1968
WH6810-04-13547-13548
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, George Wallace
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Editorial Note: The State Department Office of the Historian transcribed this conversation and published the transcript in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968: Vietnam, September 1968-January 1973. The version published here has been revised by the Presidential Recordings Program.
President Johnson: Hello?
Operator: Mr. President?
President Johnson: Dick?
Operator: I have not told them it’s a conference call. Do you want me to do so?
President Johnson: Do what?
Operator: I have not told them that they’re all going to be on with you.
President Johnson: I will--I will--
Operator: You’ll tell them.
President Johnson: Yes, I will--
Operator: I’ll put them right on.
President Johnson: Hello?
Operator: Just a moment. Go ahead please.
Hubert Humphrey: Hello?
Richard Nixon∇: Hello?
President Johnson: This is the President. This is a conference call that I have set up. I asked the operator to get the three Presidential candidates so that I might review for you a matter of the highest national importance and one which I know concerns you this morning. And I will make notes of this, a transcription of it, and you are at liberty to do likewise, if you’re prepared to do it. If not, you can take notes. If not, I will review it with you in more detail at a later date.
Nixon: Sure, fine.
President Johnson: Now, who was that speaking? [Republican presidential nominee] Dick [Nixon], is that you?
Nixon: Yeah, I’m on.
President Johnson: [Democratic presidential nominee] Hubert [Humphrey], are you on?
Humphrey: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: [Independent presidential candidate] George [Wallace], are you on? George? Hello, George? Hello, George? Tell the operator Wallace is not on. I think I will go on with you all. They told me they had all three connected.
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: This is in absolute confidence because any statement or any speeches or any comments at this time referring to the substance of these matters will be injurious to your country. I don’t think there’s any question about that.
First, I want to say this: That our position, the government position, today is exactly what it was the last time all three of you were briefed. That position namely is this: We are anxious to stop the bombing [of North Vietnam] and would be willing to stop the bombing if they would sit down with us with the Government of [South] Vietnam present and have productive discussions. We have told them that we did not think we could have discussions if, while we were talking, they were shelling the cities or if they were abusing the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone]. From time to time, beginning back late last Spring, they have nibbled back and forth at these various items. Each time they do, there is a great flurry of excitement. Now, we have been hopeful one day that they would understand this. We don’t want to call it "reciprocity"; we don’t want to call it "conditions," because they object to using those words, and that just knocks us out of an agreement. But we know that you join us in wanting peace the earliest day we can and to save lives as quickly as we can and as many as we can. So, one day we’re hopeful, and the next day we’re very disillusioned.
Now, as of today they have not signed on and agreed to the proposition which I have outlined to you, nor have they indicated that this would be a satisfactory situation to them in its entirety. Our negotiators are back and forth talking to them, and they have just finished their meeting in Paris this morning. But, yesterday in Saigon, because there are exchanges constantly going on, there came out a report that there was an agreement that would be announced at a specific hour. This morning in Paris the same thing happened, and [Averell] Harriman had to knock that down. We posted a notice here at the White House that said the same thing.
Now, very frankly, we would hope that we could have a minimum of discussion in the newspapers about these conferences, because we’re not going to get peace with public speeches, and we’re not going to get peace through the newspapers. We can get it only when they understand that our position is a firm one, and we’re going to stay by it. And what you all’s position will be when you get to be President, I would hope you could announce then. Because we have really this kind of a situation. If I’ve got a house to sell, and I put a rock bottom price of $40,000 on it, and the prospective purchaser says, "Well, that’s a little high, but let me see." And he goes--starts to leave to talk to his wife about it, and [First Lady] Lady Bird [Johnson] whispers that, "I would let you have it for $35,000." And then he gets downstairs, and Lynda Bird [Johnson] says, "We don’t like the old house anyway, and we get it $30,000." Well, he’s not likely to sign up.
Nixon: Yeah.
George Wallace: Hello?
President Johnson: The [former National Security Adviser McGeorge] Bundy speech didn’t do us any good, and there are other speeches that are not helping at all because these people--when they read one of these speeches and hear them, why, then they take off for Hanoi, or they do something else. The government’s position is going to be this: Our--we are willing to stop the bombing when it will not cost us men’s lives, when the Government of South Vietnam can be a party to the negotiations, and when they will not abuse the DMZ and not shell the cities.
Unidentified: Yes.
President Johnson: Now, we do not have to get a firm contract on all these three things. But I do have to have good reason to believe that it won’t be on-again-off-again Flanagan; that I won’t have to stop the bombing one day and start it the next. Now, obviously, they can deceive me, and we know that in dealing with the Communists that they frequently do that. We have had a good many experiences of that right in these negotiations.
But what I called you for was to say in substance this: our position has not changed. I do not plan to see a change. I have not issued any such orders. I will con--I will talk to each of you before I do, and all of you on an equal basis. I know you don’t want to play politics with your country. I’m trying to tell you what my judgment is about how not to play politics with it. And I know all of you want peace at the earliest possible moment. And I would just express the hope that you be awfully sure what you’re talking about before you get into the intricacies of these negotiations. Over. Now, I’ll be glad to have any comment any of you want to make or answer any questions.
Humphrey: No comment, Mr. President. Thank you very much.
Nixon: Yep. Well, as you know, my--this is consistent with what my position has been all along. I’ve made it very clear that I will make no statement that would undercut the negotiations. So we’ll just stay right on there and hope that this thing works out.
President Johnson: George, are you on?
Wallace: Yes, sir, Mr. President, and of course, that’s my position all along, too--is the position you stated, yes, sir. And I agree with you that we shouldn’t play any politics with this matter so that it might foul up the negotiations in any manner.
President Johnson: Thank you very much. Now, what our policy’s going to be I think all of you should know, that it’s not going to be an impetuous or hasty policy. I’ve outlined it to you. I do not want you to speak about it. I do not want you to lay down these points, because if you do, that causes them to say that they’re conditions and it’s reciprocity, and they may be able to take them if they don’t think they’re going to get something better by just waiting a few weeks or a few days. Now--so I think it’s very important this be confidential. Do you know whether your talking to me is knowledge to any of your people?
Nixon: Well, in my case, the phone was picked up by somebody here. I’m at the Union Station in Kansas City. The phone was picked up by somebody else. It may be known, but I will seal them down. I’ll just tell them we got a routine report.
President Johnson: OK. If anybody asks, we will not mention it here. If they ask us, we'll say that we stated the facts as we see them, namely, that there has been no agreement between us, that we will constantly negotiate, and when there is, why, the candidates will be among the first informed. Now, I’m not going to agree to anything unless my advisers--the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs [of Staff], and all the Joint Chiefs themselves--consider the matter and give me their best judgment. And I get that from time to time. [Humphrey tries to interject] And it is all of their best judgment now at this moment that the position I have stated to you is the soundest position for this country. Namely, the government of Vietnam must be included, and we could not expect an American President to have good discussions very long if they were shelling the cities or if they were abusing the DMZ.
Humphrey: Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes?
Humphrey: It’s obvious that I’m here at a school and I’m all alone. There’s nobody with me, and they do not know that I’ve got a call from you. But I’ve been held up in a meeting, and that press is always very alert. I’m just simply--is it all right just simply to say that we’ve had our regular report?
Nixon: That’s good.
President Johnson: Well, I think what I’m very fearful of--I’m afraid if they think that we’re doing this, that will put a seriousness on it--
Humphrey: What can we do?
President Johnson: --that we've justified. I think, if you want to, I would just say that I called the three of you and I read to you the notice that [White House Press Secretary George] Christian has posted here this morning--
Humphrey: Very good.
President Johnson: --which I will now read to you. It, in effect, says that these reports are premature, that there’s been no agreement, and that we’re not signed on with them at all.
Nixon: Good.
