: I want to do it without regard to politics. I want to do it without any regard to votes, because I never--I don't want any votes. I'm not looking for votes. I've had the votes. I had all the votes when I needed them.4

Marshall: That's right.

President Johnson: I had 15 million. And all I want to do is serve my term and do it well. But I also want to do something else. I want to leave my mark and I want to see that justice is done. And you can be a symbol there, that you can't ever be where you are.

Marshall: The answer's "yes."

President Johnson: Well, it's got to be.

Marshall: [Unclear] yes.

President Johnson: It's got to be.

Marshall: I appreciate it, Mr. President, I really do.

President Johnson: Any day or two you can come down, why, you just get on a plane and come down here and let my people know. Just call Jack Valenti here at the White House and we'll make the appropriate arrangement.

Marshall: All right, sir. I could . . . the only time I'm stuck--I'm stuck [unclear] on Friday, but I could--if either one of those would be better for you, or Monday.

President Johnson: Well, I expect to be better Monday or Tuesday. I'm going to be home on Friday. I'm going home Friday afternoon.5

Marshall: Yeah.

President Johnson: I'll be here this Wednesday. I'll be here Thursday and Friday, but I'll leave after lunch. Then I'll be there until probably Monday afternoon. I'll be back here Tuesday. What about Tuesday?

Marshall: Tuesday would be fine.

President Johnson: We'll just--now, you just forget this.

Marshall: All right.

President Johnson: And let me talk to you about it in detail and we'll work it out and . . . you don't know, I've thought about it for weeks.

Marshall: [Unclear] I'm so appreciative to be able to help.

President Johnson: Well, you can because you live such a life and they've gone over you with a fine-toothed comb and they could never use anything about you to thwart us. And we're on our way now.

Marshall: Wonderful!

President Johnson: And we're going to move.

Marshall: Right. Well, Tuesday would be fine if it's all right with you.

President Johnson: All right, that'll be fine. You have any idea what time you'd like to meet?

Marshall: Any time, sir.

President Johnson: Well, what about 11:00 in the morning?

Marshall: Eleven o'clock would be fine.

President Johnson: Thank you. Bye.

Marshall: Thank you, sir. Right.

• 1. Transcript, Thurgood Marshall Oral History Interview I, 7/10/69, by T. H. Baker, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
• 2. Thomas C. Clark was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1949 to 1967.
• 3. Johnson was hinting that he intended to nominate Marshall to the Supreme Court at some point in the future, something he said explicitly in a conversation with John Kenneth Galbraith a little under two weeks later. See Conversation WH6507-05-8362.
• 4. Johnson is referring to his landslide win over Republican Barry Goldwater in the November 1964 presidential election.
• 5. Johnson is referring to a visit to the LBJ Ranch near Johnson City, Texas.

WH6507-02-8311-8312-8313

Martin Luther King, Jr.: Hello?

President Johnson: Yes?

King: Yes, President Johnson?

President Johnson: Yes.

King: This is Martin King.

President Johnson: Yes.

King: How do you do, sir?

President Johnson: Fine.

King: Fine. [I’m] glad to hear your voice.

President Johnson: Thank you.

King: I was ve[ry] . . . I was calling because we are very concerned about the [William] McCulloch amendment in the House, and I want to get your advice on this and see what we can do to really block this serious development which will stand in the way of everything we’ve tried to get in the voting bill. I talked with the Attorney General [Nicholas Katzenbach^∇] earlier this morning, and he had some concerns about the possible closeness of the vote. We are very much concerned about it because this would be a very serious setback. I’m sure you’re familiar with the the ramifications of this.

President Johnson: Yes, I, if I can speak to you in confidence. I don’t want to . . I don’t want to be in the position of trying to influence or pressure anyone, but—

King: Sure, of course.

