The operators connect the call.
President Johnson: Max?
Maxwell Taylor: Mr. President, yes, sir.
President Johnson: I got a little labor of love. I think this fellow [Eugene] McCarthy is a[n] intellectual and one of our problems. And he keeps saying that he can see no reason for the bombing and no case for the bombing.
Taylor: Yes.
President Johnson: And I would like you to do your homework a little bit and try to get such speculations as you need from the CIA∇ and from the Defense people and from [General William] Westmoreland's people. I'd sure take that letter, cable I got from [Henry Cabot] Lodge∇ yesterday, the revised one. The first one he said it'd be over this year, and we told him to get that out, we don't want to be predicting it, so he revised it. Get Lodge's cable and then get your best military planner over there. You might want to take him with you. I don't know who you could take. Maybe take somebody like [General Andrew] Goodpaster who's been briefing folks, and go to see McCarthy and make the case for bombing. He says there's no case and nobody's every given him any reasons for it, and he doesn't understand it, and he doesn't know why, and so on and so forth. And I think that you can show him that if the boys just hunker up in these enclaves like a jackass in a hailstorm and let them shoot at them, why they're going to be a helluva shape.
Taylor: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: And if they don't try some way to make it hard on them and stop them, why they're going to kill a bunch of American boys that oughtn't to die.
Taylor: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: And that the only way you can do that is to try to stop the trucks when they come down the road.
Taylor: Yes.
President Johnson: And try to stop the oil that goes into them, and try to keep them busy fixing the bridges, and try to hold them up for a few weeks.
Taylor: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: And try to make them pay enough through attrition that they'll finally say, "Well, we'd better talk." And then show them that that's what we're trying to do. And point out to him--he's pretty anti-CIA--but just point out to him that John McCone told us last April that we just had to not take a 100 sorties or 200 sorties, but we had to take everything we had and unload it right away on all these areas because the American people wouldn't stand still for over 6-8 months of bombing.
Taylor: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: I read his memo yesterday, and it just proves it's right, the way they're raising hell, they're breaking ranks up on the Hill because of bombing.
Taylor: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: But just say, "Now, every time we lose a $3 million plane--we lost 3 of them yesterday, and we got pilots back, at least we got 2 out of the 3--but every time we lose those $3 million plane we may have saved ourselves 308 Marines."
Taylor: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: "And we have proceeded on the theory that we use a little steel and a little hydraulics and a little electric system instead of a human. And we think that they've got 100,000 people kept busy because of what we've done."
Taylor: Yes.
President Johnson: "We think they might have twice as many people down there. We don't think we ought to match them man-for-man, and we're not to match them man-for-man. We've either got to put some ships or planes, because that's all we've got besides man-for-man."
Taylor: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: [with Taylor acknowledging] "And that's what we've tried to do. And here are the ten reasons why I, as a military man and as a political man, think that it is essential." And just say, "Now, I went along with the [bombing] pause because all these people said from May until December that if you pause long enough to give us a chance that we can bring them to the peace table."
And the Russians said it. And Bill Fulbright∇ came to me and said it. And [Mike] Mansfield∇ came to me and said it. And [George] McGovern∇ came to me and said it. Everybody that this Russian ambassador [Anatoly Dobrynin∇] talked to came to me and said it. After he talked to Mac Bundy his blood pressure went to 208 and he said he's got it all worked out. And then Bob McNamara felt the same way. And finally got to [Dean] Rusk∇, and Rusk had doubts about it and we held it up three times, and then Rusk got up and said, "Well, I think so." And I still thought that we were just being a plain, damn fool to take off our pressure and do this. But everybody else thought otherwise, and finally they told me they'd talked to Max Taylor and that he would say that if we're every going to have a pause, that he wasn't urging it or recommending it, but it would do a minimum amount of damage during Christmas when we had bad weather, and so forth.
Now, I did, and I finally, on my own, without anybody being responsible, concluded that I had listened to this belly-aching so long, by so many, so frequently--it took so much of my time, every day with the Fulbrights and the Mansfields and the [Vance] Hartke's and the McCarthys and the rest of them coming in, that I just say, "Put up or shut up." So I told them to go tell that Russian ambassador, give him plenty of advance notice, and tell him we not only he'd have his 12 days, we'd have his 20 days. "And, now, let's see you get busy and let's see what they do." Well, they couldn't pee a drop. I think [Alexander] Shelepin had tried.1 I just don't think he can deliver. I think they wanted to try to work out something, but I just don't think they could.
Taylor: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: [with Taylor acknowledging] To believe otherwise is just to believe that they are really determined to eat us up and they can't be trusted at all, and I rather think that's true. I think that anybody that treat [John F.] Kennedy like they did on missiles and lied to him about that, I don't think you can trust them a second.2 But I want to try to get along in the world.
So, anyway, I went ahead on that. And I didn't go for five days; I went for five weeks. And the very damn crowd, this same crowd now, that said "if you just give us 12 days. Just give us a chance." And Fulbright and [Wayne] Morse both had been out to dinner, and Averell [Harriman] had been to dinner. They had everyone in this town to dinner. I bet they had you to dinner, telling you what they'd do. And they had [McGeorge] Bundy to dinner, and all of them. And by God, we bought it lock, stock, and barrell, and we wound up as the British said about my clothes, with a big, fat hunk, chunk of nothing. That's the way we wound up.
But we oughtn't to be blamed now for warmongers because we did. We tried to extend the peace wand, and we know that the United Nations is not going to resolve anything, at least we don't think so. But they raised hell about the United Nations, so we're going to do that. Now, their record of prophecy and success is just about as poor as ours. They started out and said we've got to kill [Ngo Dinh] Diem∇, because he's no damn good and let's knock him off. And we did.3
Taylor: That's where it all started.
President Johnson: That's exactly where it started. And I just pled with them at the time, "Please don't do it." But that's where it started. And they knocked him off. And then, by God, they came along and said, "Well, you've got to have pacification. You've got no economic program," and so on and so forth. So we did what we could there. Then they said, "Well, you're not negotiating." I said, "Well, we'll talk to anybody--
[recording cuts off]
Robert McNamara∇: Mr. President--[unclear] had a flash message from CINCPAC∇ saying "Forces are ready and weather forecast favorable for strikes against targets 48 and [4]9." That's Haiphong and Hanoi POL.1 Wednesday after 1100 hours, which means 1100 H hours, which means 11 P.M. tonight. And I'd like go ahead and issue the authority if it's acceptable to you.
President Johnson: All right.
McNamara: I've talked to "Bus" [Earle Wheeler∇]. He agrees.
President Johnson: We got--
McNamara: I haven't talked to anybody else.
President Johnson: That comes quicker than I thought. I was hoping we could do it Friday.
McNamara: Well, it does mean . . . No, you're quite right. I told you yesterday--
President Johnson: Here's what we've got. We've got three things happening. We've got [George] Ball testifying before [William] Fulbright∇, Thursday.2 And that's bad. We've got [Charles] de Gaulle leaving Thursday, coming back from Moscow and wrapping up Thursday and leaving Friday morning.3 We've got my going into the Midwest on Thursday.4 Those three events are pretty important. I was going to talk to you about them this morning in connection with Thursday. And that's why I'm just thinking out loud now.
McNamara: Yes.
President Johnson: I just I want to review this. I don't think that we're in much position to say anything to these . . .
May I ask you this, Bob: what do you think . . . You're familiar with the historical battleship Maine.5 Now, what happens to our tanker there if we hit the same proposition? What's going to be their response?
McNamara: I'm not--let me say I'm not absolutely sure that there is any tanker there right at the moment. The first one didn't finish unloading within its alloted time, those seven days, as best we can tell. And it was to leave early in order to let the second one in, the first one leaving without finishing unloading and the second one due in today or last night their time. Now, I'm not absolutely positive there's one there today, but if one is there, the chances of hitting it are small. If we do hit it--
President Johnson: Now, that's where I want to get us both--
McNamara: I think it's really serious. I think it's serious.
President Johnson: Where you're sitting there, let's put you now in their position.
McNamara: Yeah. I think it's serious, Mr. President, but I think that we have told the Russians just as clearly as if we've put it in writing, that we have done everything possible to avoid antagonizing them in this military conflict. And I think while it would be serious and while we would have a very strong protest, I myself doubt that it would lead to any military action. As a matter of fact, the appraisals are that if we put a--if we mine the harbor and stop Soviet ships from coming in there it won't lead to military action. So if we hit the tanker I doubt that it would lead to military action. I, nonetheless, recognize it as a serious action, and I think we must do everything possible to avoid it.
I think it extremely unlikely that we could plan the operation so that weather and no tanker would coincide. As best we can tell, they're having difficulties moving POL out of Haiphong with the result that it takes longer to unload these vessels than it formerly did, and since they're sending three tankers a month in there, and since under best of circumstances it takes about seven days per tanker, you can see that the month's pretty full. And this third tanker, due in this month, apparently has been diverted to Shanghai because they didn't have enough time to unload at Haiphong. So the possibility of getting a coincidence of good weather and no tanker is damn small.
President Johnson: But you do there's a possibility today?
McNamara: Well, that's what the message says. No, I shouldn't say there's a po--I just don't know for sure that at the minute there's a tanker there. I could find out in a few hours, probably. If there isn't a tanker there today it's just sheer coincidence; it's the fact that the first one's moving out and the second one's moving in. So I don't want to give you the wrong impression. Probabilities are [that] there's a tanker there now.
President Johnson: All right, now, that is 11 our time, tonight?
McNamara: That is 11 P.M. tonight, our time.
President Johnson: Do you think of any other things we ought to do?
McNamara: No, I don't think so. I think we want--
President Johnson: Did you--what was your--what significance do you give [Dean] Rusk∇'s wire yesterday?
McNamara: I didn't put any particular significance on it.
President Johnson: I thought he was more or less trying to firm things up a little bit.
McNamara: Well, I thought that--
President Johnson: Saying to us to go ahead.
McNamara: Well, I thought so too, but I didn't--he didn't have any real doubts in his mind when he left, as best I could tell. He sort of wished we could put the problem behind us, but he didn't know how to do that, and under the circumstances thought we should go ahead, and I thought that was essentially what the wire said.
President Johnson: I think, now, what we've got to analyze very, very carefully--and we have, but before execute--I think we've got to say, "Do we get enough out of this for the price we're paying?"
McNamara: Yeah. Yeah.
President Johnson: Now, you can--the [Vance] Hartke's are all, they're starting their campaign tomorrow on the Senate floor, they're speaking.
A television can be heard in the background.
McNamara: Yeah. Well, [Walter] Lippmann's got an article this morning in the paper, same thing, on exactly that point.6 And I think the answer is that this is just a minor incident in the war. And it's almost an incident that you can't avoid taking. I don't see how you can go on fighting out there, Mr. President, without doing this today, to be absolutely frank with you. I don't think you can keep the morale of your troops up. I don't think you can keep the morale of the people in the country who support you up without doing this. We're at about that point.
Now, in addition to that, I myself believe it has military value, although I don't, for the minute, put the weight on it the [Joint] Chiefs [of Staff] do. But I don't put the cost on it that some in State do. I don't put the cost on it that George Ball does, for example. I don't believe any Soviet experts, including Tommy [Llewellyn] Thompson, put the cost on it that George Ball does.
President Johnson: What do you think we ought to do now with State?