President Johnson: Let me read it to you.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: [reading] "The position of the United States with respect to Vietnam remains as set forth by the President and the Secretary of State. The position"--you can write this down--"The position of the United States with respect to Vietnam remains as set forth by the President and the Secretary of State. There has been no basic change in the situation. There has been no basic change in the situation: no breakthrough."
Humphrey: All right.
President Johnson: "As you have always been advised, when there is anything to report, you will, of course, be informed promptly."
Humphrey: Right.
President Johnson: Now, I want to make this point to all of you candidates. First, I think you want to know what the situation is so you won’t jeopardize it. Second, I don’t want any one of the three of you to think that I’m going to give a preference to any person. When we know what is happening that is significant to you, I will call each one of you just as quickly as I can before I would issue any orders. I think I have that obligation to you for your responsibility. So, don’t think you’re going to get tricked or deceived.
Now, we will be negotiating. We might sign up in--5 minutes ago. Our judgment is we won’t. But this is our position. They have not accepted it, and I’m going on until January 20 along this line. I don’t say there won’t be some modification or moderation. But, in principle, this formula must be our government position as long as I’m here. Over.
Wallace: We got it.
President Johnson: Is that clear to all of you?
Humphrey: We understand.
Nixon: We’ll maintain your proposition. Now--and Mr. Vice President, I’ll see you tonight.
Humphrey: Yes, sir. Thank you.
Nixon: At the Al Smith Dinner.
Humphrey: What time are you coming?
Nixon: I’ll be there about--I’m flying in from Kansas City. I’ll be there about 7:30 [P.M.].
Humphrey: Are you coming in at the beginning of the dinner?
Nixon: Oh, yeah, yeah, I’ll get there. You won’t make it that early?
Humphrey: [Unclear.] Are you wearing a white tie?
Nixon: Oh, yes. [laughs]
Humphrey: I gather. OK.
Nixon: I’ve got to go home and put the damn thing on.
Humphrey: OK.
Nixon: All right. Thank you.
Humphrey: Bye-bye.
Wallace: Goodbye.
President Johnson: Goodbye, George.
Wallace: Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes, George?
Wallace: Now, this is--you asked does anyone know about this call. Now, the Secret Service did know about the call.
President Johnson: That’s all right. We won’t say anything about it, unless they quiz you. If they quiz you, the reporters, you say the President read us a memorandum which stated that the government position would remain as set forth by him in his public speeches, and there had been no change--the rumors to the contrary--
Wallace: Very good.
President Johnson: There had been no breakthrough, and that he wanted to inform me of this fact because of the gossip so I wouldn’t be up in the dark, and that he would keep me informed if there’s any action taken.
Humphrey: Very good.
Wallace: Well, Mr. President, do you think continuous talk about the matter of Vietnam is endangering the peace talks in any manner?
President Johnson: Well, I think it’s what you say--that what people say, that does. I think that if they think that either Wallace or Humphrey or Nixon, if they can hold out three more weeks and get a little better deal, buy the house a little cheaper from you all than they can from me, they’re going to wait. You know that much.
Wallace: Yes, sir. But as long as we’re strong. I’ve taken a strong position, and I don’t want to do anything or say anything.
President Johnson: Well, I know. What I’d do, I’d just give my views on it, but I would bear in mind constantly that the enemy is looking at everything that’s said in this country. We had a speech made day before yesterday, and a few hours later, they came in and said, "Well, we’ve got to go back to Hanoi." And they did. Now, I think if I were in their place, and I were negotiating, and I read that Ho Chi Minh was in a sick bed, and in three weeks he would be out, and there'd be a better deal awaiting me, and the new President would really do better than he’s doing, I just don’t think I would dash in. Don’t you all feel that way?
Wallace: Yeah. I agree with you.
President Johnson: Just anybody that’s ever bought a cat knows that. And let’s just all try to stay together. I suggested to Secretary [of State Dean] Rusk∇ that he get all three of you to sign a statement that would say that our government has taken a position; we cannot change that position until January 20; therefore, we will stand behind that position until we take office, and then let Harriman read that to them so they would know it. But before we got around and got the thing written, why, it kind of blew up, and we decided it wasn’t wise to do it.
But whatever you can do in the way of peace offers or things of that kind, I would be awfully careful. As a matter of fact, I never will agree to one sentence until I have gone over it with my Joint Chiefs, and Rusk, and [Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB.] Katzenbach∇, and [Defense Secretary] Clark Clifford∇ and [CIA∇ Director] Dick Helms. And if I am afraid to make a statement like that with all of these people advising us constantly, you can imagine how a fellow is out at a box supper or a school or at a country picnic--he’s shooting from the hip. And I just hope that you all will understand that if you make a statement and it blows these conferences, I think it would hurt you more than you’ll gain from talking about the details of a peace offer right now. Wait until you get to January 20, and then you can really get into it deep.
Wallace: Well, Mr. President, I’m not even going to say a thing to the newsmen if they ask me. I’m just going to say, "I’m just campaigning." How is that?
President Johnson: That’s OK.
Wallace: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: OK, thank you, gentlemen.
Humphrey: Very good, Mr. President. Bye-bye.
WH6812-02-13821
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Harry Truman, Lady Bird Johnson, Bess Truman
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Harry Truman: Yes?
Operator: It’s President Johnson, sir.
President Johnson: I wanted to wish you a Merry Christmas and tell you that you are loved.
Harry Truman: Thank you very much, and I hope you—everything goes all right for you.
President Johnson: It’s going—it’s going—
Harry Truman: And that you get everything you want for Christmas.
President Johnson: —it’s been going well for me ever since I met you, and [Lady] Bird [Johnson] and I were just thinking about what wonderful people you and Mrs. Bess [Truman] had been to us since we met you, and we wanted to thank you.
Harry Truman: I appreciate that very much. And I want to tell you now [unclear].
President Johnson: Oh, well, bless your heart, well—you—
Harry Truman: That’s the best thing that any President has ever done.
President Johnson: Well you—you are always in our hearts. [Lady Bird Johnson tries to interject] And here’s Mrs. Truman. And I wish you could see this pretty portrait of hers—
Harry Truman: I do too.
President Johnson: —hanging here in the White House. We take so much pride in pointing out to all of our guests this portrait because we think she’s a very unusual lady.
Truman: Well, I feel that way too, and I’m in agreement with you.
Lady Bird Johnson: [Laughs] And, oh, Mr. President, I hope you just have a happy, happy time. Did you have your grandchildren with you?
Truman: How's that?
Lady Bird Johnson: This is Lady Bird. I hope you had a happy Christmas.
Harry Truman: Fine.
Lady Bird Johnson: And did you have your grandchildren with you?
Harry Truman: No, no they couldn’t come out this time. [Unclear.]
Lady Bird Johnson: Well, I know you had a good visit with them in the summer, though.
Harry Truman: I beg your pardon?
Lady Bird Johnson: I know you had a good visit with them sometime in the summer, because I remember seeing some pictures and you looked so happy.
Harry Truman: That’s right. That’s mighty nice.
Lady Bird Johnson: Well you give Mrs. Truman my love and we just wanted to wish you both a happy Christmas and tell you that—
Harry Truman: Thank you. Thank you very much.
President Johnson: Is she there where we can say a word to her?
Harry Truman: Yes—I’ll—here. Bess?
Bess Truman: Hello?
President Johnson: We wanted to—Lady Bird and I wanted to you and the President how loved you are and how admired you are and how grateful we are for all that you have done for us.
Bess Truman: Oh, you’re just too nice Mr. President.
President Johnson: No, I’m not. [Lady Bird Johnson laughs]
Bess Truman: Much too nice.
President Johnson: No, I’m not.
Bess Truman: I hope you all had a wonderful day with your family.