President Johnson: I’d be glad to. All right, I think that we are confronted with the realistic problem that we have faced all through the years, a combination of the South and the Republicans. The Republicans have got new leadership. They have kicked out [Charles] Halleck, and there is a great challenge to that leadership between [Gerald] Ford^∇ and a fellow named Melvin Laird^∇ of Wisconsin who is [Barry] Goldwater^∇’s choice to be chairman of the platform committee. Those people have got a substitute which is a very dangerous one. They tried in the Senate to get a big fight started over which way to repeal the poll tax. There were two ways, and we . . . [Nicholas] Katzenbach felt one of them would be constitutional because he thought he could get it in Alabama and Mississippi and Louisiana and Texas by challenging them in the courts, and he couldn’t get it in Vermont. So, if he had a blanket repeal it would all go out, but if he had an individual thing, he could get rid of it. I told him to get rid of the poll tax any way in the world he could constitutionally without nullifying the whole law. I didn’t want them to say I wrote a bad law that wouldn’t stand up. So they got some of them started over there, and they got a challenge to it, and some of the boys wanted to go a little further and help a little more. Really, it was the best judgment we had. Instead of helping more, it would help less.

But anyway, finally we got it solved in the Senate, and it was acceptable. It worked out. Now it got over to the House, and they’ve tried every way in the world they could. The first thing they did is they went to the forces that are on our side and said well, you’ve got to go . . . You’ve got to repeal the poll tax outright, which means you repeal Vermont. Vermont is not a discriminatory tax., Therefore, the court wouldn’t hold it, and you wouldn’t do any good. But they got McCormack and they got the real friend that we have to go all the way, hoping that that would get the job done for them later on and would hold up the legislation.

I think the Civil Rights leadership is coming around now to see the problem that we all have. If they don’t have much confidence in the Attorney General, they’re going to be in trouble anyway because he’s the man we have to try to rely on to help us. I picked him for that problem because he and [John] Doar and the others had demonstrated that they had the confidence of the leadership. But we got back then to the big question. What do . . . How do we avoid this combination? Judge Smith held it for a while, and we had to file a 21 day rule. There’s been nobody really around here shoving it. I’ve done the best I could, but they’re hitting me on different sides, and the press is kind of . . . Vietnam or the Dominican Republic or some mistake here or some mistake there. I’m getting kind of cut up a little bit. Wilkins is having a national convention, and you were somewhere else. I called George Meany to ask him to help. He’d gone to Europe. I called [Walter] Reuther. He won’t be back until August. I called Joe Rauh and said, “For God’s sakes you try to get in here before it’s too late.” We [are] all off celebrating and doing something else, and they’re going to put a package together that I can see forming. And I called [Andrew] Biemiller, and I got him to agree to go send some, and they got a wire sent from Roy [Wilkins] to all the Republicans.

But the Republicans are going to hold pretty well. They’re not going to . . . They’re going to quit the nigras. They will not let a nigra vote for them. They just . . . every time they get a chance to help out a little they’ll blow it. They could help out here, and they could elect some good men in suburban districts and in cities, but they haven’t got that much sense. That’s why they are disintegrating as a party. So they’re going to wind up being pretty solid. Then they’re going to get the southerners, and they put the two together. It’ll probably be within ten votes of counting. Now, when I went up with my message, I could have probably passed it by 75. But it’s deteriorating. The other day they almost beat my rental . . . my rent subsidy which is very important to the working groups and the poor people because—

King: [unclear.]

President Johnson: —When a man pays 25 percent of his income for rent . . . We’ll say a man makes 200 [dollars] a month in New York City working in a bakery shop. Why, he pays $50 a month rent, and his rent costs him maybe 67 [dollars]. The government will come in after 25 percent which is $50 of his 200. They’ll pay the other $17.50 themselves. It’s the most modern idea we’ve had, and it takes care of lots of families. But they’ve beaten me . . . I beat them 208 to 202, but I had to work all night the night before. We called 90 people, and it was just a struggle of a lifetime. The labor people who were supposed to be supporting it, they were off, and I couldn’t get them to help.

What they’ve done is just kind of taken a victory, Doctor, and not been concerned. Now Smith comes out and says my bill has had a lot of venom in it, and I have a great hatred for the South, and I’m like a rattlesnake. I’m trying to punish them and all that kind of stuff. So he gets the Congressmen from the 13 old Confederate states, and he puts 100 with 150 Republicans. That gives him 250, and 250 is a good majority of 435. So we get some of them away from him. I’ll get a few from Texas away from him, and we’ll get a few from Tennessee away from him, the Confederate states . . . But he’ll still get 70, 80 of them, and unless we can pull some of the Republicans away, why we’re in trouble, and we’re dangerous. Even if we do, we get a bill in conference.