McNamara: Well, assuming you wanted to do this, I'd be inclined to send out the execute order. I don't like to do these on a half-assed basis, and they do need some time to be absolutely sure that they have authority to do it so they take all the necessary precautions and preparations for the mission. So I'd send out the execute order now, if you want to do it. If later in the day you want to cancel, you can always cancel. But it's much easier to send execute now and cancel later than it is to defer a decision and then late in the day send out an execute. So I'd send out the execute now, and then maybe at noontime or even later in the afternoon, talk to George Ball.
But the only thing that needs to be done, I think, that hasn't really been done thoroughly, is to go over our plans for announcing this after it's done. I think that needs further work, and I'd like to get George and Walt [Rostow∇] and myself, personally, go into that late in the day.
President Johnson: Yes, I thought about that yesterday and thought we ought to spend some of the time today at lunch. And I think in the light of the editorial this morning that you probably ought to try to see two or three members of that board at, here at the [Washington] Post, maybe [Ben] Bradlee and Kay [Graham]--
McNamara: Yeah. [J.R.] Wiggins∇.
President Johnson: --and Wiggins.7
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: Those three people.
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: Because it's a pretty good editorial this morning.
McNamara: Yeah. Yeah.
President Johnson: Yes, Bob, I would go ahead with this suggestion you make. Then we'll talk before the luncheon.
McNamara: Yeah, then you feel free to cancel later in the day. And we can always do that.
President Johnson: What I want you to carefully weigh is . . . you gave, just now, when you're talking about your troops and things of that kind, I wish you'd just build two columns for us to let us just look at and think carefully, because we might have a lot of problems in the morning we don't have tonight.
McNamara: Yeah, you're right. You're right.
President Johnson: We might have them in Berlin. We might have them in lots of places.
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: Now, what is going to flow from this? We know that we'll get some temporary approval, but if things go bad that won't last very long.
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: And what do we get out of it, really?
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: Things are going reasonably well in the South [Vietnam], aren't they?
McNamara: Yes, I think so.
President Johnson: What are these 6,000 men doing? They're trying to locate the enemy, I see, and they've run them into caves.8
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: Do you know anything about that?
McNamara: Yeah, and they've--but it's a small--it's just so typical, Mr. President. It's a relatively small enemy force. We think we're taking a heavy toll of them, but it just scares me to see what we're doing there with taking 6,000 U.S. soldiers with God knows how many airplanes and helicopters and firepower and going after a bunch of half-starved beggars in a sm[all]--2,000 at most, and probably less than that. And this is what's going on in the South. And the great danger--and it's not a certainty, but it's a danger we need to look at, is that that they can keep that up almost indefinitely.
President Johnson: Well, I'd say with their manpower resources they have, they can.
McNamara: Yeah, that's the point. The only thing that'll prevent it, Mr. President, is their morale breaking. And if we hurt them enough it isn't so much that they don't have more men as it is that they can't get the men to fight because the men know that once they get assigned to that task their chances of living are small. And I, myself, believe that's the only chance we have of winning this thing. And that's one reason I'm in favor of this [targeting of] POL, because there's no question but what the troops in the South, the VC [Vietcong] and North Vietnamese troops in the South ultimately become aware of what's going on in the North. We see this through the interrogation of the prisoner reports. I've been trying to watch those carefully to see what comes through those. And they know that we're bombing in the North. Now, they know we haven't destroyed the place, so that in a sense our bombing isn't fully effective, but they also know that nobody is protecting North Vietnam, and we just have a free reign. And when we bomb this POL, ultimately, that will become known to the North Vietnamese soldiers and the Vietcong in the South. And this is just one more foundation brick that's knocked away from their support. And when they see they're getting killed in such high rates in the South and they see that supplies are less likely to come down from the North, I think it will just hurt their morale a little bit more. And to me that's the only way to win, because we're not killing enough of them to make it impossible for the North to continue to fight. But we are killing enough to destroy the morale of those people down there if they think this is going to have to go on forever.
President Johnson: All right. Go ahead, Bob.
McNamara: Thanks.
President Johnson: Hello?
Harry Truman: Hello?
President Johnson: Mr. President?
Truman: Well, how are you?
President Johnson: I read on the ticker where you were thinking about going to Israel.
Truman: Yes, and I’ve decided I can’t go.
President Johnson: Well, I was—
Truman: I can’t get out of reach of my doctor. He’s giving me some special treatments.
President Johnson: Well, I didn’t want you going over there except in my plane if you were going, and I wanted my doctor and your doctor and my plane and anything else that you wanted—
Truman: That would be fine. But I thought I would put if off to fall when they have the building up so we can see what it looks like.
President Johnson: Well, I just didn’t want you gallivanting around on a commercial airliner.
Truman: [chuckling] I appreciate that more than I can tell you.
President Johnson: And I just saw it and I got—I had to get [it] back from Tokyo. [Dean] Rusk∇ is over there in it but I told him to do it, and it would be back tonight, and I wanted it—if you’re going anywhere anytime I want you to call us and let us take you. I don’t want you running around over the country; you’re too precious.
Truman: [chuckling] Well, I’ll make you a promise: I’ll do that.
President Johnson: Well, please do.
Truman: I will.
President Johnson: And if you need anything out there, if you want any of our people to come see you anytime, quietly, [unclear] if you want to, [unclear] over at the Walter Reed [Hospital], or any of the Navy people or of the [unclear], or you want Harry Vaughn to come out and see you, I’ll put him on a plane, [unclear comment by Truman] any people you want you please let me know. You’re too modest and—
Truman: Well, that's a promise, but I always hate to interfere with you. I know you’ve got more business than any man's entitled to, and [unclear]—
President Johnson: You don’t interfere. You give me a great deal of pleasure if I could do something to show you how much we appreciate you.
Truman: Well, I appreciate that.
President Johnson: And you tell Mrs. Truman now that if you consider going anywhere, I don’t want to read about it in the paper. You tell your aide to call up the White House and tell them, and let me work on it.
Truman: All right. I’ll agree to do that.
President Johnson: All right, give Mrs. Truman my love.
Truman: I’ll do that.
President Johnson: And when you decide to go in the fall, my plane is available to you anytime you want to go anywhere.
Truman: Well, I appreciate it.
President Johnson: And you’re entitled to it for services rendered.
Truman: Well, I appreciate that too. And I think you’re doing a grand job, and I—
President Johnson: What?
Truman: You’re just right on that Vietnam thing.
President Johnson: Well, God bless you. Wait a minute. Here's Lady Bird wants to tell you how much she loves you and Luci [Baines Johnson] too.
Truman: [chuckling] All right.
Lady Bird Johnson: Mr. President?
Truman: Yes.
Lady Bird Johnson: This is Lady Bird. I just wanted to get on and say to you--I have Luci standing by too--that the—and I’m going to let her really do the talking, but as you know, Luci is being married on the sixth of August.
Truman: Well, that’s wonderful.
Lady Bird Johnson: [with Truman acknowledging] And we just—it’s just not going to be a state affair by any means--this is just going to be the Johnsons and their friends and their kin folks and—but we consider you all—we hope we are fortunate enough to count you and Mrs. Truman among our real friends.
Truman: That's very nice.
Lady Bird Johnson: And it would be the greatest honor and delight to us, if you felt up to it, if you could come to the wedding.
Truman: Well, I’ll do my best, now. You can be sure of that. But then the doctor--I can’t get out of reach of my doctor. He may be through with me by that time.
Lady Bird Johnson: [laughs] Well, the invitations are going out within the week, but rather than just have an invitation come to you in the mail I wanted to talk to you or Mrs. Truman personally about it, so when I heard my husband talking, I just ran in here and grabbed the phone.
Truman: [laughs] Thats mighty nice.
Lady Bird Johnson: And here’s a young lady that wants to say a word to you.
Truman: Thank you.
Luci Johnson: Mr. Truman?
Truman: Yes.
Luci Johnson: Hi, this is Luci.
Truman: Well, that’s mighty nice.
Luci Johnson: I just wanted to go along with my mother and extend the invitation, and we’d certainly be pleased as we could be if you could make it, but we certainly would understand if—
Truman: Well, I’m going to do it this fall instead of now.
Luci Johnson: Well—you’re a sweetie pie, and it’s been great to talk to you, and take care.
Truman: Well, that’s mighty nice.
Luci Johnson: Thank you much, sir. Here's is my father.
President Johnson: Well, goodbye, Mr. President. Take care of yourself.
Truman: I’ll do it if you do the same. You be very careful. You’re too valuable of a man to risk yourself now.
President Johnson: Give a hug to Mrs. Truman.
Truman: Huh?
President Johnson: Give Mrs. Truman a hug for us.
Truman: [chuckles] What’d you say?
President Johnson: I said give a big hug to Mrs. Truman from all the Johnsons.
Truman: I’ll sure do it.
President Johnson: Goodbye.
Truman: Goodbye.
Earlier this day, on the floor of the Senate, Senator John J. Williams said that Lawrence L. 'Larry' Callanan of St. Louis, an official at the St. Louis Steamfitters Union who had been convicted of labor racketeering a decade earlier and whose sentence had been commuted by President Johnson, had donated a total of $2,000 to the Democratic National Committee in 1965. Callanan had been convicted in 1954 for a $28,000 shakedown of a Tulsa pipeline contractor and while serving half of his 12-year sentence had accrued significant tax debt. In April 1964, President Johnson commuted his sentence, thereby removing legal obstacles to Callanan resuming union activities and accepting a job there. Callanan subsequently assumed a post as director of the Steamfitters' Voluntary Political, Educational, Legislative, Charity, and Defense Fund, a post in which he was able to steer political funding and thereby exercise significant local electoral influence. On November 2, 1964, the fund had contributed $25,000 to the "Friends of LBJ;" this was in addition to the $2,000 Callanan was accused of personally contributing. Williams further suggested that Callanan had attempted to disguise the donations and said that "perhaps there is a plausible explanation for the strange circumstances surrounding this case, but I fail to see it."1
President Johnson: Yes, Nick.
White House Operator: [Unclear] Ready, sir.
President Johnson: Yeah.
Nicholas Katzenbach∇: Hello?
President Johnson: Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.
Katzenbach: Mr. President, let me give you what I can give you on Lawrence Callanan--
President Johnson: OK.
Katzenbach: --the [John] Williams story. This is a fellow who was indicted and convicted of a Hobbs Act extortion in 1954, and he was given a very heavy sentence of 12 years imprisonment and five years probation.2 He served six years of his sentence and was put on probation in [19]60 and then served for about four years on probation. At this point, his probation officer wrote to our pardon attorney, said that he'd been very impressed with the conduct of this person, and that while he couldn't recommend it, he thought--he couldn't recommend it because he was an officer of the court--he thought that the commutation might be in order because until he was relieved of the restrictions for convicted union officials, he couldn't get a job. And that he could be able to get a job at $10,000 a year for the union, instructing in steamfitting, if a commutation was given.
The pardon attorney sent forms to Callanan at that point. They were made out--they were endorsed by several people, including a number of contractors and company presidents in the area of St. Louis. United States attorney recommended a commutation. Pardon attorney made a recommendation that a commutation be given, primarily because the sentence was way out of line with other Hobbs Act sentences, and this enabled the person to get a job. Because of the fact that he'd been unable to earn money, the fine was remitted.
This went forward in a routine way to you, was recommended by Attorney General [Robert F. 'Bobby'] Kennedy, to you on February 12, and you signed it in April on the same day in which you signed some 20 pardons and 9 other commutations.
The--subsequently to this, it apparently is true that he did make campaign contributions as indicated in the ticker.3 The $25,000 referred to in the ticker story is, to the best of our knowledge, not an offense at this point, although it's still under investigation. The story is that it wasn't--it was misentered in the files as a $25,000 contribution. In point of fact, it was a collection of a lot of smaller contributions that were made.