President Johnson: We have. We’re just so blessed. We had the sweetest daughters here, and we talked to the boys last night in Denang.
Bess Truman: Oh, that’s wonderful.
President Johnson: The—one of them went up with the--the Air boy went up and met with the Marine and we talked to them about 9:00 [P.M.]. It was 9:00 in the morning there [in Denang].
Bess Truman: Oh.
President Johnson: And we were so thrilled and we made both of them’s little baby--one of them's little baby is two months old, and one’s a little less than two years, and we made them both squeal over the telephone so they could hear them.
Bess Truman: [Laughing] Oh that’s great.
President Johnson: We think of you often, and every time I go by your picture I see my favorite First Lady except one.
Bess Truman: Oh, well [unclear].
President Johnson: And the one—the other one is on the phone, wants to say hello to you.
Bess Truman: Oh good.
Lady Bird Johnson: Oh, Mrs. Truman I’m just getting all packed and ready to go and I’m just thinking, in all my time here I’ve always just considered you such a strong, good help to Lyndon and to and—you’ve both been a great reliance to us and—
Bess Truman: Oh, you’re so nice to say that.
Lady Bird Johnson: We appreciate your friendship, and we’re just so fond of you.
Bess Truman: That gives us a big lift.
President Johnson: Did I tell you the other day--I told you this, but I want to tell you again--the other day my Cabinet gave me a silver blotter with a silver pen set on it and they had the major acts that we had passed, more than a hundred.
Bess Truman: Oh, is that true?
President Johnson: And the—you know things like elementary education and medical care and things of that kind, Civil Rights and conservation measures, and they listed each one of the major bills. And they said that they had a nice little statement about—
Bess Truman: Oh.
President Johnson: —how they were glad to serve in an administration that passed all of these.
Bess Truman: Well, that was a lovely gift.
President Johnson: I took it and reviewed it on a trip that I was making home, and do you know that almost half of the bills that I had passed, President Truman had started 20 years ago.
Bess Truman: Is that so. That’s very interesting.
President Johnson: So I thought that you would be interested in knowing that most of the good things like education and Medicare and Civil Rights, conservation, it took 20 years to get his ideas through but they were finally passed and—
Bess Truman: Well, you did it.
President Johnson: —I’ve tried to say that to the country but the paper don’t pay much attention to it.
Bess Truman: [with gusto] Oh no, the papers. You know what we all think of the papers. [Lady Bird Johnson laughs]
Lady Bird Johnson: Well, you have a healthy regard for them. [Laughs] Well, we’ll let you go and we hope we get to see you during the next year.
Bess Truman: [Unclear.] We’re so proud of the books that you sent us.
Lady Bird Johnson: Thank you.
President Johnson: Mrs.--Mrs. Truman?
Bess Truman: Yes.
President Johnson: The man that gives me the most pleasure is a [Marine] Corps man that comes in and looks after me and watches me a little and lifts me around and gives me a message once in a while. And I have one out in Kansas City, that’s a Kansas City boy that’s as loyal and devoted and I hope that—I hope he’s there, and I hope that as long as you and the President are there that he’ll look after you. He’s just a wonderful medical background, and any time you need it, please call him because you’re entitled to it.
Bess Truman: You’re awfully nice to do that.
President Johnson: President [Dwight] Eisenhower has it. President Johnson has it. And I don’t know any day if something happens, if you slipped or you had a fall or something, and I wish you’d come in, if the President would let him. He rubs me—he rubbed me to sleep nearly every night.
Bess Truman: Oh, that’s [unclear].
President Johnson: And he is there. And he’s going to be there anyway. And he’s stationed there and we don’t want to send a doctor to keep there any time because you have your own, but any time you want anything, you’ll never ask for it but I do want you to know I wish you’d use him because your country wants you to.
Bess Truman: Well, that you so much. I just can’t tell you how much we appreciate that.
President Johnson: This boy’s name is [Don] Nauser, N-A-U-S-E-R, and he is as faithful as your husband.
Bess Truman: Oh, that’s doing pretty well.
President Johnson: He’s just a good a boy as I ever met in my life—
Bess Truman: Oh.
President Johnson: And the reason I sent him is because of he is from Missouri.
Bess Truman: Oh, I see.
President Johnson: He was here at the White House for years, and I just told him one day to get out there. And I issued his orders and sent him out there. And I said, “Now you stay there, and they’ll put you busy doing other things. But the first thing that you do is be available to the President [Truman]."
Bess Truman: Oh.
President Johnson: "If you have to—if she wants you to go downtown and pick up something, well you go do it. If she wants to put an adhesive bandage on her wrist, well you do it."
Bess Truman: [Laughs] That’s great to know that.
President Johnson: Well, he’s there, and I wish you’d use him.
Bess Truman: Well, thank you so much.
Lady Bird Johnson: And we hope you have a good, good new year.
Bess Truman: Well, I hope you will too.
Lady Bird Johnson: Thank you.
Bess Truman: And I hope if you come this way you'll always stop over.
Lady Bird Johnson: Oh, we’ll always love to.
President Johnson: We’re going to do that as long as we live.
Bess Truman: Good.
President Johnson: Because no one else had done more to help us than you and the President.
Bess Truman: Well, I don’t know about that, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Well, I do. I do.
Bess Truman: [Unclear] we wanted to.
President Johnson: You—I do. Thank you, ma'am.
Bess Truman: Thank you so much for calling.
President Johnson: Bye.
Lady Bird Johnson: Good night.
Bess Truman: Good night.
WH6804-01-12908
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Lady Bird Johnson, Ivan Allen
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
At 6:01 P.M. on April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was shot at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, Tennessee. He was pronounced dead at 7:05 P.M. At 9:07 P.M. that same evening, President Johnson read a short statement for radio and television broadcast from outside the entrance to the West Lobby of the White House. The statement read:
America is shocked and saddened by the brutal slaying tonight of Dr. Martin Luther King. I ask every citizen to reject the blind violence that has struck Dr. King, who lived by nonviolence. I pray that his family can find comfort in the memory of all he tried to do for the land he loved so well. I have just conveyed the sympathy of Mrs. Johnson and myself to his widow, Mrs. King. I know that every American of good will joins me in mourning the death of this outstanding leader and in praying for peace and understanding throughout this land. We can achieve nothing by lawlessness and divisiveness among the American people. It is only by joining together and only by working together that we can continue to move toward equality and fulfillment for all of our people. I hope that all Americans tonight will search their hearts as they ponder this most tragic incident. I have canceled my plans for the evening. I am postponing my trip to Hawaii until tomorrow. Thank you.
In this call two hours later, Mayor Ivan Allen, mayor of King's home own of Atlanta, called President Johnson to update him on the situation in the city and to express his appreciation for Johnson's statement.
The operator connects the call.
President Johnson: Yes, Mr. Mayor.
Ivan Allen: Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes, Mr. Allen.
Allen: I want to thank you for your very fine statement that you made so promptly, sir.
President Johnson: Thank you, Mayor.
Allen: We're doing everything we can. We're having a very heavy rain storm here in Atlanta that's preventing any disorder at the present time. We've been through these situations before. I think that we can cope with them. I'll do everything I can to hold the house in order here, sir.
President Johnson: Well, you're mighty good, and I have great confidence in you, and I know that you're right on top of it. I called Mrs. [Corretta Scott] King and--
Allen: I was with Mrs. King when you called here.
President Johnson: Well, I--
Allen: I accompanied her to the airport where we heard of Dr. [Martin Luther] King's death and then went home with her. And Mrs. Allen was with me, and we've done everything we possibly could, sir. Martin was my close personal friend. I had great respect and admiration for him, sir.