Now when it gets in conference with this House insisting on repealing (blanket) the poll tax, repealing it in blank. We think the Court would not uphold us in that. We think that’s unconstitutional. We’ve said so, but we can’t avoid it because our own friends have bought it, and they want to be stronger for the Negro than Nick Katzenbach is. So, we’ve got to pass it that way. Then it goes to conference. When it gets to conference you can’t, you can’t pass that way in the Senate because the Senate will not take it. They know that it’s unconstitutional, and they’ve got six year terms. They’re good lawyers, and they’re not going to vote for it. So they get in an argument, and that delays it, and maybe nothing comes out. But if something does come out, then you’ve got to go back to Judge Smith again, and you’ve got to get a rule from him, and he won’t give you a rule. He . . . So you’ve got to file a petition and take another 21 days.

Now the smart thing to do—if we had people that would all stay with us and follow leadership and get in and when the ball goes through the center or around the end, [they] would follow it—would be to get some language that the Leadership Conference would agree on. Go in and see McCormack and our friends and say, now, let’s take this language that the Senate will accept without it going to conference so we can go on and get this bill passed and start registering our people and get them ready to vote next year. That’s what we need to do. But we . . . They’re playing us, and we’re not parliamentary-smart enough.

If you want to be honest now, you ask[ed] for my advice, I’m just telling you. You all are either going to have confidence in me and in Katzenbach, or you ought to pick some leader you do have and inform him. Now, I started out on this voting bill last November right after the election. I called them down and told them that I was going to do it. I called you down here and told you what I was going to do. I went before the Congress and made a speech and asked them to work every weekend. Then we all went off, and they haven’t had any heat except from me. They’re getting tired of the heat from me. They don’t like for me to be asking for rent one day and poverty the next day and education the next day and voting rights the next day. They know I can’t defeat them out there in their district in Michigan, or some other place. So I’m just fighting the battle the best I can. I think I’ll win it, but it’s going to be close, and it’s going to be dangerous. I have notified the labor people. I’ve asked Lee White to talk to you and talk to Roy and talk to any of them that call him . . . Whitney Young.I talked to a fellow named Proctor from New York in here today that . . . with the Council of Churches. I tell them all that this is a very dangerous thing. I’ve been at this business 35 years.

I got a wonderful response on my speech at Howard. I’ve had it printed. I’ve sent it out to all the leaders over the country. I’ve got them writing their Congressmen and their Senators, but I cannot influence the Republicans. Now the people that can influence the Republicans are men like the local chapters of CORE or NAACP or your group in New York and in Illinois, downstate Illinois, and in Pennsylvania and in Ohio and these states where you got a good many Negro voters. And you’ve got to say to them, “Now we’re not Democrats. We’re going to vote for the man that give[s] us freedom. We don’t give a damn whether it’s Abraham Lincoln or Lyndon Johnson. We’re going to know, and we’re not—We’re smart enough to know, and we’re here watching you. And we want to see how you go through that tally vote, and we want to see how you answer on that roll call--Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, California.”

And do it. Now that’s what we need. We need it Wednesday and Thursday and Friday and maybe, maybe even Saturday if they run over. And I told Joe Rauh that, and I said, “Now, don’t come back to me after it’s defeated and say well the President didn’t give us leadership because I’m sounding warning.” UP [United Press] put out a story Sunday. That story says that there will be less than a dozen votes difference. Now, they counted a good many Southerners voting with us. We think we’ll lose some of those dozen that they give us. So . . . but we’re going to try to pick up some more Republicans. That’s where you’ve got to pick them up. No use trying to pick up a fellow from Mississippi, Alabama, Virginia, [or] those places. We’ll pick up one or two from Florida. We’ll pick up something from Texas. But the place you’ve got to pick them up is Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New York. You’ll get a fellow like [John] Lindsay. He’s running for mayor, and he’s going to be with us. But you won’t get a dozen Republicans, and we’ve got to get . . . We ought to get 25 of them, or they ought to be defeated.

King: Well, I duly appreciate your [?niceness] but I’m . . . I’ve been ] very much concerned about this. I have [a surreal/] job first of [unclear] the South. I guess this amendment came out before I really realized the extent of it and the real danger of it, and I just [unclear] equaled my [?espousals] going back down into the Black Belt of Alabama [unclear—and other cities] that are trying to register and can’t register. It means that there’s a lot of demonstration on our hands that we really can’t control. This is my great concern. It gives a psychologically very [unclear], and I see the voting bill as our way out.