President Johnson: Well, what do we do about it?
Katzenbach: Well, I would think as far as you were concerned--and there has been some adverse publicity in the St. Louis Globe Dispatch for some time--and there's some correspondence I haven't yet run down in terms of our answers to this and the questions that were asked about this. I would think as far as you were concerned, you would simply state that this came as a routine matter over to you from Mr. Kennedy in February, that you signed this along with a lot of other pardons and probations in April, and that as far as any further details on this are concerned, they ought to be in touch with the Department of Justice.
President Johnson: All right, well you tell Bill [Moyers] that in the morning.
Katzenbach: Yes.
President Johnson: I'm going to Kansas City at eight o'clock and--
Katzenbach: Do you want a--I can get a memo--
President Johnson: I want to look at anything comes from Missouri. I'll be damned if it's not the hottest thing in the world. [Katzenbach laughs.] And I don't want to do anything wrong, and I want you to try to make them keep me from doing it. And don't let them get over here. And I just don't know . . . this Williams will make anything appear. Now, I can't see who contributes, and I can't see who's pardoned. [laughs]
Katzenbach: No, and you certainly can't tell who's going to contribute after they're pardoned, which is, I think the [unclear] the facts on this, at least as far as the file shows here, which is all that I've done, was routine and was sent over routinely by Bobby. But I would think there'd be a good deal of protection to you, simply to deal with it as that kind of routine--you don't know any of the facts.
President Johnson: OK, thank you.
Katzenbach: All right.
President Johnson: Tell Bill how to handle it, if they ask him. All right. Bye.
Katzenbach: All right, I'll speak to Bill, and I'll get you a fuller memo on it tomorrow sometime.
President Johnson: Let me see--let me see if he's here. If he is I can transfer you--
Katzenbach holds for 1 minute and 51 seconds while President Johnson tries to locate Moyers.
President Johnson: Nick?
Katzenbach: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: He is here, and I'll get the operator to transfer you.
Katzenbach: Oh, I'll--let me just ring . . . I'll just ring back on this line, Mr. President.
President Johnson: OK. All right, OK.
Katzenbach: Thanks.
President Johnson: Yes?
White House Operator: The Solicitor General, 9-0.
President Johnson: Hello?
Thurgood Marshall: Good morning, sir. Happy New Year.
President Johnson: Fine, Judge. Glad to hear you.
Marshall: Look, rumors are running around again about the chairman of the [Federal] Power Commission.1 And I'd heard a little way back that they were considering Ralph Spritzer, who was my top assistant when I first got here, and I told them, "Please, let him stay a little while." But I didn't know whether the information had been given that--I'm perfectly willing--I'd love to see him get it. I mean, he wouldn't . . . we can work it out here without him.
President Johnson: [with Marshall acknowledging] Mm-hmm. Now, I haven't given it any serious thought, Judge. There's been some folks that have suggested him. One or two of them thought he had a background that would be reasonably good, but just between us, I haven't given any serious consideration to it. I haven't--not to my knowledge, haven't even met him.
Marshall: Right. Right.
President Johnson: And he's been surfaced and nearly anybody that gets surfaced, I get enough opposition to him.
Marshall: [Laughs.]
President Johnson: And in about five minutes the only thing I’ve been hearing is that they're talking about him and what's wrong with him now. And so . . .
Marshall: Uh-huh. That's normal.
President Johnson: [Laughs] So, my guess would be that it'd be highly unlikely, but I don't know. We might come around to it and see.
Marshall: Right.
President Johnson: I'm trying to find someone with regulatory experience--
Marshall: Oh, I know.
President Johnson: --with a judicial background, with a progressive viewpoint.
Marshall: Mm-hmm. Right.
President Johnson: And I would like to find someone that's not owned by either the gas companies or the ADA.2
Marshall: Boy, that's tough. That's really tough.
President Johnson: And I don't know . . . I've got a very serious problem over in the Urban Affairs department.3
Marshall: Oh, boy. Yes, yes.
President Johnson: [Speaking over Marshall] And that's given me a lot trouble.
Marshall: Yes, yes.
President Johnson: I . . . I don't know--
Marshall: It's going to be a real problem.
President Johnson: I have a feeling that we'll have to get into it. Whitney [Young] is . . . there's some conversation about him for either the top place or one of the minor ones.4 There's a good deal of feeling that Bob Weaver∇ ought to be given a chance.5
Marshall: Yes, sir, there is.
President Johnson: I rather like Weaver. If it were just up to me and just my personal association, I rather think I would give him a chance.
Marshall: He'd be good.
President Johnson: Most of the folks take the position that he's not going to be able to do as much for the negro as others would--
Marshall: Wow.
President Johnson: --and that he's not a man that is imaginative and has the initiative that's desired in this new, tough job.
Marshall: He's a good administrator, though. He's terrific. But I don't know about that idea point.
President Johnson: I think he's a good man.
Marshall: Yeah, yeah. I certainly do. One hundred percent in my book. And I've known him all the way back to [Harold] Ickes, when he used to be with Ickes way back.6
President Johnson: What did he do with Ickes?
Marshall: He was with original housing, you know when we had the federal housing?
President Johnson: Yeah.
Marshall: He was in Ickes' office. He and Bill Hasty(?) was in the solicitor of the Interior.
President Johnson: Uh-huh.
Marshall: And the two of them were the early ones on housing.
President Johnson: Tell me, Thurgood, what would you do if you were in my place? Would you appoint him?
Marshall: Yes, I would. Honestly. And he's 100 percent reliable, that I know. I certainly would.
President Johnson: I'm giving thought to another fellow that's not for this place at all, but for another rather top spot that has to be confirmed by the Senate.
Marshall: Mm-hmm.
President Johnson: And he's this boy that's just named ambassador to Ghana--[Franklin] Williams.7
Marshall: Oh, Frank Williams.
President Johnson: And that used to be over in the Peace Corps.
Marshall: Yeah, oh, I knew him. He used to work for me.
President Johnson: What's your evaluation of him, just between us two? What's his strength and what's his weakness?
Marshall: He's got all the imagination and brain that you want. His ambition is a little too much for him.
President Johnson: Mmm.
Marshall: When he was with me, I--well, I ended up one time and I just explained to him as a Dutch uncle, I said, "Frank, I know what you're shooting at. You're shooting for either my job or Roy Wilkins’s, and so far as I’m concerned, you better start shooting for Roy's because you can't take mine, you're not man enough."
President Johnson: [Laughs.]
Marshall: He's that kind of operator, and he somehow fouled up with the Peace Corps. I don't know how, but he did over there. But as for ability, he's really tops. He's very good.8
President Johnson: Well, now, can I tell you something without your discussing it with a human?
Marshall: Why, certainly.
President Johnson: What would you think about him taking [Sargent] Shriver’s place at the Peace Corps?
Marshall: Terrific.
President Johnson: They recommend him, not Shriver, but the boys that know him over there think that the bureaucracy over there. They like him because he's imaginative and he's attractive and he's acceptable to Latin America and to Africa--
Marshall: Right!
President Johnson: --and to the non-aligned countries. And he's personable, and he's got an attractive wife, and he works at it.
Marshall: Mm-hmm.
President Johnson: And Shriver's got to give up one of the two, and he's begging everyday to get out.9 And I want somebody that will give me a good image and—
Marshall: I would put Frank there without any hesitation because there his ambition would take over.
President Johnson: Yeah, yeah.
Marshall: He doesn’t have to worry.
President Johnson: That's right. He would have realized it.
Marshall: He would have reached his point. And he can come up with more ideas in a minute than most people I know of. And they're darn good ones.
President Johnson: Now, he's just been made ambassador to Ghana. And we sent his papers over, and they've accepted him, and he's getting ready to go in the next week.
Marshall: Well, I would unhesitatingly say "yes" without any doubt. And I mean, everything that I have that would recommend against him would not in a position like that. He would--
President Johnson: Yeah. Well, what you have is just a little balance and just to hold your feet on the ground a little bit.
Marshall: Well, the point is once he gets what he wants, I think from there he'll drive like mad. And he'll drive everybody under him, too. Because he puts in a real day's work. He's terrific. I think he'd be good. Yes, sir.
President Johnson: Tell me about this fellow that's your assistant over there. What are his strong points?10
Marshall: While he was--started with Power Commission in the legal staff and stayed there quite awhile, and then he's been over here for 10 or 15 years. And every man on the Supreme Court goes out of his way for his legal ability. I mean, everybody from the Chief Justice down. He is a terrific administrator with ideas and his real leaning is in power. That he really knows, and he's terrific. And I guarantee you nobody could own him. You just can't own him, he's not the owning type. And he's had that background in the Power Commission. And that's hard to get somebody with, you know, the actual back--governmental background in power.
President Johnson: Does he get on with people reasonably well?
Marshall: No trouble. No trouble. Well, I've never--I haven't had one inch of trouble since I've been here, and everybody else said the same thing. He gets the work done and there's no problems at all. None. And he's absolutely good. I would hate to lose him. But, I mean, at 22 years in government he's beginning to look, you know, around for something. But, if--he doesn't have the stature you're looking for.
President Johnson: OK, well, I’ll be talking to you. You got any suggestions, things we ought to be doing in this negro field that we're not? I see that they say they're getting very disillusioned with Johnson.
Marshall: Well, I'm going to get together with some of them within the two week period and try to find out what's going on. I'm having great difficulty in finding out what they want. Not that I'm going to suggest it—
President Johnson: The two things that I wish they would really do, could help me and help them more than anything in the world, if they could get two or three real able men like Roy [Wilkins] and—
Marshall: Whitney.
President Johnson: --and Whitney [Young] and maybe [Martin Luther] King or somebody, to go to these foundations and say, "Now, fellas we've got to have some help. We've got to have some money." And make Ford∇ and Rockefeller∇ and Carnegie and some of them put up some money. And then organize like they never organized a march before in their life to register peopl. And then every place that they haven't got a register that they need one I'll put one there and keep 'em up all night with a lantern if I need to.
Marshall: Right.
President Johnson: But I can't go out there--
Marshall: No.
President Johnson: --and yank a fella out of bed and pull him in. And they don't understand that. And they say, "Well, [U.S. Attorney General Nicholas] Katzenbach∇'s not doing nothing." Now, Katzenbach's the best friend the negro's got in this government, I think.
Marshall: I know. I know it. I told them the last time I met with them that there was nothing in the Voting Bill, the Constitution or anyplace else that required the Attorney General to go down into the bayous and pick up a negro in his Cadillac and take him to vote. That wasn't in the bill. That wasn't his requirement. It was our requirement to get 'em outta there. And they got a little hot about it, but I told them. That's what they're waiting for. And I, of course, can cuss them out, but I mean it's a little difficult for some people to do it, and recognizably so. But they know the record I've had. And now I told them I would like to talk to them again within two weeks after the first of the year. Now, what they're going to come up with, I don't know. But, they're not--they're all right to holler at Katzenbach and all, but they're not doing it with reason.
President Johnson: No. And he's a good man and he's—
Marshall: Sure, he is.
President Johnson: And we ought help him, and that's the way they could help him. They would shore up a—
Marshall: Well, [Stephen] Currier is supposed to get together 250,000 [dollars]. A hundred from him and a hundred from one of the big foundations. I think it's Ford.
President Johnson: Who's supposed to?
Marshall: Stephen Currier.
President Johnson: Yeah.
Marshall: And it's something over 200,000 [dollars]. That's the money that's supposed to come up for [unclear] those boys. That's what I understand. And--uh no, it's the Field Foundation and Currier. But we need more than that. And if they want me to go to some of these foundations, I could do it.