President Johnson: Well, you've done a great job there, and I hope you'll let me know anything--any suggestions you have. We had a little problem in Durham, and we have one here in Washington. They're moving around. We don't know the extent of it, don't know how serious it's going to be. But they have 2- or 3,000 people gathering
Allen: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: And I was due to [head] out to Honolulu in the morning, but I decided I'd wait until the morning and take a look at it and see what to do. Do you have any suggestions as to anything else that I ought to do?
Allen: Mr. President, I think you've taken exactly the right steps, sir, and I'm following the same pattern here, sir. And I'm just delighted that you're running the show, sir.
President Johnson: Well, you're wonderful to call me, and stay in touch with me, and please know that I'm very grateful for your whole attitude.
Allen: You're very fine, sir. I hated to hear that news last Sunday night, sir, but you're a great man, sir.
President Johnson: Thank you so much, Mayor, and I look forward to seeing you.
Allen: Give Mrs. Johnson our thoughts, sir.
President Johnson: Here she is. I'll let you say a word to her.
Lady Bird Johnson: Mayor Allen?
Allen: Mrs. Johnson, how are you?
Lady Bird Johnson: Oh, troubled and sad, but God bless those who keep on striving and trying. And you're sure among them.
Allen: Thank you ma'am, and we're certainly proud of the President. And his statement last Sunday night was just magnificent. And he's a great man. And I'm so grateful that he made the statement that he made. It was exactly the right thing. I've tried to follow the same course here in Atlanta, and I hope everything will be all right.
Lady Bird Johnson: Thank you. Thank you. And for many things.
Allen: Thank you, ma'am.
Lady Bird Johnson: Good night.
Allen: Good night.
MLK assassination. Atlanta mayor calls LBJ
WH6804-01-12910
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Richard Daley
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley called President Johnson to ask for federal troops to help control the rioting in Chicago in the wake of the assassination of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King.
Operator: There you are.
President Johnson: Hello?
Richard Daley: Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes, Dick?
Daley: We're in trouble. We need some help.
President Johnson: Yes. I was afraid of that.
Daley: Yes. It's starting to break down in different places.
President Johnson: Yeah.
Daley: And we just met with our people, and they felt that we should try to get some federal assistance. I've talked to [Illinois Lieutenant] Governor [Samuel H.] Shapiro, and he's ready to do anything and everything, so we needed help as soon as we can get it.
President Johnson: All right. First thing you ought to do is talk to the Attorney General [Ramsey Clark∇] and see what kind of finding his legislature's got to make. In the meantime, we'll--I've talked to the Attorney General. I told him I'd call early this morning and told you, because they have to move from California, you see?
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: They won't do any good tonight.
Daley: Mm-hmm. Well, we--
President Johnson: That's why--
Daley: --hope to get them in tonight if we can.
President Johnson: Well--
Daley: Where is Ramsey tonight?
President Johnson: He's right here at the Department of Justice, and I'll switch you over there now, and you can talk to him. But the Governor has to--[unclear comment by Daley] You know the finding they have to make? [Unclear comment by Daley] They have to make a finding in the state that you've used all your [National] Guard, that you've used all your facilities, that you're unable to take care of the situation--
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: --and therefore, you ask for federal troops.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: Then he has to make a finding for the President. The President has to issue an order. That is to keep a President from doing it except for at the instance [sic: insistence] of local officials.
Daley: I see.
President Johnson: [with Daley acknowledging] That's what I anticipated this morning, and I knew dark was coming, and I knew if we thought we'd rather have them, they ought to be moving.
Daley: Well, these fellows kept saying to you, you know, which they will, but now this--we had a meeting [unclear]--
President Johnson: That's what they did to me yesterday and I just cried.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: I chewed--I ate my fingernails off and I finally ordered the men on my own while a mayor couldn't make up his mind. And we got them in, but they got big headlines here. Here's the--"Too Little, Too Late?"
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: "Long Stretches of the Capital Laid to Waste. What it Cost: 690 Injured, 299 Fires." So, what we'll do is we'll--we will have Governor Shapiro call Ramsey and I'll have Ramsey alert to the call. He'll be waiting for it.
Daley: All right.
President Johnson: Just tell him to call the White House, and they'll connect him. That's number--
Daley: I see.
President Johnson: Just tell him to ask for the White House in Washington. They'll connect him. He'll tell him exactly what kind of wire to send. He'll--ask him to dictate it--
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: And then, in the meantime, I'll see where he can find the troops and how many. Do you know how many they want?
Daley: At least 3,000.
President Johnson: Yeah, well, you better say 5[,000].
Daley: Yeah. I think we need 5[,000].
President Johnson: I would tell him--
Daley: Fine.
President Johnson: --what you're do, and we'll be right back to you, Dick.
Daley: I'll have Shapiro call Ramsey--
President Johnson: That's right.
Daley: --through the White House.
President Johnson: That's right. Thanks.
Daley: Thanks, Mr. President--
President Johnson: Right.
MLK assassination. Federal assistance for Chicago riots.
WH6804-01-12911
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Richard Daley
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
President Johnson followed up on Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's request for federal troops to help control the riots in Chicago in the wake of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King's assassination.
Operator: Hello?
President Johnson: Yes?
Operator: Can you hear on here [unclear]?
President Johnson: Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am.
Operator: [Chicago] Mayor [Richard J.] Daley.
Richard Daley: Hello?
President Johnson: Mayor?
Daley: Yes, sir?
President Johnson: Did you get [Illinois Governor Samuel H.] Shapiro?
Daley: Yes.
President Johnson: Is he calling you?
Daley: Yeah. He's calling [Attorney General] Ramsey [Clark] now.
President Johnson: All right. We--I told Ramsey to go ahead, even before he got the call. We won't make a record of it.
Daley: All right.
President Johnson: But just to tell him--tell them to put the planes in the air just as soon as he can.
Daley: Right.
President Johnson: Now, it looks like that you won't get much help until a pretty late hour, midnight until daylight--
Daley: Right.
President Johnson: --and it's hard to get them deployed, but they'll be moved. I told him this morning, just keep them [unclear] with the motors running until we got the request. I wanted to move them in to Kansas City, but Attorney General--or some joint place--
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: But they'll be ready now, [unclear comment by Daley] and they'll be in the air very shortly, and then as soon as we--Shapiro ought to make his call and get his wire down here just as quick as he can to--
Daley: He'll get it. Don't worry about that.
President Johnson: --to the Attorney General, and you--
Daley: They'll be under way then, Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes, sir. They're on the way now.
Daley: All right. Thank you.
President Johnson: They've already been called and told to go.
Daley: All right. Thank you.
President Johnson: OK.
MLK assassination. Federal troops.
WH6804-01-12912
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Ramsey Clark
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Ramsey Clark∇: -- [unclear] Governor [Samuel H. Shapiro] called at 6:40 [P.M.]. I've just--
President Johnson: 5:40 [P.M.]?
Clark: --hung up. Yes, 5:40 [P.M.]. He said that he had just heard from the [Chicago] Mayor [Richard J. Daley]. He's in Springfield. The Mayor says he wants troops, that he said he doesn't really know anything about it, but--and he doesn't know how to know anything about it, so he is requesting troops. And he didn't know how many. I told him that we would confirm this back to him.
President Johnson: He wants 5,000 troops.
Clark: I know how many he wants, Mr. President. The point was that the Governor didn't know how many he wanted, and he's supposed to ask us for them, or we'll get [unclear].
President Johnson: I told the Governor--I told the Mayor that you would dictate to the Governor the form wire--
Clark: He's got it, Mr. President. He's got it.
President Johnson: Just tell him to send it on. I'm sitting here with a proclamation. I'll sign it just as soon as I get it.
Clark: Well, Mr. President, I don't think you ought to sign the proclamation right away. You'll get the--
President Johnson: Yeah.
Clark: You will get the telegram on the ticker.
President Johnson: [Unclear.]