President Johnson: It is.

King: And this is why I have taken the position that I’ve taken now. Something should be done to avoid a long battle in the conference between the House and the Senate because this again complicates the problem. This makes it much more difficult for us to control the work we have going on in . . . that we have in Lowndes [County] today. Our work is in 84 counties now, and the whole summer [unclear] . . . the whole summer program’s predicated on passing the voting bill, which we all have been involved with. [If] we get bogged down for the rest of the summer, there’s a danger of an amendment which keeps [unclear] automatically triggered in there. This would mean we have a very complicated problem on our hands.

President Johnson: We sure do. We’re back—We’ve lost a good deal of the gain we made last November. I don’t know. I have the problem . . . You know my practical political problem in the Senate. The Attorney [General]—Bobby Kennedy and Teddy were for the bill, the blanket repeal of the poll tax—I told the Attorney General to repeal it any way in the world he could as quickly as he could, that I would like for them to vote at 18, and I would like for him to repeal the poll tax. He came up with his lawyers, and he says that best way to repeal it is to establish discrimination. I can establish it in all the states but Vermont. But they’ll bring the case on Vermont, and that’ll be the case that they’ll take to the Court. They will not hold that it’s discriminatory in Vermont because it’s not. It doesn’t even apply to the poor.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: And he said I’ll lose it there. Now these boys are not good lawyers, and they just . . . It won’t stand up. So, I have to take his judgment. But I didn’t get out and quarrel about it one way or the other, but the Senate finally followed the Attorney General. They understood it, and even the boys themselves did. And that passed the Senate.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: But while they were talking about it, McCormack was afraid that somebody would be stronger for the Negro than he was. So he picked up the Kennedy argument they had made in the Senate over in the House. So he came out red hot for a complete repeal. So he and the Attorney General are on opposite sides now. But the Attorney General has got no choice because the Speaker is going to put it in there so that’s going to be a different bill from the Senate bill.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: So then if we beat off McCulloch . . . If we win with him, we[‘ve] still got one bill in the Senate and one in the House. That’s what the Southerners that are smart parliamentarians want us to do. They want your wife to go one direction and you to go the other.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: Then the kids don’t know which one to follow. [King chuckles] So they’ve got to . . . They’ve got that happening. Then we go to a conference. Suppose we get them all in a room, and you come and talk to them, and everybody else talks to them and say, “Please get your agreement. We’re willing to follow the Attorney General.” You get them agreed on it. Then they’ve got to go back to Judge Smith to get him to give a rule to get the conference report of it. That just makes it we ought to never have to do that because he won’t give it. So then we’ve got to notify him and then give him 21 days notice. They want to get out of here Labor Day, and they plan for that time. Now they’ve been doing that for 35 years that I’ve been here, and I’ve been watching them do it. The only times that we’ve beat them was when I beat them in ’57 and when I beat them in ’60 and when I beat them in ’63. This year we’ve got to beat them again, but that’s what they’re doing. You can’t beat them unless you know what they’re doing.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: And that’s about it.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: So I would say there are about two things that ought to be done. You ought to have the strongest man that can speak for you—and the most knowledgeable legislative-wise—authorized to speak and authorized to tell people like the Speaker what you want. And you don’t want this fight going on, and you ought to find out who you believe you can trust, if you can trust me, if you can trust the Attorney General. If you can’t trust us, why, trust Teddy Kennedy or whoever you want to trust and then get behind them and see that they take the thing because I’ll give every bit, ounce of energy and ability of any that I have to passing the most effective bill that can be written.

King: Well, I certainly appreciate this, Mr. President because as I said, I [unclear—, Lyndon,/, the amendment, I am confident that you] [unclear] the whole voting bill. [unclear] would be [unclear] Alabama.

President Johnson: You sure have and . . .

King: [unclear.]

President Johnson: Well, you helped, I think, [to] dramatize and bring it to a point where I could go before the Congress in that night session, and I think that was one of the most effective things that had ever happened, but you had worked for months to help create the sentiment that supported it.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: Now the trouble is that fire has gone out.

King: That’s right.

President Johnson: We’ve got a few coals on it. And we’ve got to put some more cedar back on it and put a little coal oil on it.