President Johnson: Thank--
Marshall: I'll see what I can do. I'll--in the next two days.
President Johnson: Do that and give me a call. Bye.
Marshall: Will do. Thank you, sir.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara∇ updated President Johnson on conversations he had had to bring the chief of the US Army of Engineers, Lieutenant General William Cassidy, into line on the White House's position on the Department of Transportation Bill.
Cassidy had recently recommended that preference be given to developing shared oil tanker and pipeline facilities closer to coastal channels rather than invest in further development of harbor and channel dredging. "There is no doubt that in more and more places along our seacoasts, the limits of channel enlargement are already in sight, and we must seek alternatives," he told the audience at the annual tanker conference of the American Petroleum Institute in mid-May. Oil exectives endorsed the recommendation.1
The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was also holding hearings on U.S. maritime policies. On June 8, President of the National Maritime Union Joseph Curran had accused Johnson and McNamara of aiding the Soviet Union "in its drive for mastery of the seas" by not investing adequately in American merchant marine capabilities.2 The following day, President of the Shipbuilders Council of America Edwin M. Hood struck a similar theme, accusing McNamara of reneging on a 1962 program to which he had agreed of an increase in the number of ships built to accommodate both military and civilian needs.3
The conversation has already begun when the recording starts.
Robert McNamara: I told him [William Cassidy] exactly what you asked me to. I told him that there was evidence that the [Army] Corps [of Engineers] was subverting the Transportation Department bill, and you wanted it stopped and stopped immediately. He said he couldn't believe that it had been. He himself had spoken in favor of it. And I said [that] whether he believed it or not, it was true, that I myself had gotten evidence of that last night, and that I thought it was absolutely essential that he issue orders today to all of his staff to immediately get behind it and positively support it. He said he would.
Secondly, I said I wanted a written statement from him immediately as to what had to be done to satisfy these barge operators. We talked about what had to be done. We agreed on what his statement would say, and he's going to dictate it. And he'll take it with him to a 2:00 [P.M.] meeting at the White House that's already been set by Joe Califano to discuss this subject. [There are] a number of other details I don't have to go into with you.
[John] McClellan sent word to Cassidy [that] he wanted Cassidy to stop talking in favor of the bill. So tempers are rather high, that's clear.
It's very clear the standards have to be changed, Mr. President. It's probably also clear that Section 7 should be dropped and that it can be dropped without any penalty, because most of what it asks for can be done by executive order anyhow. But that's another question. The one thing that is absolutely clear is that the standards have to be changed if you're going to reduce this barge pressure on the Senators and Representatives.
President Johnson: I agree with that. Thank you.
They told you about they jumped all over this morning about my cancelling your briefing yesterday because he had an urgent meeting in the White House?
McNamara: No, sir, they didn't mention it.
President Johnson: Well, the--
McNamara: You didn't have a damn thing to do with it.
President Johnson: I never heard of it.
McNamara: And the briefing wasn't cancelled. [Deputy Secretary of Defense] Cy[rus Vance] took it.
President Johnson: [David] Kraslow of the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post man said, "Why did you call--lie to us about McNamara coming to the White House at 3:00 yesterday?" And we said we didn't. They said, "We called over after he cancelled his 3:00 briefing and asked why he was over there and you told us he wasn't, and now we see he was." And we said, "No, he came last night, and the President just saw him and told him he wanted him to come."
McNamara: And the backgrounder wasn't cancelled, Mr. President. And, moreover, Cy had it at 3:00 and I met with the press at 5:15. And, as a matter of fact, they had a birthday gift for me, so I spent a half an hour with them then.4
President Johnson: Well, I think that you ought to find out who told them that you were here for that purpose.
McNamara: I'll be happy to.
President Johnson: Because they're blaming us. They say we lack credibility. They call over here and want to know why we made you come at 3:00.
McNamara: [chuckling] Well, absolute lie. I'll find out.
President Johnson: Thank you.
McNamara: Right.
The Democratic primaries in Illinois served as a test of political strength of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and the Illinois political machine he headed. A series of primary and other votes on June 15, 1966, reaffirmed Daley's continuing influence despite concerted attacks from critics leading up to the votes.
Having staked his prestige on passage of a bond issue for $195 million worth of capital improvements, the vote came overwhelmingly in favor. And several Daley-backed candidates had triumphed in primaries. The results were widely regarded as key indicators of Daley's continuing political strength and possibly foreshadowing Daley seeking an unprecedented fourth term in the elections to be held the following April.
Johnson called Daley to congratulate him and to ask him to feed him any information about anyone in the administration or Democrats in Congress that might be leaking to critics.
The New York Times report the following day noted that the outcome of the votes brought a congratulatory call from President Johnson.1
The tapes skips at the beginning.
Richard Daley: Hello?
President Johnson: Well, congratulations, hero!
Daley: What do you think about that Johnson-Daley ticket out there?
President Johnson: [laughs] I'm pretty strong for that Daley ticket, I'll tell you.
Daley: With all those articles and, Mr. President, they hit us with everything in the country. They had money coming in from New York and California. And they had a lot of people that should be supporting you, undermining us and against us. We had a terrible time with some of those people that we've done so much with. But goddammit we won it and [unclear]--
President Johnson: You sure did, and that's the best news I've heard, and it was so--
Daley: That is one of the roughest ones we've had. We shot the works, as I told you last week, we had them in. And I fooled them in a lot of places. They thought we were going to be in bad shape, and I turned it around and reached in and got some people in the last week or so. And we just won a great victory, and that was for you because--
President Johnson: Well.
Daley: --with all those things going and with all the articles, they started to appear out here--I told you I don't read them, but I take a little peek at them now and then. [laughs] But this was a great victory. And the same thing for Bill Dawson. Bill wins going away by about 20,000 and Barratt [O'Hara] ends up with about 3,500 to 4,000.2
President Johnson: Well--
Daley: It was rough, and they had more money and more people and all the interests. Some of our own people [unclear] us and going around us and sending things out here, they surely had it. And they got it from a lot of sources.
President Johnson: Well--
Daley: And there might be some truth in some of those articles you were reading from the east. But we were determined that they weren't going to come out here and tell us how to run this city. And we were going to show them that we're behind you 100 percent in your programs and in everything else.
President Johnson: Well, Mayor, I'll just tell you, you don't know how proud I was when the Colonel called last night.
Daley: Yes, I asked him, because we were--
President Johnson: He told me you did, and it's the nicest thing that's happened to us.
Daley: Well, it was good, and we win, you saw, we win the bond issues two and a half to three to one.
President Johnson: Oh, that's wonderful.
Daley: Everyone was watching that and showing how, you know, we're supposed to be slipping. But, if we keep slipping the way we are in 1968, we'll do better than we did in [19]64! [Both laugh.] Well, I just wanted to say hello to you. And I knew it'd make you--
President Johnson: I--
Daley: --especially when they made this one. And, you know, they thought they were in here. And they thought they were going to show this as a great turn-back of your policies. And he used Vietnam. And he used every conceivable thing [unclear].
President Johnson: Did the Dawson man go anti-Vietnam, too?3
Daley: Yes, pretty much.
President Johnson: And the Barrett O'Hara man too?
Daley: The Barrett O'Hara man that was his whole campaign, on Johnson and on Vietnam. And he went all the way out. But you know, and he even admitted after you came out here. He said he was one of the nervous nellies that Johnson was referring to the other night.4
President Johnson: Mm-hmm.
Daley: --in his campaign, he . . .
President Johnson: Mm-hmm.
Daley: And he had a lot of people with him and a lot of people supporting that were --
President Johnson: Do they have anybody here in--
Daley: [Unclear] our eyebrows on them. We saw this. And, you know, we're not vindictive, but we're not foolish either. We got after it a little bit.
President Johnson: No, what I--I want to know what you learn.
Daley: That's right.
President Johnson: Will you let me know?
Daley: I surely will. Nice to talk to you, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Mayor, I'm proud of you. Now, please, please let us know who cuts us from here.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: I know the general crowd, but I just want to . . . if you got any little indication, let's have it.
Daley: Wonderful.
President Johnson: It'll just be between you and me. OK.
Daley: All right. And nice to talk to you, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Thank you, Mayor.
Daley: We're very happy to hear from you.
President Johnson: I surely am.
Daley: Bye now. Bye, Mr. President.
The conversation has already begun when the recording starts.
President Johnson: --give you this other appointment.
George Meany: Yes.
President Johnson: [with Meany acknowleding] He said, "All right." So we moved him out, sent his name to the Senate. All the Senate voted for him and confirmed him over on the [Federal] Communications Commission. That place is vacant. That is the man that will make the recommendations to the commissioners.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: Now, I agreed to you to sit down and talk [about] who'd you want on there. Maybe we want [John] Hennings [sic: Henning] or somebody. I don't care who has it. I have nobody to nominate, but it isn't that I made him a promise I haven't kept. I made a promise to appoint a committee. I did. I made a promise to consider the report of the committee. I have it. I'm ready to. I've got a man assigned to do nothing but that. But I want the Secretary that will make the decision to be in on it, you see. And as it is, I don't want to put it back over in Commerce because each one of them will spilt apart. Now, I don't believe that [Paul] Hall understands this.
Meany: Well, I-- I think he does. And I think that he feels that they were trimmed in the sense that this thing has dragged on now to over two and a half years and there's been no changes, you see. And they're pretty bitter. Although he said, he promised me he would still try to reach in and see if he could find some agreement there with his people who are over on the Hill there now.
President Johnson: Well, the agreement they ought to have is this: that we will appoint fair men on this. They will take his report. They will digest it. We'll discuss it with him, and we'll do it at the highest level. And I don't believe that [Gerald] Ford∇ can help him. I don't believe--
Meany: No.
President Johnson: --he can do much good on it, and I think you can, if he lets you.
Meany: Well, I'll keep working on it.
President Johnson: Thank you.
Meany: Bye.
President Johnson: Hello.
Warren "Maggie" Magnuson: Hello.
President Johnson: Hi, Maggie.
Magnuson: Happy birthday.
President Johnson: Thank you.
Magnuson: I just got through about two hours with [Paul] Hall, and we've made some progress. I'll tell you about it Monday.
President Johnson: Good.
Magnuson: And he's got to save a little face, you know, about--because [AFL-CIO President George] Meany and the AFL [American Federation of Labor] put that resolution through on Thursday over there about being independent, and he's got to save [face]. You know, he can't just say, "Well, we're going to abandon this thing." But they're working. I think they'll be willing to work over the weekend on other language that'll give some measure of independence [unclear].
President Johnson: [To someone in the office] Get me that [unclear] wire.
Magnuson: Huh? Well, anyway, I think it was well worthwhile.
President Johnson: Here's what we can do, Maggie. Have they told you how far we could, what we could say?
Magnuson: No. Well, Gerry's [Ford∇] been talking to [Jim] Reynolds and Joe about it, Joe Califano.
President Johnson: Well, I guess he knows. Here's what we think we ought to say and we think if we go less or further, we [will] get in trouble. [Reading] "The administration re-affirms the objectives stated in the Maritime Act of '36."1 Now, that's the identical language the AF of L submitted. [Reading again] "And will ask as a matter of high priority the Secretary of Transportation and the Maritime Administrator to give sympathetic consideration to the report of the new Maritime Advisory Committee as a basis for developing a new maritime program."
Magnuson: That's when you talk about the '36 act?
President Johnson: That's right.
Magnuson: Now--
President Johnson: Now--
Magnuson: They are going to--I think that they'll want to insist, and I think there's something to it, that within the department, this board would be within the department.