Clark: I think--I told the Governor that we are beginning the movement of troops right now. I had already talked to General Johnson, and he will have troops airborne beginning at 6:00 [P.M.] tonight.
President Johnson: That's good.
Clark: Now, the troops will not close at O'Hare [Airport], the first contingent coming from Fort Hood [Texas] , until--they'll begin to be airborne at 18:00 and they won't close at O'Hare for 7.5 hours. So, that--and t'll be 2:00 [A.M.] before the ones from Fort Carson [Colorado] close. 2:00 tomorrow morning. Seven and a half hours would be 1:30 [A.M.]. It will be 2:00--which would be 12:30 [A.M.] their time. It'll be 2:00 before they close at the Naval Air Station [Denver, Colorado] , the ones coming from Fort Carson. We had already talked, [Deputy Attorney General] Warren Christopher had, to the people at the Pentagon. They had sent, but they had not yet arrived, a military team out there, in civilian clothes, to begin reconnoitering. We should not move now because we won't have command capability for quite some time. We should not federalize the [National] Guard yet, because then we would be responsible for what it does, and we wouldn't even be there to tell them what to do. In addition, we've got to protect ourselves from [Michigan] Governor [George] Romney∇, and we can do it without losing any time. But to do it we've got to hold off signing this thing.
President Johnson: Yeah. We're not--I'm going to--I'm not going to act until we get his request, as you dictated to him if you get it, and then we'll talk about it after you get it.
Clark: Yeah, but you're going to have to--we need to reconnoiter and make the judgment, like we did in Detroit [Michigan] , to keep Romney from saying, "Well, he takes care of his buddies like [Richard] Daley, but he doesn't take care of his political enemies like Romney." You won't lose any time, but you don't want to sign that thing until we can say that we had troops moving all the time. We didn't lose a second, that we had military men there in advance, and they reconnoiter and they made their own judgement, just like [Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus R.] Cy Vance made his judgment in Detroit.
President Johnson: That's right. Unless the Governor would make the judgement. That's why Cy had to make it, because the Governor refused to sign that kind of wire, you know?
Clark: No, that--we had plenty of problems with the Governor, but he asked for the troops, and this was hours after he asked for them, and we said, if you remember, that we had a responsibility too, and our responsibility was to make our own judgment. Now, we know, just as we knew then, that we ought to send them in right away, I think. We know that we're going to decide to send them in. We know we're sending them in. But we want to give the appearance of reconnoitering and having a fact basis to make our own judgment.
President Johnson: Yeah, that's good.
Clark: Otherwise, we will do [unclear]--
President Johnson: Have you got your team on the way out there?
Clark: Well, we've got a military team. Now, I think I should send Warren Christopher and a staff from here to play the civilian role.
President Johnson: Yeah. Yeah.
Clark: And we'll have them airborne within an hour.
President Johnson: All right. That's good. Well, they'll be there a lot closer, a lot before the boys get there.
Clark: And, then I'll be in touch with you on signing this, and the timing and all.
President Johnson: All right. I want to be sure be sure that we're getting all we need here.
Clark: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: As I gather it, what they told me, they had 2,000, and they had a few hundred [Military Police] MPs, then they had another 2,000. I gather from you that all of that group, those three, have already been ordered in.
Clark: Everything that we have air capacity to lift in here--
President Johnson: All right.
Clark: [with Johnson acknowledging] --is here or on it's way. And, the total, including the [Washington,] D.C. National Guard, which is 1,263 men, is 1,000--I'm sorry, 11,492. The two units that are en route are the 503rd Military Police Batallion, from Fort Bragg [North Carolina], which is 550 men, and the Second Brigade is of the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, which is 1,995.
President Johnson: Uh huh. Yeah. And, then, prior that, you had the 82nd group that came in this morning, didn't you?
Clark: That was the First Batallion.
President Johnson: Yeah, that's what it was. That's right. Now--
Clark: I'm sorry, that's a brigade.
President Johnson: Yeah. Is that about all now we have of 82nd that's available?
Clark: That's the 82nd.
President Johnson: Do we have anymore available for Washington if we need them?
Clark: We've got two groups that have quite a long delay time getting here that we will have as soon as the planes that are bringing the Second Brigade of the 82nd are free will be available to bring.
President Johnson: Where do they come from?
Clark: They come from--I have to look back at my notes. They come--they've got a long delay time, but they come from Fort Knox [Kentucky], I think. I'm not really sure. I can look back if you want me to.
President Johnson: But, they wouldn't be here tonight?
Clark: I think, realistically, based on my experience of the Army, that they would not be here tonight.
President Johnson: Are we requesting them, or are we just waiting to see? Have to wait until the planes anyway to--
Clark: We have to wait until the planes are free, and I would assume that we would have a judgment then. I assume the judgment would be we'd bring them on it, but--
President Johnson: Well, why don't we--maybe we want to consider civilian planes.
Clark: Well, I've asked them to look for all National Guard planes and look for commercial jets. I haven't heard back. That was about 2:00.
President Johnson: Was that [General] Johnson?
Clark: I beg your pardon?
President Johnson: Who did you ask?
Clark: David McGifford.
President Johnson: OK. All right.
Clark: All right, sir.
WH6804-01-12913-12914
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Cyrus Vance
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance gave President Johnson an update on the civil unrest in Washington DC in the wake of Dr. Martin Luther King's assassination.
Cyrus Vance: --in the following precincts: the Second Precinct, which is the one I mentioned to you this afternoon, is a troublesome one. The Thirteenth Precinct, to the North of that--these are in the 7th Street area, and going over towards 14th Street. I have expected trouble in the Ninth Precinct, although General O'Malley comes in and says that the situation is now better there than it has been at any other time. However, my own guess is that it may prove fairly hot there during the night. There were some rumors a short while ago that things were acting in up in the Fourteenth and the Eleventh, which is Anacostia, and the adjacent area. Those have not checked out. We checked them out recently with [Metropolitan Police Department Police] Chief [John B.] Layton here, and it is fairly quiet over there. But I think, again, this is a possible area which has not erupted, but it might, and we're going to patrol it very heavily during--
The recording cuts off.
Cyrus Vance updates LBJ on civil unrest in Washington DC. MLK assassination
WH6804-01-12919
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Richard Daley
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Johnson had recently returned from Honolulu where he had met with U.S. military commanders and South Korean President Chung Hee Park. On March 31, Johnson had called for two weeks of greatly reduced U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in order to encourage moves toward negotiations and had offered to meet the North Vietnamese "in any forum" in a "suitable place." Since then, the two sides had engaged in a series of mutual rejections of suggested meeting places such as Warsaw, India, Indonesia, Burma, and Laos.
The Honolulu trip had originally been scheduled for April 5, but had been postponed due to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the subsequent civil unrest in major cities like Chicago, Washington, and Detroit. In this call, Johnson scolds Richard Daley for the delay in the Chicago mayor in calling for federal troops to help control the unrest on the streets of the city.
This recording suffers from poor sound quality.
President Johnson: Hello?
Richard Daley: Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes, [unclear].
Daley: How are you? How are you feeling after your trip?
President Johnson: Well, pretty good. Pretty good. But these [unclear] always get me upset, but we'd had a good meeting and we're just having hell holding all of our allies together.
Daley: Yeah, I hear that.
President Johnson: The communists are [sic] got the North Koreans trying to open a second front in Korea and got those people just frightened to death.
Daley: Hmm.