King: Yeah. Well, I’ll get right to work, and I’ll be talking to Roy and some of the others [unclear]

President Johnson: Roy sent them a wire yesterday, but they just put a wire in their file. What they’ve got to do is have you and Roy and Whitney Young and Phil Randolph and [James] Farmer and some of these fellows, any of you that can work together, to come sit in a hotel room and talk to your people and get your reports and watch it for a day or two and be able to talk to men like Speaker McCormack and like the Majority Leader [Mike Mansfield^∇] and tell them what you want them to do. Because this morning the Vice President, now he is very, very strong for you, and his heart and soul is in this. Now he said, “Please men, let’s don’t go to conference and let Judge Smith keep this another twenty-one days. Let’s don’t get into a fight among ourselves. The Attorney General is right and let’s get language. The Leadership Conference is ready to go along on modified language, and I’ve got it here in my pocket.”

But McCormack said, “Oh no, they’ll do it when we—do it and then they’ll come in [and] blame me, and I’m going to go for the strongest thing I can go for so nobody can blame me.” I said what are you going to do when the Court holds it’s no good and throws it out? Where are you going to be? Well, that’ll be down the road a long time from now. So that’s where we are.

King: Yes.

President Johnson: So I think . . . My recommendation would be that you get the best lawyer that you and Roy and the rest of you have and get him to talk to Katzenbach, and if he has confidence in Katzenbach, follow Katzenbach’s legal judgment and come in here and follow my political judgment and see if we can’t get a bill passed.

King: OK. Well, this has been very sound, and I certainly appreciate it very much. Now there’s one other part that I wanted to mention to you because it has, again, concerned me a great deal. In the last few days, [unclear—in fact/back to] last week I was making a speech in Virginia where I made a statement concerning the Vietnam situation, and there have been a number of press statements about it, both from a reporting and editorial point of view, and I wanted to say to you that this is in no way an attempt to engage in a destructive criticism of the policy of the administration. I was speaking merely as [?innocent] [unclear—minister of the gospel?/a [person] interested in the gospel].

As you are, I’m gravely concerned about the problem of war and the possibilities of nuclear annihilation, and I think that the press unfortunately lifted it out of context and made it appear that I made a statement saying that we should unilaterally withdraw the troops from Vietnam, which I thought [unclear—was] very unreasonable and that the Civil Rights Movement should take on the whole peace struggle of foreign policy issue [unclear] part of this whole struggle. This was totally out of context, and I felt that this would eventually come to your attention. I wanted you to know exactly what I said, which is merely a statement that all citizens of good will [unclear] be concerned about the problem that faces our world, the problems of war and [unclear]. [unclear] have a debate on these issues. And I was just speaking generally in that area, and many of these [unclear] were [unclear—explicit in the] context. So, I just wanted to say that to you [unclear—convincingly/because] I felt that eventually they would come to your attention. [President Johnson attempts to interject.] I know the terrible burden and awesome responsibilities and decisions that you have to make are very complicated, and I didn’t want to add to the burdens because I know they’re very difficult.

President Johnson: Well, you, you, you’re very . . . helpful, and I appreciate it. I did see it. I was distressed. I do want to talk to you. I’d welcome a chance to review with you my problems and our alternatives there. And I not only know you have a right, [but] I think you have a duty as a minister and as a leader of millions of people to give them a sense of purpose and direction. I . . . You have an obligation to do that, and I’ll just welcome an opportunity to give you my views and problems I have because for 20 months I have . . . Well, the Republican leader who had a press conference this after noon. Ford demanded I bomb Hanoi.

King: [Unclear.]

President Johnson: I have tried to do my best to . . . I’ve lost about two hundred and sixty-four lives up to now, and I could lose two hundred and sixty-five thousand mighty easy. I’m trying to keep those zeroes down and at the same time not trigger a conflagration that would be worse if we pulled out. I can’t stay there and do nothing. Unless I bomb, they run me out right quick. That’s the only pressure we have, and if they’ll quit bombing, if they’ll quit coming in, if they’ll quit tearing up our roads and our highways and quit taking over our camps and bombing our planes and destroying them, well, we’ll quit the next day if they’ll just leave the folks alone, but they won’t do it. So the only pressure we can put on is to try to hold them back as much as we can by taking their bridges out, delaying them and taking out their ammunition dumps and destroying them, by taking out their radar stations that permit them to shoot down our planes. Now that’s what we’ve been doing. A good many people, including the military, think that’s not near enough, that I ought to do a lot more. I’ve tried to keep it to that so I won’t escalate it and get into trouble with China and with Russia, and I don’t want to be a warmonger. At the same time, if I didn’t do that, I’d stay it as long as I could the other way. I held up until February after I came in in November. I went from November to November, and from November to February. But they kept coming. They just kept coming, and I couldn’t stand it any longer. I had to get out or do it. Now I’m doing it with the restraint and with the best judgment that I know how.