President Johnson: Yeah. That's all right.
Magnuson: Yeah. But that when they rule on a subsidy, for instance, under the '36 act, within the act, or make a ruling following out the law, there's got to be some measure of finality about their ruling. Now, I think [if] we get over that point, we're all right. Same as we do in the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration].
President Johnson: Well, I don't want to make this Secretary [of Transportation] a eunuch or an impotent fellow where he gets a war all the time with the administrator or the board. I'm willing--because if it did, all I'd do is just fire the administrator and the board when they didn't agree with the Secretary.
Magnuson: Well, we understand that but let us work on the weekend here and see what we can find out.
President Johnson: OK, Maggie.
Magnuson: All right. Have a good birthday.
President Johnson: Thank you.
Magnuson: All right.
The conversation has already begun when the recording starts.
President Johnson: [Unclear] I apologized. I--Emerson wires us from Japan. Have you seen his cable?
Robert McNamara∇: No, I haven't.
President Johnson: The net of it is that [Ferdinand] Marcos suggests--and I assume because of what he said about [Senator J. William] Fulbright∇-- that he's going to be crowded and it looks like that you won't have the facilities for handling these people and that you ought to have the meeting in the middle of November instead of the last [unclear] of October.
McNamara: Bill Bundy mentioned the problem to me this morning. I told him that I thought that we could supply facilities at Clark [Air Base] for newsmen and others that the Filipinos may not be able to care of, if that were desirable in order to hold a meeting in--around whatever you suggested--October 24. I think it's entirely a question of your preference. I think we can develop the physical facilities to support whatever decision you want.
President Johnson: Don't you think we'll look bad to go later--
McNamara: I--
President Johnson: --than we've announced?
McNamara: I think so. Cy [Vance] happened to be with me at the time I was talking about this and he--his reaction was stronger than mine. He thought it'd be a serious error to postpone it until mid-November. And I think it would be undesirable.
President Johnson: Listen to this. [reading and paraphrasing the cable] "I was able to talk separately with both Marcos and Ramos at the Press Club luncheon. Ramos sent a message [saying] he wished to see me urgently. When I met him, he said he wished the message transmitted to President Johnson from Marcos to the effect that in view of short time for preparation and lack of hotel space in Manila, Marcos proposed to postpone the conference until mid-November. I then told Ramos our proposal of October 24 to 26, but he said this would not be agreeable, noting they had been carried away by their enthusiasm to schedule a meeting so soon and without adequate preparation, especially in view of the extraordinarily large numbers of press and media representatives now expected to be in Manila at [the] time of [the] conference. Ramos showed me telegrams from Manila pointing out all the hotels fully booked for period originally intended. He then referred to criticisms appearing both in [the] Philippines and elsewhere for the next meeting [occurring before] the U.S. election, noting this is an additional reason for postponement until mid-November. Later I was able to talk privately to Marcos and give him the President's message directly. The repeated statements made by Ramos asked me to communicate to Washington his desire that [the] conference be rescheduled in November after [the] U.S. election. I said I would transmit this message. Marcos is reported to remain in Japan until Monday, October 3."
I think you better think about it and we'll try to decide it tomorrow afternoon--
McNamara: All right.
President Johnson: --before we leave here. Does 3:30 [P.M.] suit you?
McNamara: Perfect.
President Johnson: We get through the wedding--I've got to go the [Stanley] Wirtz∇ wedding.1
Now, here's the tentative reply: [reading and paraphrasing] "Mr. Emerson has given me your message, [which] suggests the conference in the Philippines be postponed to mid-November. I understand he gave you at the same time my message suggesting October 24 and 26. From a policy standpoint I would be very concerned at a postponement until mid-November for several reasons but especially because of the South Vietnamese situation. As you know, the Constituent Assembly has convened and as deliberations proceed there there's a very strong chance that there will be significant conflict and friction between the assembly and the government headed by General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky. Ambassador Lodge∇ has [unclear] me that such difficulties can be handled and should not, in any event, become serious before November. However, I think you'll readily see that a major meeting with Thieu and Ky while good difficulties exist could raise the most serious question of apparent intervention in South Vietnamese politics, which is one of the major concerns I've always had in considering a conference of this type. This is my principal reason for feeling that a postponement would not be wise nor in our common interest. But I should perhaps note, from my own personal standpoint, it'd be vastly preferable to have the meeting earlier because the pressing load of business that will confront me during November and December." I don't think that'll impress this country if that gets out, that he's talking about the United Nations. "I understand from Mr. Emerson that your major concern is the difficulty of adequate preparation and accommodation. In this respect, I would hope that my proposed postponement of a few days would give further time to make the necessary arrangements. But more basically, I wish to assure you that I'm prepared to make extensive military facilities in the Philippines available to accommodate whatever overflow may exist either in Manila or [unclear]. In the handling the substantial number of newspaper men and otherwise who will doubtless wish to be in the Philippines during the conference. I am today dispatching a senior from the [State] Department to work with our embassy in the Philippines and of course in close association with Ambassador [unclear] to ensure that all necessary facilities are provided in a timely and effective measure. Let me add one other important factor. As you know, both [New Zealand] Prime Minister [Keith] Holyoake has scheduled elections November 26. I'm not sure they can readily attend a conference in mid-November, and I'm certain that such attendance would significantly hamper their campaign. Moreover, I've been considering the possibility of a visit to these two countries after the conference, and in the mid-November period so close to their election this would run very serious risks of being interpreted as interference in elections. For this reason it might well not be possible. In the light of the major policy factors I've described I hope very much that you can reconsider and accept the suggested dates of October 24 to 26. Needless to say, I hope we can reach an early decision on the matter. I take this occasion to congratulate on your excellent statement to attend the conference which you made in Tokyo, which conveyed exactly the right picture of the conference [and] will be all the more effective in Japan. Sincerely."
McNamara: I think that's a terrific cable. I'd let it go tonight, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Well, I have this feeling, Bob, [that] we may be imposing on Australia and New Zealand to go in there the first of November. When we go out there--we're going there--
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: --for their elections [on] November 26. We may--this fellow, if he's got cold feet and he's worried, we may let Fulbright pitch us as really trying to shove a conference down their throats. Now, in the light of what's been said, we might just--you and Dean [Rusk∇] and I think it over tomorrow and send it out tomorrow night or whatever we think, but I have--
McNamara: Oh, I suppose. Yeah, I supposed that's all right, to wait until tomorrow.
President Johnson: He--he's going to be there till Monday.
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: And I would beg we might give thought to saying we take care of them, we could move it back to October 31 and November 1, Monday and Tuesday. That'd be a week later.
McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: We'll take care of all the guests. If you don't want to do that, then we'll be glad to wait until after the November elections there in--
McNamara: --in Australia.
President Johnson: --Australia.
McNamara: You're going to have to do that because [Australian Prime Minister Harold] Holt said that he didn't want it any closer to his election. I'm not even sure he'd be able to take October 31 and November. There was a cable in from him a week or so ago that--
President Johnson: [Unclear] can't we talk to [unclear: Tokyo] all right without sending a bunch of damn cables. I don't like to have [unclear] anyway.
McNamara: I think you can talk to them, sure.
President Johnson: OK. I'll talk to you tomorrow.
McNamara: Fine. Thanks.
Until the previous day, October 2, 1966, Nicholas Katzenbach∇ had been Attorney General. He had been replaced by Ramsey Clark∇. Katzenbach had resigned from the post to become Undersecretary of State.
Nicholas Katzenbach is on hold for 1 minute 33 seconds. A woman's muffled voice can be heard briefly.
President Johnson: Yes?
White House Operator: Secretary [Nicholas] Katzenbach on four.
Nicholas Katzenbach: [Mr. President?].
President Johnson: Should I call Ramsey [Clark] and tell him to carry on? Or you tell him, or what?
Katzenbach: I think he would automatically carry on, but I think a phone call from you would be nice.
President Johnson: What would you say?
Katzenbach: What?
President Johnson: What would you say?
Katzenbach: Just tell him that he's Acting Attorney General now and that you're counting on him to run the [Justice] Department.
President Johnson: All right. Did you see the column today on--by David Lawrence?1
Katzenbach: No, I didn't.
President Johnson: He got a mean--saying that Thurgood's [Marshall] not the best-qualified man. That's the net of it.
Katzenbach: Yeah.
President Johnson: He says that Ramsey [Clark] might be qualified. But if he qualified, his daddy couldn't serve.2 And his daddy couldn't serve. And then I'd probably appoint Thurgood. And then the question would be, do you appoint him because he's negro? Because a lot of them say he's not the best lawyer available.
Katzenbach: Well, you know my views on that.
President Johnson: But he, no doubt, wouldn't be appointed until after the election. [laughs]
Katzenbach: [Laughs.]
President Johnson: So, it's hell. OK, I'll just--I'll do that. Much obliged.
Katzenbach: Fine, Mr. President.
Robert Anderson: How are you doing, Mr. President?
President Johnson: Fine, Bob.
Anderson: I got to thinking about this new department you're going to set up for transportation.
President Johnson: Well, I hope I can get it passed. I've got a good many hurdles yet to get over because the maritime people are fighting it very strongly, and we don't know whether we got--we didn't have the votes to get it in the House.
Anderson: Yeah. Well--
President Johnson: So, we are--
Anderson: I talked to you about that once before and, of course, if I can put an oar in, just let me know.
President Johnson: [with Anderson acknowledging] Well, we need to awfully bad. Right now, the Republicans are joined up with the Communist labor unions 100 percent to oppose [Dwight] Eisenhower's recommendation.1
Anderson: Yeah.
President Johnson: And, as you know, he was shocked. But the Senate didn't--[Everett] Dirksen didn't. But [Gerald] Ford∇ did because anything he can beat us on, that's his theory. Now, I think it's very short-sighted, and I don't think it helps him, but he delivered a solid vote for Gus Hall.2
Anderson: Well, that's unbelievable.
President Johnson: Yeah, well, that's true. And what we've got is we've got 31 agencies that have no supervision. They go in all direction[s]. No President can hold them together. We would like to have one agency and one man bossing. But they told us yesterday that they want to kill it if they could. And they had the votes in the House the first time, so I'm fearful they might have [them] a second time. We're going to work on it and try.
Anderson: Maybe Eisenhower and I ought to join, go see our friends over in the House.
President Johnson: I think if he would write two sentences or--and you take it to him. If he'd just say, "I originally recommended [the] Transportation Department because I thought that we ought to have one Cabinet officer looking after 31 separate agenc[ies]."
Anderson: Yeah.
President Johnson: "President Johnson picked up my recommendation and passed it. And I hope, I hope that your Republicans would give it a chance to operate since both houses [of Congress] have already spoken." We passed it in both houses, but they say they're going to kill it now. All we know is that George Meany said yesterday that he could not handle [Paul] Hall. We know that Hall did deliver--3
Anderson: Yeah.
President Johnson: --all the Republicans after I talked to you here.
Anderson: Well, how can they--can they kill it in conference? Is that what you mean?
President Johnson: Oh, yeah. When you--see, when it come[s] back, it goes to conference.
Anderson: Yeah.
President Johnson: [with Anderson acknowledging] They come back [and] the vote will be up or down on the conference report. There are enough coast cities like New Orleans where you have Democratic delegations, Maryland, where you have Democratic delegations, New York City, Seattle, wherever the rest of them are, Portland. Wherever you have a water city then these folks--the Harry Bridges and [Paul] Hall group run these few places.4 Now, they're not over 12 or 15--but I can beat the Democrats. They usually represent those cities, but when you go to having a fellow from Nebraska and Iowa and downstate Illinois vote with them, I can't beat--I can't beat the--[Edward] Garmatz, who is head of it, and Javitz. I can't beat them when they go to getting [Representative] Howard Smith [D-VA] and all this group, you see. So, they get the Republicans then, why, they beat me, and that's what they did.