President Johnson: The sons-of-bitches in this country, the [J. William] Fulbrights and Bobby Kennedys and Teddy [Kennedy] and the rest of them are got the South Vietnamese government scared to death that we're going to sell them out and have a coalition and let the commies take over, and that means all them get killed. And it's just about like my saying I was going to agree with [Everett] Dirksen and we were sending troops in, and you and your wife would be assassinated. You know how you'd feel.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: So we have to keep [unclear]. The Thailanders are getting ready to send me an extra division. And they're good and staunch. But everyday there are about six senators [that] denounce them.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: And, so they're scared to death. And I got the [South] Koreans back and got them to agree to give us 5,000 more men even though they're afraid they'll be invaded tomorrow, and got them to agree that they'd hold still and not raise hell, that they have enough confidence in me that . . . it's awfully hard to get somebody else to have confidence in you when wife hasn't.
Daley: That's right.
President Johnson: And if Mrs. Daley doesn't think much of you, and your boys don't, it's awfully hard for me to get--for me to have much.
Daley: That's right.
President Johnson: So there are all these senators talking all the time, and [Richard] Nixon and the Republicans--these foreigners and actually get a little bit worried. And I'm in pretty strong with them; I think they believe in me, and I think they trust me.
Daley: Oh, I think [unclear]--
President Johnson: But they read all this stuff, and they get upset. In any event, it wound up that they will have their people sit around; we'll report to them every day when we're talking, and they will let--they will follow up pretty generally our guidelines without kicking over the milk bucket, and [unclear] we've presented 15 sites yesterday, and we've got 3 or 4 more in the bag that we haven't presented that we could. Even one or two communist sites that would be reasonable. We couldn't take Cambodia because they're housing the enemy right now and we couldn't get a message in or out of there, even to our Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice. We couldn't take Warsaw because they won't let--first they won't let any Jewish newspaper men go in.
Daley: Oh, I see.
President Johnson: The second thing: they got everything wired, and we would have no security whatever. The third thing: they won't let any of our allies come in, like South Vietnam's got 800,000 men in service, but they couldn't even be present--and Thailand and Korea. And we are afraid they're going to wind up trying to put us in Paris, where [Charles] De Gaulle would propagandize against us. Most people have forgotten what happened in Korea, but [Harry] Truman tried--well, I guess, let's see who it was. [Dwight] Eisenhower yesterday told me of a quotation that Napoleon [Bonaparte] said about the French, and said that the French they were hysterical in victory and [unclear]. And we're so panicky when we want peace that we're willing to do damn near anything, like [former British Prime Minister Neville] Chamberlain did, to get it. And that's the great danger among our people; they all become secretary of states. Now, in the Korean thing, Truman was a pretty tough little guy, but he agreed to meet with them at a communist site. And the first day they showed up our negotiator was placed in a little baby's high chair and theirs was put up on a pedestal like a king.
Daley: Hmm.
President Johnson: They took pictures like that and sent it all through the communist world, showing our midget and their great, powerful man.
Daley: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: The next meeting, they made them all hold white flags and our Admiral [C. Turner] Joy, who was doing our negotiations, had to go over with a white flag in his hand showing he was surrendering. And that wound up all over the communist world. So as a consequence, about a third of the world thought we'd surrendered for nearly two years.
Daley: I see.
President Johnson: And that's what happens when you go to one of these capitals.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: So we've rocked them off balance a little bit with our proposal. I've taken two weeks of it. They've moved in between 20- and 30,000 men. I've got that many more to whip--it's kind of like you're having your problem in Chicago--
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: --and Martin Luther King [Jr.] moving 30,000 warriors in to fight you, and you haven't added anything to your police force.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: They've moved about 30,000 in the last two weeks, while we're sitting here trying to get them to talk.
Daley: Mm-hmm.
President Johnson: I don't know how much longer we can keep them doing that, so [for] that reason I asked [Dean] Rusk∇ last night . . . I had this statement, I was figuring on making it, and then [Secretary of Defense] Clark Clifford∇ and [former President Dwight D.] Eisenhower thought it would be better for the Secretary of State to make it, that the White House oughtn't to be too close to it. So, we got him to make the others, and then we went out to [President Muhammad] Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan, and he was meeting with [Premier Alexey] Kosygin, and we asked the Russians to recommend any of these 15 sites.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: If they didn't recommend them, recommend some that we could live with. We cannot--I cannot ask you to come and live with me if I won't let your wife and children come.
Daley: That's right.
President Johnson: You just can't afford to do it. I can't go to a place where they won't let my allies even show up.
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: And you can imagine what the New York Times and the Washington Post and Newsweek and these Jewish organizations would do--
Daley: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: --if they wouldn't let a Jew come in.
Daley: That's right.
President Johnson: It's just like going to Jackson, Mississippi, to have a convention in the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People].
Daley: [Laughs.]
President Johnson: So that's my problem, and we're working on it, and we think we're making some progress. And at least I'm getting a minimum of static from the candidates, and I'm--we've got a much freer hand. And I think if we can just hold things and not get too political in this country until August, then maybe we can wrap this thing up.
Daley: I see. Are you going to be able to come out to our meeting, or--?
President Johnson: Yes, I'm going to do anything you want me to do that I can.
Daley: Oh, that's wonderful. That'll be [April] 24.
President Johnson: Yeah. That's April 24.
Daley: We'll make it a "Salute to Johnson" night.
President Johnson: All right, well, I'm going to stand with you as long as I've got breath in my body. When you're--
Daley: Well, you--
President Johnson: —right, somewhat reluctantly, and when you're wrong, enthusiastically.
Daley: Well, we're--
President Johnson: [Laughs]
Daley: Well, we're--I don't know if you agreed with what I said, but I think [unclear]--
President Johnson: [Unclear] . . . Goddammit, I don't know how we handle these things. But I know one thing: that we've got to handle them with muscle and with toughness. And we put troops in every place they asked me to, and we came after it [in] reasonably good shape..
Daley: But the thing is, is there's just so much of this destruction takes place before we're able to--that was my observation. We have all these things destroyed before we ever--
President Johnson: Well, that's right. Now, Mayor, if you want my judgment what's wrong, it's wrong with your not asking for it.
Daley: I see.
President Johnson: Now, I told you that morning--
Daley: [Unclear: Yes, you did].
President Johnson: —because I look upon you like I look upon my wife.
Daley: Well, you're.
President Johnson: She's the [unclear] because [unclear] lots of guts and brains and you're my kind of public [unclear: figure]. I thought you were going to have trouble. And I said, "Now, if you tell me"—
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: —"because I want to give you the first call."
Daley: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: "And I'd start moving now." And you said you were going to check into it. But I didn't hear until--
Daley: Happens all the time, as you--as what happens with you--the General of the [National] Guard didn't want them.
President Johnson: That's right. Well, now, what you've got to do next time, though, to hell with these generals, we've got to--when you've got [unclear] and get the [unclear] manpower [unclear] move them in.
Daley: Well, that's what I think--we have to have them closer, if we can.
President Johnson: Well, I don't know--you can't change their training bases, but you can give us--you see, if we had moved them that morning, they'd have been there by 4:00 [P.M.]. [Unclear.] And that's what we've got to do. I told them to send up all of our people. We've got them folks [unclear] sent for that purpose. [Unclear.]
Daley: Yeah.
President Johnson: So they've got some of them in Nevada and some of them in California and some in Oklahoma and Texas and [unclear], but we've got airplanes and we can move them. And what we ought to do is move them into these airports close by. And we don't have to deploy them until you need them. Then you can say "send them now" and they can be there in an hour.
Daley: That's right. Well, we had quite a delay off, though, of the National Guard in getting in. It took them about ten hours.
President Johnson: Well, we've got to move those. Now, we've got to get [unclear] somewhere. And what you do is you get you the man that can bark orders and do what you want him to do, and then you and I'll keep in touch, and when you're having problems, well, we'll just move them up--10, 15, 20,000, running out of our ears. I'd rather move them and not need them than need them and not have them.
Daley: You're right. Well, thanks, and you'll be with us Wednesday.
President Johnson: Yes, sir.