King: [Unclear.]

President Johnson: If I pulled out, I think our commitments would be no good anywhere. I think that we’d immediately trigger a situation in Thailand that would be just as bad as it is in Vietnam. I think we’d be right back to the Philippines with problems. I think the Germans would be scared to death that our commitment to them was no good,and God knows what we’d have other places in the world. I think it’s the situation we had in Lebanon, I think it’s the situation we had in Formosa. I think it’s the situation we had in Greece and Turkey and Iran, and Truman and Eisenhower and none of these people allowed them to go in and take these peoples’ freedom away from them. And I’m trying . . . I didn’t get us into this. We got into it in ’54. Eisenhower and Kennedy were in it deep. There were 33,000 men out there when I came into the presidency. I don’t want to pull down the flag and come home running with my tail between my legs, particularly if it’s going to create more problems than I got out there, and it would according to all of our best judges. On the other hand, I don’t want to get us in war with China and Russia. So I’ve got a pretty tough problem, and I’m not all wise. I pray every night to get direction and judgment and leadership that permit me to do what’s right. But when you come in, I’ll just welcome a chance to have the Secretary of State talk to you, the Secretary of Defense or any of our people. I’ll give you all I know, and I appreciate very much your attitude and your desire to be helpful, and I know that is your desire, as it always has been in our dealings together.

King: Yes. Well, I certainly appreciate your position, and the breadth of your concern, I feel was . . . represents true leadership and true greatness. [unclear] and we all think it.

President Johnson: No . . .

King: I don’t think I’ve had the chance to thank you for what I consider the greatest leap that any President has made on the quest for civil rights. The [unclear] [?same for Vietnam] the depth, the grasp, and the sensitivity and everything [unclear] Howard [unclear].

President Johnson: Well, as soon as I have some new copies printed, I’ll send you some of them. [I] got one with your picture in it. I’ve got one of our leadership meetings here. [unclear comment by King.] I put some pictures in the printed copy. I’ll send you some.

King: Well, I [unclear]—

President Johnson: If you’re up this way anyway, you let me know and talk about it. I hope that you do talk to Roy and you all see what can be done quick because tomorrow’s Thursday, [unclear comment by King] and this thing will be decided Thursday and Friday.

King: Well, I’ll get right to work tonight.

President Johnson: OK. You let me know, and if I’m not available . . . in a security meeting or anything call Lee White.

King: All right, Mr. [President]—

President Johnson: Anytime you have any problems, call him anyway.

King: Thank you.

President Johnson: You know that, don’t you?

King: Fine, of course.

President Johnson: All right, OK.

King: All right.

President Johnson: Bye.

King: Bye.

WH6507-03-8326

President Johnson: --ought to just--how when we go with [Thurgood] Marshall, how we get [Constance] Motley at the same time, without leaking Marshall to anybody? Now, is there anyway that you could check with the senators?

Nicholas Katzenbach: Yes, sir.

President Johnson: And say, "These two judges . . . and that if there's any vacancies anytime on the circuit, would you be . . . did I understand you to say that you would not object to Motley?"

Katzenbach: Mm-hmm.

President Johnson: So that we wouldn't expose the Marshall thing until we've got it wrapped.

Katzenbach: All right.

President Johnson: But we could simultaneously do it. And I'll tell you why I'm--Carl Rowan is resigning.1

Katzenbach: Yeah.

President Johnson: And I want to try to show that I am letting one negro go, but I am hiring another one.

Katzenbach: Mm-hmm.

President Johnson: Do you follow me?

Katzenbach: Right.

President Johnson: Now, could you do that without his getting suspicious? Ramsey [Clark] told me that he wanted this woman as a judge once before, but they got into the city [unclear] or the borough president or something--

Katzenbach: The city-borough thing. And I don't know whether that would affect her now. I wouldn't think it would for a court of appeals. But I can't [unclear]. I could do it without [unclear].