Anderson: Well, the real secret is to get Ike to talk to Gerry Ford, I think.
President Johnson: That's right. And--but the secret, first, is get him to know enough about it, because if I'm a congressman and you call me and you know more about the money thing than I do and more about the Federal Reserve than I do, you got a hell of a lot of weight with me.
Anderson: Yes.
President Johnson: But if you call me and you don't know what the hell you're talking about and you just say, "Lyndon Johnson asked me to call you," then it just makes me mad.
Anderson: Yeah, well, I'm--
President Johnson: But--
Anderson: I wouldn't say Lyndon Johnson asked me--
President Johnson: No, no, no. I mean this; I'm just illustrating. I say, if Eisenhower picks up the phone and calls Gerry Ford and says, "Listen--"
Anderson: I've [unclear].
President Johnson: "--some of my friends are interested in this and the President's recommended this. Bob Anderson's interested." And he don't give a damn, but if he picks up the phone and says, "You know, I feel very strongly about this Transportation Department because when I was President there were 31 agencies and nobody ran them. So, I said put them under one Cabinet officer and let's save some money, and let's be economical, and let's have a good administration. I recommended it. Johnson came along--I talked to him about it the first week he was President, and he's picked it up and recommended it. Now, I understand that these maritime workers are trying to get the Republicans to kill it. I hope you'd give it a chance to try it for a year to see how it works."
Anderson: I'll do it.
President Johnson: That'll do it.
Anderson: Now, let me tell you one thing. I just kept thinking about this. If it passes and if you do not already have somebody that you ought to--that you want to get to run it-- this might be a place where it would be worth your while to think of John Loeb.
President Johnson: Yeah.
Anderson: I'll tell you why. John is Jewish. There is not a Jewish Cabinet member at the moment. Also, he was an investment banker, and in these times when monetary things are so much a part of this world, if you have some fellow down there who has spent all of his life in this banking community and can talk to them on their level and who's supported the President's policy--and John does 100 percent--it might be worth a lot.
President Johnson: Well, we'll sure take a good look at it once we get close to it.
Anderson: He'll take something, perhaps, maybe some time if you ever get a vacancy in the Treasury or Commerce or somewhere in that place where John would be qualified. I think both the fact of having [unclear] there and the fact that he's got the ear of this financial community might be an asset and would be an asset particularly, you know, with the hard-nosed banker crowd.
President Johnson: Yeah.
Anderson: So, I didn't want to [unclear].
President Johnson: We'll take a good look at it, and I'll talk to you before we do anything.
Anderson: Now, let me tell you one other final thing. I have been working, trying to get them to pass this bill, or to get them to have a hearing; I don't care or give or damn whether they pass it or not, which would correct this airline situation because [George] Meany has been up to talk to [Harley] Staggers. Staggers just won't move. He won't even call a hearing and all we want is a hearing. And they've got $300 million foreign exchange involved in it, and they've got 162,000 jobs involved in it, and it passed the Senate unanimously. It goes into committee in--
President Johnson: What bill is it?
Anderson: Oh, it's the bill which says that all of the airlines that got hurt when the Japs and the British pick up passengers on both sides, that they give them relief so that they can at least, the airlines, can pick up passengers the same way and then use American airlines for the Japs or British. And it means $300 million to us. Now, Bob McNamara has gone into it thoroughly. Joe Fowler∇, Joe Barr∇, Joe [Califano]--well, there in your office, that you got from McNamara. But I just think Staggers has got to have somebody tell him, for Lord's sakes, don't close the Senate [unclear].
President Johnson: Let me talk to Califano, and I'll see and have him get in touch with you.
Anderson: OK, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Bye.
Anderson: Thank you.
President Johnson: Yes, sir?
Richard Daley: Hiya pal, how are you doing?
President Johnson: Pretty good, pretty good. Have you--
Daley: I hear you're still rousing the crowds wherever you go.
President Johnson: --are you . . . are you wearing the scars of battle these days?
Daley: Well, we don't wear them, we shove them away from us--we tell them about our record.
President Johnson: [laughs] Well, you--
Daley: Don't you let them worry about the scars of battle. You're doing all right.
President Johnson: You're wonderful.
Daley: And to hell with them.
President Johnson: I--
Daley: We--you sent that telegram to me--
President Johnson: Yes.
Daley: --but I'll tell you, [Paul Howard] Douglas wanted [Robert F.] Kennedy to come out here.
President Johnson: Yes.
Daley: He's coming out tomorrow. We're going to have--
President Johnson: Good.
Daley: --five or six big rallies. What about yourself coming out--
President Johnson: Well, I--
Daley: --or will you be able to, on the way back from . . . When will you be back from Manila [Philippines]?
President Johnson: Um--
Daley: Hell, we'd really like to give you an old Chicago welcome, [unclear]--
President Johnson: We'll just check--
Daley: --we always do and we love it.
President Johnson: I'll sure try to when I come back, let me--
Daley: I think it'd help--you will be able--you'll help tremendously.
President Johnson: Just one second. Wait just a minute, Dick.
President Johnson speaks aside with an unidentified person in his office asking him to pass a message to Walt Rostow∇.
President Johnson: Go ahead, Dick, I just had to--
Daley: Keep going. Don't let them--I liked what you said, "We're not going to falter. We're not going to fall back. We're going ahead."
President Johnson: Well--
Daley: --and don't worry a hell of a lot, as you said, about this poll and the popularity thing. You know, many times when a fella takes a stand, he does--right at the present time, the people don't get it fast enough, but when you're talking social security to the fellas as you did the other night, we all sat around our family home and my wife said, "Well, there's a man with a heart. He's talking about these poor people, and all of us know that they're in these nursing homes, which are a damn disgrace throughout the entire country."
President Johnson: Well, they are and we're going to have a program next year that'll knock them off of their corners on that. [Unclear interjection by Daley] I think that there's a good deal of this in the Literary Digest and the [unclear magazine] and old Harkness. They were talking this way about [Harry] Truman. [Speaking over Daley] I just read his stuff yesterday because every place I've been I just can't find it. And I--they hired a couple of them, you know.
Daley: Do you remember the way he talked about [Franklin D.] Roosevelt? Do you remember the way they talked about [John F.] Kennedy?
President Johnson: [laughs] Oh, I remember Roosevelt had just lost his popularity and he didn't have a chance for a third term and they launched poor old [John Nance "Cactus Jack"] Garner out there and Garner got far enough in front, he couldn't carry two states.
Daley: Every time you show up any place, they're in the streets, they're in the windows. There's crowds of people. And what--well, as long as that keeps happening, don't you worry about these columnists and all that.
President Johnson: Where--
Daley: What are you going to do tomorrow at this meeting with the mayors?
President Johnson: I'm just going to talk to then about the inflation picture and our problems. You don't need to come, I'll--I've said everything to you.
Daley: All right, I wish you could, Mr. President. We'd really love you out here.
President Johnson: You talk to Douglas. Are you going to lose any congressmen?
Daley: No, no, we're liable to pick up one or two.
President Johnson: God, I hope you do.
Daley: We've got this [unclear] in good shape. We've been doing a lot of things for him, that young fella downstate. We've got--we won't lose anything in here, and we might pick up one or two in the suburbs. We've got some pretty good candidates. We've got a doctor--
President Johnson: You really work on that. That's awfully important. Is Paul going to make it?
Daley: Paul'll make it, yes, he'll make it. We are moving along with him, you know. He was pretty down in the dumps, but the organization is starting to move and we're doing a lot of things to--
President Johnson: You, you let--you let--you talk to Paul and talk to Marvin Watson∇ and tell him, tell him what you want and when. We'll see if we can work out something.
Daley: Well, I'd love it, and nice to talk to you. Say hello to Mrs. [Lady Bird] Johnson and the family and have a wonderful trip. I like that idea of you going there. And don't let anyone tell you that it isn't a good move. And as I said to you back in August, hell, I think you could meet with the other guy, whatever the hell his name is, in Hanoi and settle the thing out if you ever get a chance to have him sit down with you.
President Johnson: Thank you, Dick.
Daley: Fine, Mr. President, nice to talk to you.
President Johnson: All right, bye.
Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt called LBJ to wish him well on his impending operation and to follow-up on LBJ's recent visit to Australia, the first official visit by a sitting U.S. President to Australia. Holt and Johnson had first met in 1942 in Melbourne when Johnson was stationed in the region. About five months before this call, Holt had earned notoriety in Australia when, while lunching at the White House, he committed Australia to go "all the way with LBJ" in Vietnam.
Operators connect the call.
Harold Holt: Hello?
President Johnson: Yes, Harold.
Holt: Is that you, Lyndon?
President Johnson: Glad to hear you.
Holt: [Unclear] bother to--you with a phone call, but we had a report here this morning that you were going to have your surgery earlier than had been previously announced.
President Johnson: We think probably a week earlier, probably the end of the week, but I'm going to check it tomorrow.
Holt: Oh, well, I was writing to you, and when I heard this report I thought, well, then it might not get to you in time, and the first thing I wanted to say is how very sorry we are that you've got to face up to this unpleasantness.
President Johnson: Well, that's mighty sweet--mighty good of you and we appreciate it. And I think it's very minor. We just got to--we got to--as long as there's a possibility of malignancy, we want to go find out about it.
Holt: Yes. Well I--you've got us concerned about this. You know that all good wishes and our prayers are with you.
President Johnson: I sure do, Harold, and we have most pleasant memories of our visit there, and I've got some nice pictures I'm going to send you. You've got some dandy. You look like a movie star.
Holt: Well, I got--I've got some film for you of the--film of the tour done by our information people, which I'll be sending over. I also will want to send you the film we made about our boys in Vietnam and the Fox Movietone [News] people tell me they've got a film that they can let me have if you would like to see it, and I'll get that too.
President Johnson: Oh, I wish you would. I'd enjoy it very much, and I'm going have a lot of time to see it.
Holt: You'll be seeing yourself from all angles around this place. The other thing I wanted you to know, and I've written this [unclear], because we're really concerned, and I didn't want you to go into hospital without at least knowing that there a lot of warm and friendly people out here wishing you well.
President Johnson: Well, Harold, I know that, and I'm so grateful, and I hope you'll give my love to Mrs. Holt.
Holt: All the [unclear] since the visit has been very good.
President Johnson: Good. Well, I--
Holt: Nothing of the unpleasant kind at all, and I've recorded the policy speech for the election, and I don't think you'll find anything in that that will disappoint you.
President Johnson: Well--
Holt: So we're full steam ahead.
President Johnson: I know there's not anything you in Australia are going to do that disappoints anybody, because you're our kind of folks and we've just got to stay close together and get this job done. We're going to do it.
Holt: Anyhow, congratulations on the tour as a whole. I think it went wonderfully well. It focused attention just where you wanted it focused and you put us all on the alert that the job has to be done.
President Johnson: Fine. Well, we're very pleased with it.
Holt: [Unclear] best wishes to Mrs. Johnson. Young Christopher has got your picture hanging up now in the bedroom. It's an inspiration to him. [Johnson laughs]
President Johnson: That's wonderful, and you give our love to Mrs. Holt and remember me to Ed Clark.