Daley: Will Mrs. [Lady Bird] Johnson come out too?
President Johnson: I don't know, but [unclear].
Daley: Oh, well wonderful.
President Johnson: [Unclear.] I'll let you know tonight.
Daley: Thanks, Mr. President.
President Johnson: OK.
Vietnam peace talks. Chicago riots in wake of MLK assassination.
WH6806-01-13113
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Edward Kennedy
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
A few minutes fter midnight on June 5, 1968, Democratic presidential candidate Senator Robert F. Kennedy was shot shortly after claiming victory in the California Democratic primary in Los Angeles. He was rushed to hospital in a critical condition.
At the time of the shooting, Senator Edward Kennedy had been in San Francisco, where he had been campaigning on behalf of his brother. Returning to his hotel after a campaign event, he learned of the shooting after he turned on the television and saw coverage of the shooting's aftermath. He rushed to the Good Samaritan Hospital in Los Angeles where Robert Kennedy∇ had been taken. Hours later, it fell to Edward Kennedy to call his father, Joseph, in Cape Code to tell him that a second of his sons had been shot.
Twenty-five hours after being shot, at 3:44 [A.M.] Pacific Time on June 6, Robert Kennedy died.
In this call, about four hours after Robert Kennedy was pronounced dead, President Johnson called Senator Edward Kennedy to offer his condolences. Johnson was in the Mansion at the White House. Kennedy was in Los Angeles.
Editors' Note: Kennedy's side of the call is difficult to hear at times.
Edward Kennedy: Mr. President, how are you? Ted Kennedy here.
President Johnson: Ted, I know what a burden you bear, but your shoulders are broad, and you’ve got lots of people who love you and who want to help you and make it as bearing and . . . as possible. So I don’t want to add to your burdens by having to answer my call, but I didn’t feel like that a wire would just be enough. [Lady] Bird [Johnson] and I wired your parents and Ethel [Kennedy] and we don’t want to require them to just be answering a lot of our calls. But I did want to talk to you direct and tell you that anything and everything that I have or the country has or that we can get, is at your disposal, if you’ll just tell [James] Flug to tell Jim Jones.
And we are grieved and wish there was something we could do. But we can’t. I was up from 3:30 [A.M.] here yesterday morning until 2 [A.M.] last night and then I was up since 5 [A.M.], and you—I know what you’ve gone through because we just had a tenth of it here. But if there is anything, why, we’re as close as the telephone, and your boy Flug has been handling things with us. We’ve told him. And if you’ll just whisper, why, your requests will be our command.
Kennedy: Well, Mr. President, you’re most kind. I can’t tell you how much [unclear]. You know that both my parents appreciated your call five years ago and they certainly did the other night. [Unclear] you've really [been] terribly kind to me personally and I know the members of the family want you to know. I appreciate it more [unclear] you understand that it's [unclear] have to [unclear] feel our way along. But knowing that your call and those expressions were very, very [unclear]. Thank you for them.
President Johnson: Well, I’ll be seeing you. But please, just tell any of your folks to talk to my boy Jim Jones. He—you may not have met him, but he’s a boy that was with Howard Edmondson [Kennedy acknowledges] and who took Marvin Watson∇’s place when he moved over. He’s the old Kenny O’Donnell desk.
Kennedy: Yeah.
President Johnson: And he works—he and Tom Johnson--work with, I think you’ve got a boy named Flug.
Kennedy: Yes, that’s right, Jim Flug.
President Johnson: And they like him. So you just tell him whatever we can help do, well, we want to do, in any way we can. And may God be with you.
Kennedy: Thank you very, very much, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Bye.
Kennedy: And I appreciate it very much.
President Johnson: Come in any time you feel like it. Let’s get together when this is all over.
Kennedy: Fine, Mr. President.
President Johnson: We've been too few of us, and we’ve got to stay a little closer together. Bye.
Kennedy: Thank you so much, Mr. President.
President Johnson: Bye.
WH6809-04-13432-13433
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jim Jones, Walt Rostow
Location:
White House Telephone
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Editorial Note: The State Department Office of the Historian transcribed this conversation and published the transcript in: FRUS, 1964-68: 7: Document 38. The version published here has been revised and updated by the Presidential Recordings Program.
Jim Jones: [The President is in] a meeting right now. I'll have to call him out. Will you inform the party there?
Operator: Yes.
Jones: Do you have him on?
Operator: Yes.
Jones: All right. Let me . . .
Operator: It's up to you.
Jones: Yeah, let me tell him that.
Operator: Fine. [Pause] Mr. [Richard] Nixon is on.
Jones: Hello?
Richard Nixon∇: Yes?
Jones: This is [White House aide] Jim Jones. The President's in a meeting right now. If you'll hold just a minute, I'll try to get him out right away.
Nixon: If--I would appreciate it, Mr. Jones.
Jones: All right, fine. Just a second.
Long pause.
President Johnson: Hello?
Nixon: Hello?
President Johnson: Hello?
Nixon: Hello, Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes.
Nixon: I'm awfully sorry to bother you. This is Dick Nixon.
President Johnson: Yes, Dick.
Nixon: And the only reason that I bother you is that I'm going very shortly to be on a television program, and there just came over the wire this statement by Hubert [Humphrey] with regard to--saying that he would have a bombing pause, if elected. And the only purpose of my call is to determine whether there's any change in our own policy at this time with regard to what position the administration is taking.
President Johnson: No, there is not. I have not read his speech. It has not been discussed with me. I say this in strict confidence.
Nixon: I understand.
President Johnson: I don't want you to quote me or repeat me, so I'll talk freely.
Nixon: I won't. I won't. I'm not even letting anybody know I called you.
President Johnson: I have not read it. I've just had the press secretary [George Christian∇] call me with the flash that he says he'll stop the bombing pause--he'll stop the bombing if elected. And then it indicates that he has to have direct or indirect, or deed or act, assurance that they would respect the DMZ.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: I don't know really what he is saying. [Former U.N. Ambassador George W.] Ball said, two or three days ago when he quickly resigned, that the bombing was not . . . well, he said that the newspapers were pressing that too much, it was just a part of a whole big general picture.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: So I was rather surprised that as his adviser, that Hubert would take this position, because it looks like a little bit inconsistent with what Ball said.
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: I haven't reconciled it, because I don't have the text. Our position is this: We are very anxious to stop the bombing. We went out before we met with the [Congressional] leadership prior to the Chicago [Democratic National] Convention and asked [Creighton] Abrams what effect the bombing operations in Vietnam were having. He came back and said, [reading and paraphrasing] "We believe we're destroying or damaging 15 percent of the trucks moving into the South. It is our conviction the air interdiction program has been the primary agent which has reduced trucks detected by 80 percent between mid-July and the present time. A third effect is to prevent the enemy from massing artillery and air defense means in the area to the north of the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] from which they can attack our forces." You see, [unclear], they have to stop up [at] the 20th [parallel] now, and we're already up to the 19th—we haven't gone above that. But if we stop the bombing, they could just come day and night, with lights on and lights off, bumper to bumper, right down the DMZ where they'd be poised to hit us.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: So, in the light of these three things--the trucks that he's stopping, the 80 percent between mid-July and the present time, and the massing [of] the artillery at the DMZ, then we said, [reading and paraphrasing] Well, "what would be the effect of a cessation of that bombing?" He says, "First, military matériel would be able to reach the DMZ or the borders of Laos unimpeded. We believe the current attrition from truck destruction alone, not to mention truck parts, is running several hundred tons per day. The truck flow could be expected to return to the mid-July level or higher within as little as a week. We're talking about an increase--repeat increase--in southwest movements--southward movement--which could amount to as much as 1,500 tons per day or more. Next, the enemy would mass artillery, air defense means, [and] ground units north of the DMZ for use against our troops. Finally, freed from interdiction north of the 17th degree, the enemy could move reinforcements to the DMZ by truck or rail, thus drastically shortening transit time."