President Johnson: Try to do it today now because I need to do it, and--

Katzenbach: I'll do it this afternoon [unclear].

President Johnson: Now don't, for God's sakes, let the other get out.2

Katzenbach: I will not let that get out.

President Johnson: Because I don't want to get into that trouble. It might, if something did happen, then I'd really be ruined. But I want to be courteous to him and I don't want to be tricky with him. At the same time, I don't want to ruin myself on the other problem. You can see that, don't you?

Katzenbach: I see the problem, right.

President Johnson: So, you just see that she is not objectionable to any of them. And then we'll take--now, has she been checked by the ABA [American Bar Association]?

Katzenbach: She was checked for the district vacancy. She has not been checked for the court of appeals. I don't know whether they completed that check or if it was called off before they completed it. I think it was called off before they completed it. They said she couldn't serve as a borough [unclear].

President Johnson: All right. Now, could we--is it conceivable that they wouldn't qualify her? 

Katzenbach: Umm . . . it's conceivable, but highly unlikely on the court of appeals.

President Johnson: I would--we could announce our intention to have it cleared, couldn't we?

Katzenbach: Yeah, I'd have to . . . yeah, I'd have to check that.

President Johnson: This other thing won't hold a month or a week or whatever time it takes.

Katzenbach: Oh, no.

President Johnson: But, now, the [Anthony] Celebrezze^∇ thing--didn't we check Celebrezze out last year?

Katzenbach: We checked him out informally. We never did a--got a formal opinions on him at all. That's going to take a little more--a little time.

President Johnson: Well, I wish you'd call somebody because when I get that to the Cabinet office and he gets to thinking about it, and we're not going to be able to wait. Now, what's wrong with our announcing our intention, and if they find him disqualified, then considering the merits of it then?

Katzenbach: Well, they don't like that because they think if your intentions are known, they don't get honest evaluations from lawyers because they think that the probability is you're going through and therefore all the lawyers will fall in. 

President Johnson: Now, I thought that they told us when I considered him for the court of appeals for the District of Columbia, which I had offered him, I thought we'd made that steady, and I thought they told us that they would clear him, but they weren't enthusiastic.

Katzenbach: That was the informal opinion that I got from the chairman that it probably [unclear]. 

President Johnson: Well, would you just get him to formalize it as quick as you can?

Katzenbach: Yes, I will. [Unclear.]

President Johnson: I've got his successor, probably appearing, and he'll be surfaced and there'll be speculation about it.

Katzenbach: Yeah.

President Johnson: And I don't want to hold up and hurt him as he goes out. And I've got the senators' recommendations of it. As I recall, both of them have recommended him.

Katzenbach: That's right, yes.

President Johnson: Now, we don't have to touch anything else. We've got a vacancy.

Katzenbach: Mm-hmm.

President Johnson: And he wants it. Has he told you he wants it?

Katzenbach: Yeah.

President Johnson: All right. Now, then, so all you need to do is you get this fellow on the phone and tell him that they told you this, but that the Cabinet officer is so unusual that it's liable to break any moment and we want to hold it, but please confirm it to you.

Katzenbach: I'll try.

President Johnson: OK, my friend.

Katzenbach: All right.

President Johnson: How's your [voting rights] bill going? 

Katzenbach: We're going to have a vote in about five minutes. I think we're in very easily. [Speaking over President Johnson] We have over 220 Democrats.

President Johnson: Would you call over here to Jack Valenti or somebody and dictate the strongest statement you can, and there's words that every negro can understand about the House passing the bill and just appealing to the Conference to act wisely and promptly?

Katzenbach: Right. Right.

President Johnson: So that I can get that through?

Katzenbach: [Unclear] for the whole passage?

President Johnson: Well, I would dictate the statement after you get through with your critical vote and let them type it and then they'll get it to us on the plane and we can release it when the bill's passed. 

Katzenbach: All right. 

President Johnson: But you dictate as warm a statement as you can.

Katzenbach: All right. Thanks.

• 1. Carl Rowan was the director of the United States Information Agency and at the time the highest ranking  African American in the federal government.
• 2. Johnson is referring to his intention to nominate Thurgood Marshall to be Solicitor General.