Holt: I shall. He knew I was going ring you. In fact, I asked him how I could get onto you, and he gave me the [unclear]. So he said if I was talking to you to pass on his fondest regards.
President Johnson: Thank you so much, Harold, for calling. It's very, very typical and very generous, and I'm so grateful.
Holt: Well, I won't bother you--I won't bother you again about--on a telephone call unless it's really of sufficient importance. But this is important to us to [unclear] your spirits and facing up to this thing in good heart.
President Johnson: Well, it's never a bother. It's always a great pleasure. And you just pick up that phone any time you can raise enough money to do it, and I'll do likewise.
Holt: [Laughing] All right. And may it be in the results not too serious and certainly quick in its recovery. Look after yourself.
President Johnson: We'll let you know just soon as they get through with the operation.
Holt: Good man. Look after yourself.
President Johnson: Thank you, Harold.
Holt: [Unclear.]1
President Johnson: OK.
Holt: Goodbye.
White House Operator: He'll be with you in just a moment, sir.
Hubert Humphrey: OK.
Telephone operators heard speaking indistinctly in the background.
President Johnson: Hello?
Humphrey: Hello, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Hi, Hubert. How are you?
Humphrey: Well, I'm--we're bruised and battered, but not down.
President Johnson: Well . . .
Humphrey: We've had a rather close one up here [in Minnesota] on this governorship, but Karl [Rolvaag] has lost, our man. It looked like he was going to win up here this week. [Walter] Mondale, of course, won. Three of our congressmen, Democratic congressmen, are in solid. And the other one looks as if, Alec Olson, looks as if he might be out according to the last tabulation, but all the votes of that district are not in. But, I don't understand it.
President Johnson: Well, I think that it's not as good as we'd like it but it's something we've got to reconcile ourselves to, and I think it's pretty easily understood and rather easily explained. I asked Boyd∇ to come in here this morning, what he thought about the election. He said, well he'd sure hate to see a Republicans sweep the House. And I said, "Did the Republicans carry the House?" And he said, "Yes." He'd listened to General [David] Sarnoff and Bill [unclear]1 all night. And he thought that the Republicans had carried the House. And I said, "Well, looks to me like it's going to be about 250 for the Democrats and 185 . . . and if you have an election there are 435 votes and you carried it by 65--
Humphrey: That's right.
Johnson: --you wouldn't say that you'd lost. But, if they say it enough like Hitler, why, then everybody thinks it's a great--it's awfully terrible. "Now," I said, "that's what you had." I had an election one time, it had two million and I won by 87 and I thought it was awful good. [Humphrey laughs] And I won the Senate one time by one vote in 1954. I had the best organization and did more voting together than . . . we even took on Joe McCarthy and didn't lose a single vote. Now, when I had a majority of one now, we let a lot of these boys off the hook in the House.
Humphrey: That's right.
Johnson: One way of voting. And they all go on their tours. And about 30, 40 of them are absent the whole time.
Humphrey: Yup.
President Johnson: And so we can expect it then I think when [Robert Kennedy∇] Bobby and Abe [Abraham] Ribicoff and some of our fool liberals--
Humphrey: Yeah, they were [unclear]--
President Johnson: --start out talking about how many billion it's going to take, and what we ought to have 6[00], 700 billion and we got a few Cavanaughs in Michigan and a few things like that, and then Martin Luther King's in Chicago. I don't think you can expect much more and I think this is just--our friend Walter [Mondale], who's a great fellow, I understand he's playing all ends against the middle these days.
Humphrey: Sure is--
President Johnson: He's just drafted a big bill for Bobby on old age assistance--
Humphrey: Yeah.
President Johnson: --and stuff like that. But when I went out there to speak, why, they didn't have a corporal's guard and then they acted an ass when [George] Romney∇ came in to try to welcome the President, they booed him off the platform.
Humphrey: Yeah, I--
President Johnson: And when [Robert P.] Griffin came up they booed him. And people just won't tolerate this--that low life stuff like the negroes and the Labor Union's been doing. And they're going to get back and that's what they do. And I think--I don't think that 14B helped us much, and I don't think that these extreme liberal things helped us much, and I think the folks will react. Now, I think --
Humphrey: I think so, and I'll tell you what I've said here, Mr. President. I haven't made any statement at all. I didn't want to say anything, and I'm not going to until we know what you're saying and what others. But, I've said to one of my personal friends here, I said, "Look, we've got about the same vote now in the 90th Congress that we had in the 88th.2 We're not far off. They're about the same number of Democrats in the House of Representatives, and that was considered to be a pretty good Democratic Congress. And we've got the same numbers--we got about two more senators than we had in the 88th. So I think if we just keep in mind that the last Congress under [John] Kennedy, in the 88th Congress, had about the same number of Democrats in it that we have now. And the last--Senate had--we actually have a couple more now than we had then."3
President Johnson: Well--
Humphrey: Something to keep in mind. And I can't help but feel that we ought not to cry about it. I think we've got a pretty good working majority, and it'll be--it'll depend on how much discipline these fellas have and self restraint to get us through.
President Johnson: Yeah, that's it. I was rather hopeful that we'd do something with Wyoming and Idaho.
Humphrey: So was I. And every indication, Mr. President, in Idaho, every single indication proved that we could do it. The polls out here [in Minnesota], for example, in this state, and not just the Minneapolis polls but the Harris poll, all of them were way off. We don't know what in the devil caused that to be the case. However, again, I'd say we got [John] Blatnik, we've got [Joseph] Karth, and we've got [Donald M.] Fraser, and we have Mondale and we have two of our state officers out here. And the lieutenant governorship race out in Minnesota is still nip and tuck.
President Johnson: What happened to your governor's race?
Humphrey: The governor's race, [Karl] Rolvaag will lose by about 45-50,000 in the state.4
President Johnson: Was that that insurance stuff?
Humphrey: Yep. He just--he was as non-guilty as a man could be. But this was the problem that we had that he just didn't have the zip and the go to do something about it. And the paper out here just really went wild on him. But we looked--the last poll before this election showed us having a four percent margin. So we have to just keep that in mind that sometimes these measurements are not as accurate as they might be. And yet, there are a couple other polls on fellows that showed our people down, they came through. I don't feel too badly. I figure that we did what we had to do, and I'm pleased that some of the places that we went we were at least somewhat helpful. [Fran E.] Evans came through out in Colorado, one of our fine young congressmen that stood with you all the way right up and down the line, never batted an eyelash. And we had some others that--on the Eastern seaboard, of course, there were some of them that came through real good. And--
President Johnson: Yes, there were more of them elected than were defeated in the 48. There's 26 elected and 22 defeated.
Humphrey: That's right. That's right. And many of those from historically Republican areas.
President Johnson: Like Joe Resnick [of New York].
Humphrey: That's right. And you got [Peter] Kyros up there, this young Greek boy up in Maine. I remember I went up there and walked around up there with him a day. Everybody said he couldn't win. Nobody thought he could win. [Kenneth] Curtis was elected governor. We sent him up a little help from some friends out here. He appreciated it very much. . . . Well, I [unclear]--
President Johnson: I think the biggest defeat was the governors.
Humphrey: Yeah, that's right.
President Johnson: Like losing Alaska and losing New Mexico and losing Arizona and . . .
Humphrey: That's right. Well, Mr. President, remember [Franklin] Roosevelt, in 1936 and then '38. There's always a kind of an equalizer. I think people, it's a funny thing, I think people sort of feel "Well, let's see, but we maybe ought to kind of balance it off again."
President Johnson: I got the Christian Science Monitor article yesterday when I voted, and they asked me what I thought, and I said I thought the Senate would be about a standoff. Our people had estimated we'd lose one in the Senate. We didn't think we'd lose Tennessee, and we didn't think we'd lose Massachusetts.
Humphrey: No.
President Johnson: But, I said I think it'd be a standoff there. And I don't think it'll be far--the loss will be much more than the average. And then fortunately, I got that on the record yesterday morning, and if we come around to 41, looks like we may lose 46 now.
Humphrey: Uh-huh.
President Johnson: But the average, 1890 is 41 seats. There's a good article in the Christian Science Monitor.
Humphrey: Uh-huh.
President Johnson: That's . . . wait a minute, they let me have it for an hour and then they like to file it and keep it.
Humphrey: [chuckles] Yeah.
President Johnson: I'll just keep it here while I'm here. It's June 29, 1966, and the heading of it is "1966 the presidential off-year, history favors the party out of power. This year issues like Vietnam, Civil Rights, ganged up. Here's a look at key congressional and gubernatorial races that are causing the Democrats concern. Today's page: Open special coverage of the November election." And it says the average off-year scoreboard is 41. That's the average gain. Since 1890. Now, let's see, what does it say about the governors? Doesn't say [unclear, while paraphrasing] difficult to single out a handful of Senate contests [unclear]. No, let's see.
Now, I don't rather think--I don't think we're going to suffer much with the [unclear] guy or [Charles H.] Percy or the Massachusetts boy from the standpoint of our domestic program.
Humphrey: Mm-hmm.
President Johnson: I believe they're going to be pretty progressive Republicans.
Humphrey: Mm-hmm. I think so, too. When you pick up someone like [Edward W.] Brooke or Percy, these fellas, we're maybe going to get a little more, a few more votes out of them we than we have with some others. So, not too bad.
Well, Mr. President, I'm going back to Washington tonight, going to be there, and I just wanted to talk to you. What's your plans now?
President Johnson: I don't know. I'm going to be operated on the early part of the week, but I don't know where, whether it'll be here or there. I'm trying to talk to--there's--I've six, seven doctors involved. You get this article out of the Christian Science Monitor. It's very interesting what they were saying then. "Republicans are most sanguine. Senate leader [Everett] Dirksen says the possibility is a gain of 70. A GOP organization leader puts it at 60 with the possibility of going as high as 80. Locales of fierce fighting for Democratic freshman seats include . . . "
Humphrey: Uh-huh.
President Johnson: And then he goes ahead.
Humphrey: Uh-huh. Very interesting.
President Johnson: The average gain for the House in off-presidential election is 41, beginning the off-year election under President [Benjamin] Harrison in 1890. One Democratic leader says anything less than a gain of 20 would be equivalent to a landslide. He sees such a holding action as a possibility. [Unclear] 48 districts, the key races--well, of 48 we won 26 of them.
Humphrey: Mm-hmm.
President Johnson: OK, much obliged for calling.
Humphrey: Well, thank you, Mr. President. Be of good cheer.
President Johnson: I'll be in touch with you. Where are you going to be there, a day or two?
Humphrey: No, I'm going to go back to Washington tomorrow. And I just got--we've made a little move there and I want to get back and kind of get settled in. And then I'll be around there until the next couple of weeks.
President Johnson: OK.
Humphrey: You bet. Bye-bye.
In Kansas, Robert Docking, the son of a former Kansas Democratic governor, defeated the incumbent Republican governor William H. Avery in a tight race.
President Johnson: Hello?
Robert 'Bob' Docking: Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes.
Docking: This is Bob Docking.
President Johnson: Congratulations, Governor. How are you?
Docking: Well, thank you, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Mighty proud of you. You're one of the real breaths of fresh air.
Docking: Well, thank you so much, sir. I wanted to call you and to assure you of the support of my administration in Kansas for your administration for our country.
President Johnson: Well, thank you so much, and you'll surely have mine. And I wanted very much to come there and would have, except I was crippled and kind of waning the past few days.1 But, I'm glad that you could win like you did, and it gives us a great comfort. And we really think a lot of Kansas and we want to do anything and everything we can to be helpful to you.
Docking: Well, thank you so much. Mr. President, I hope that someday after, you know, after you're fully, completely recovered that I might have the opportunity to come back to Washington to seek advice and counsel--
President Johnson: You just anytime you want to give us--Marvin Watson∇ a ring and we'll set it up the next day.
Docking: All right, fine. And all the family and my mother wish you the greatest success in your operation.
President Johnson: Well--
Docking: And a speedy recovery.
President Johnson: --we've got our fingers crossed, and we think it's all right. And I'm going to count you on the team.
Docking: Well, I want very much to be a member of the team. And I appreciate that so much.
President Johnson: Thank you for calling.
Docking: Thank you for returning my call.
President Johnson: Bye.
The recording starts after the conversation has already begun.
Dean Rusk∇: --back to Saigon, we think, tonight our time. [Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry] Cabot [Lodge∇, Jr.] apparently felt that they'd have to meet together in the government there in Saigon and it would not be feasible to try to deal with this while they were out of town. So, I would think that about all we should say today is that the leaders in--of the Saigon government have been visiting different parts of the country over the weekend, that they'll be back within hours and that thi will be taken up by them as soon as they meet again in Saigon.
President Johnson: OK. He ought to get them back, though.
Rusk: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: [Unclear.] He ought to get them back. Maybe we ought to originate it instead of waiting for them to take the initiative. It makes us look mighty bad to just keep on waiting.
Rusk: I think it ought to be pointed out that this was accepted--that a Christmas truce was accepted last year, that there was some dissatisfaction with the way in which the Viet Cong carried it out, but this is a matter in which there were will be a very short, a very quick decision.
President Johnson: Well, what I would try to do is point out to somebody on a backgrounding basis what they did last week.
Rusk: Right.
President Johnson: First, just let that drift in while we're waiting on the other.
Rusk: Right.
President Johnson: So it looks like that's what we're [unclear].
Rusk: All right. Fine. Well, we'll do some backgrounding here.
President Johnson: On this India thing, what I think--I read this [William] Macomber's report and I thought it was pretty good. I liked it. What I want to do, I don't want to be making huge commitments out there anymore, as I said last year. I'm kind of committed not to, unless the Congress looks it and approves it, unless they feel like they want to go along in the tune of several hundred million dollars. I'm not going to rely on [Chester] Bowles and the do-gooders and the welfare folk boys because they're always for everything--Dorothy Jacobsen and Bowles. You could--they'd give away the Capitol if they thought that it would--if somebody asked for it. Now, the Indians, according to my information, we gave them about ten million tons [of food aid] last year [worth] nearly a billion dollars, and we told them that they had to do this with fertilizer and they had to do this in new production methods and they had to concentrate. They've done a good deal of it. At least they produced 11 million tons more than they produced last year. Now, they have it in some of the states now that they could transfer to others, but they won't do it. It's like Texas having a surplus of wheat but won't let Oklahoma and Arkansas have any of it. And I think their position is that there's no use in letting them have it. They need it and while it is more than they've had [in previous years], that if they get it from the United States they don't need to get it from themselves. [Unclear] told, according to the Macomber report, that [it is] important to keep the pipeline going, even if we just had 500,000 tons of it. They, of course, would like to get a hold of several million--
Rusk: Right.
President Johnson: --and certainly two million between now and February. I understand we have a million tons in the pipeline in December that will arrive there in January. That's about what we've been putting in a month. I understand that we've got two or three hundred thousand tons going in in January that'll be there in February. Now, my thought is what we ought to do is just take the [J. William] Fulbright∇ position pretty generally on these things, that we don't want to operate independently and unilaterally on everything. That we're not the only wheat producing nation in the world. France produces a lot of it. Australia produces a lot of it. Canada produces a lot of it. "Now, [Jawaharlal] Nehru, you've got to understand the New York Time[s], Washington Post and their editorials are not going feed anybody. We've had an election in this country, and we've had--we had it even last year the President said he's going to get the Congress to go along. It's going to be a problem for us, but you've got to get up there at the United Nations, UNES--or--"what's that organization?
Rusk: UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization].
Presidential Johnson: UCE . . .
Rusk: Oh, OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development].
President Johnson: "OECD. And you've got to get these folks." Well, Canada's always comes back. They're always frozen over. That's the first thing they say. They're frozen. Well just say, "OK, if they'll give you two million tons, why, we'll advance that much until theirs comes in if they're frozen over." That's the excuse they always use. And Australia is sold out to China always and we're just sitting there with the cup in our hands and we give more each year. Each year increases for the last several years. Now, we're just going to stop that because we're short as hell, and they're asking us for $2 billion more to replenish what we gave away last year.
Rusk: Right.
President Johnson: And we can't replenish it. I'm not going to ask [for] it in my budget. I just can't give it that way. So, I think [Arthur] Goldberg∇ ought to be put to busy. He needs something, anyway. I keep seeing everyday in Drew Pearson['s columns] where he's playing a good soldier and he's taking it but he's telling the State Department that China ought to be in and that the State Department won't let them come in. Poor fellow--he's imposed on. Look at Drew Pearson. I told him to call [Nicholas] Katzenbach∇ today and tell him to tell Goldberg--you might tell him--that if there's any difficulties between you and Goldberg, let's keep them to ourselves and stay out of Drew Pearson's column. I'm not aware of any and they don't give me any. You-all are always together, but he--about twice a week I read down here about [how] Goldberg's a very patient and good man and--but he has one view at the United Nations and another at the State Department and--
Rusk: Well, I'll tell you about--I called--I talk to him on the phone about every day or two, and he doesn't say those things to me.
President Johnson: No, but I was reading the Pearson column.
Rusk: Right.
President Johnson: [To someone in his office] What is it, Jake? I just gave it you. Hand me that Pearson column. I just told them to send it up here. [To Rusk again] I just read the Pearson column in the Washington Post. Here's what he says: "Ambassador Goldberg is a loyal member of the Johnson team." That sounds like that he's talking--that much of it. "And he's carrying out State Department orders in New York. Inside the Department, however, he has argued it is time for America to put it to China and that it's easier to deal with China within the family of nations rather than as a belligerent outside[r]. The United States should adopt a two China policy. Now, today, China has its own nuclear weapons and missiles and so on and so forth." Well, now, I don't think you're telling him that. And the two people involved are the State Department and Goldberg. So, I think somebody ought to tell him, straighten that out with Pearson and give him a little letter explaining it so we do it. But get him [Goldberg] busy so he's got some irons in the fire. See what he can deliver from France and what he can deliver from Australia and what he can deliver from Canada. And our position ought to be that we've got a congressional delegation going out there. The new Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee wants to look at it. Now, we've got a million tons on the way now in ships that are getting there in January. That we're going to have two or three hundred thousand more going in January. That if Canada, if France, if Australia will give some indication that they will do likewise, we'll be glad to join them. If nobody will do it but us, we're not going to do it.
Rusk: Right. Well now, Mr. President, I met just a few minutes ago with Orville Freeman∇, Bill Macomber, and Walt Rostow∇ and we're trying to put together a package in which there would be three or four countries involved, including India, making some purchases with their own foreign exchange. And I think that kind of a package would be the strongest. We're trying to get exactly what is needed in terms of our shipments, say, between now and the middle of January. And that would take them into the greater part of their pre-election period. It looks like now it might be a total of, say, a million and a half tons, but we'll get those figures exactly for you and we'll try to work out a [unclear: club?] here so that we do it in such a way as to include the Indians in demonstrating that they can take this seriously by making some purchases out of their own foreign exchange.
President Johnson: They got 200 million. They could do that and if we could put in, oh, 500,000. I would go for it. I don't want go much over that. That's 70 million.
Rusk: All right. This is the sort of figure we're working on. We'll see what we can do on it and I'll get back to you.
President Johnson: All right. All right.
Rusk: Thank you.
The conversation has already begun when the recording starts.
President Johnson: --and I hope you had a good Christmas?
George Meany: Very good.
President Johnson: Are you getting ready to go down to Miami?
Meany: No, no, no. I'll be here.
President Johnson: When are you going?
Meany: Oh, not for another four weeks.
President Johnson: Oh, it's that long?
Meany: Oh, yeah.
President Johnson: George, I want to ask you--give you a bombshell and let you think about it and not discuss it with anybody, except maybe your boy [Lane] Kirkland if you want to. But let's don't let it get out anywhere else. I--I'm--you may-- [Joe] Califano may have called you. Has he talked to you this morning?
Meany: No.
President Johnson: I want you to give some rather serious thought from my standpoint as well as yours--
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: --to putting the Commerce Department over in the Labor Department. We're going to have--now, this is just between us and I'm talking to you like my brother--
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: It may or may not be wise but the only way I can find out is to get some good heads that had some experience to look at it.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: We're concentrating 32 administrative agencies in the Department of Transportation. We pulled together HEW∇ [Health, Education, and Welfare] much more efficiently, as you know, with [the] Food and Drug [Administration] and all that, Surgeon General and everything. We have pulled together HEW pretty well.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: Now, Commerce has got nothing left.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: It exports some stuff. It's got some census. It's got some economic reports that conflict with the Bureau of Labor statistics. And it's generally regarded as the spokesman for business.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: But it really doesn't. The President makes whatever decisions that he thinks ought to be made. I would say the biggest spokesman for business is normally the Treasury Department.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: Now, that department over there--that fellow hasn't got much to do. [Secretary of Commerce John] Connor is--came for two years. He's going to be leaving.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: If we could combine the two and I could get it through, I would be glad for [Secretary of Labor Willard] Wirtz∇ to be the head of it while I'm there, if he wants to. If he wants to leave, I'd be glad for [James] Reynolds to.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: Now, it may or may not be right. They may say, well, labor would lose its identity.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: I don't think you'd change a thing in the world in labor.
Meany: No.
President Johnson: I think you'd just increase it.
Meany: Yep.
President Johnson: The businessmen say, well, business will lose its identity and I would say, "Well, Jim Reynolds is a damn good businessman, very sympathetic to it. Wirtz has been representing them all of his life. He's a good one. And the Treasury's here. And you want to save money. And we could just call it the Department of Human and Economic Development. And our--if you want labor's name in it, you could call it the Department of Labor and Economics. It's just something we've been thinking about.
My braintrusters, who are not very practical, don't know any of your problems, [and] don't know a lot of my political ones, think it's very desirable. I have not talked to Wirtz and I have not talked to Connor.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: They're both liable to blow, but I didn't want to 'til I talked to you.
Meany: Well, my first reaction is I don't see anything wrong with it.
President Johnson: I think it would strengthen you. And I talked to your boy [Thomas] Donahue yesterday--
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: --at considerable length. Ms. Johnson did, too. We were quite impressed and we're think he's going to be very, very good. I want to talk to Wirtz and be sure. Now, you cleared him with Wirtz, didn't you?
Meany: Oh, yes. And Wirtz has gone and talked to him since then and is quite pleased.
President Johnson: I told him that I expect him to be loyal to his country.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: And that is the first consideration, labor or no labor, that I expect him to be loyal to his President, and I expect him to be loyal to you. And that--could he do all those three without having any major conflicts? And if he did have conflicts, just be loyal to his God. And he said he could.
Meany: Yeah, I think so.
President Johnson: And I told him that you and I didn't have any trouble being true to each other, and he ought to be able to do the same. He said he could.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: And then we talked about different things, and Ms. Johnson, she had a couple hours with him, and we came away with kind of a, oh, I guess a grade A.
Meany: Yeah.
President Johnson: So, I'll call Wirtz and he's on--talk to him. You think about this and then I'll talk to you when I get back.
Meany: OK. Fine.
President Johnson: Thank you.