Then we said, [reading and paraphrasing] "Is there any possibility of your providing even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stop the bombing of North Vietnam?" He said, "We would have to expect a several-fold increase in U.S. and allied casualties in I Corps." [repeating] "We would have to expect a several-fold increase in U.S. and allied casualties . . ."
Now, for that reason, our people took the position in the [Democratic Party's campaign] platform that we would stop the bombing when we were assured that it would not cost us men by doing so.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: Now, we don't have that assurance as of now. At least, I do not have it. Then he goes on, I'm quoting Abrams now, [reading and paraphrasing] "With the bombing authority now in effect, I am able with forces available to limit the enemy's capability in South Vietnam by interdicting his roads and destroying a substantial amount of his munitions before they reach South Vietnam. In addition, I am able to suppress his artillery and air defense north of Ben Hai so that our positions south of the DMZ are secure." Now, this is the key question. "If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were to be suspended, the enemy in ten days to two weeks could develop a capability"--be careful of that word "capability"--"in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity, and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has." In ten days he'd increase his capability five times.
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: "I cannot agree to place our forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose." Now, that was reviewed with the joint leadership. They know that. That has not been made public, because we don't want to notify Hanoi that that is our estimate.
Nixon: Sure. Sure.
President Johnson: Now, our position--which I've been very careful with you and very careful with Humphrey, and I've told both of you the same thing.
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: And you both have the same information. Our position has been this: we are anxious to stop the bombing, we'd be glad to stop the bombing, if we can have any assurance that (A) they would respect the DMZ, thereby not endangering these four divisions, the three of ours and one allied, or stop shelling the cities—
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: —or, and most important of all, talk to the GVN, talk to the Government of [South] Vietnam. Now, we do not think that we ought to cause that government to fall and immobilize a million men that are going to be under arms this year, by meeting in Paris and dividing up their country or deciding what they're going to do without their being present. So our first condition all along has been to say that they have got to be present. They have consistently refused to agree to do that. We have said you can bring the NLF if you want to. But we can't decide the future of South Vietnam--it now has an elected government--in their absence without their presence. So, in effect, we have said we are interested in what you have to say on these three subjects: DMZ, GVN presence, shelling the cities.
Nixon: Yeah. But you don't insist on all three, just the--
President Johnson: Well, we'd like to have all three.
Nixon: Yeah, yeah.
President Johnson: But we ask them to make their commitment to us--tell us what they would do.
Nixon: On any one of these matters.
President Johnson: Now, we don't say that you've got to sign in blood beforehand. But we do say this: "What would happen if we stopped the bombing Sunday and we walked in Monday morning with the GVN? Would you walk out?" They have not responded, and we don't know what they would do. Now, until we do know, and that is very important to us, we don't want to gamble American lives. And when we do know, then we will have to make that decision.
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: But they're making it now, and we don't know what they're going to do about it. They may decide that they'll try to hang on until January. They're taking a terrible--they're paying a terrible price. Now, the message--the information I gave you came in before the [Democratic National] Convention and we met with the joint leadership, Republican and Democratic. I had today a wire that came in yesterday from him. I'm trying to find it . . . from Abrams, the net of which he says that he thinks he is destroying between five and ten thousand military per--is it--
Johnson covers the phone and speaks aside with Rostow.
—destroying between five and ten thousand military per month in Vietnam by his bombing alone. We are losing, oh, seven, eight hundred a month--
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: --our people, all told, a couple of hundred a week, 100 to 200 a week, maybe 250 sometimes. Now, we have 200 million [population]; we're losing 7[00] to 800 a month, and he's losing 5[000] to 10,000 just from the bombing. Now, if we stop that . . . he says that they have now a hundred-odd thousand . . .
Johnson covers the phone and speaks aside to Rostow.
Nixon: Hello?
President Johnson: Wait, I'm just trying [unclear].
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: [muffled] I've got his wire on the bombing, but [unclear], Dick, and I just answered your call out of a meeting.
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: But he says very much that he's very much opposed to the bombing [halt], as of last night, to stopping the bombing—
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: —unless we get some of these things. Now, our negotiators have been unable to get them up to now. We have a meeting Wednesday. I thought after Wednesday I might have further talks with [U.S. Delegate to the Paris Peace Talks] Cy Vance and [Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell] Harriman and see what they had to say there. But--
Nixon: The way this--the way--I'm just seeing the AP dispatch here, and of course the papers tend to--the press tends to always make a bigger difference than there is. He says, that this was a dramatic--they say, a dramatic moving away from the Johnson administration war policy. But when you read further down, it says Humphrey said, "in weighing the risk, he would place importance on evidence--direct or indirect, by deed or word--of Communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone." So that would indicate that he wasn't just going to do it unilaterally, but--
President Johnson: I think the safest position for anyone to take--he takes it part of the way in his position, but he does not--
Johnson covers the phone and speaks aside to Rostow.
Nixon: I can't quite hear you. Hello? Hello? Hello? Hello? I can't quite hear you.
President Johnson: I want to put [National Security Adviser] Walt Rostow∇ on in just a second. [aside, to Rostow] Summarize for him Abrams' latest wire just as if he could read it.
Rostow: Mr. Nixon? This is Walt Rostow, sir.
Nixon: Yeah, yeah, sure.
Rostow: We went out again to General Abrams, and put the same questions we put a month ago.
Nixon: Yeah.
Rostow: His response was that the weather was changing and there were--he'd had some successful operations, but essentially, he would make the same answers that he would a month ago, namely that unless we got some assurance on the DMZ, we would take a very heavy military consequence from a cessation of bombing at this time.
Nixon: Well, to an extent, of course, I think Humphrey leaves that as a possibility where he talks about, that he would . . . you know, the press always tends to play the biggest part of the story. And it says, "But in weighing the risk, he said, he would place importance on evidence--direct or indirect, by deed or word--of Communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone."
Rostow: Yes, I noticed that on the ticker, Mr. Nixon.
Nixon: But, on the other hand, this will be interpreted, as I'm sure you know, as a dramatic move away from the administration. It's my intention not to move in that direction, I think, for this fundamental reason: As long as the administration is still negotiating, I think we've got--I think that my position has to be, in good conscience, that unless and until there is some evidence of a reciprocal step, that we could not stop the bombing.
President Johnson: Yes.
Nixon: That's still the administration's position?
President Johnson: Yes, except "reciprocal," Dick, is a bad word with them.
Nixon: Yeah [unclear].
President Johnson: I'd say unless they give us some assurance—
Nixon: Some--
President Johnson: —that it wouldn't--or, unless we had some indication that it would not cost the lives of our men.
Nixon: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: I found this memo, if you want me to read it to you very quickly. [reading and paraphrasing] "What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam?" This is September 28 from Abrams to Johnson. "Deterrence is the first effect. Our air presence is keeping the enemy from moving his air forces, rail system, [and] logistic bases southward toward the DMZ. After better than 70 days of effort, it is now clear that our concentrated efforts to choke traffic at four prime areas and six road points and at six critical water points in North Vietnam have reduced the enemy's detected flow of troops from the mid-July high of 1,000 per day to less than 150 since that time. Southbound truck detections the past few weeks have numbered fewer than a hundred per day. If the bombing in North Vietnam ceases, a return to the level of a thousand per day would have to be expected. These efforts have also prevented the enemy from massing artillery, supplies, and air defense means for sudden attack against the DMZ. Possibly of greater consequence is the combined Navy and 7th Air Force interdiction efforts in North Vietnam [which] have effectively impeded the transshipment southward of a significant stock of supplies which continue to move into Thanh Hoa and Vinh areas by rail, road, and boat.
"Question number two: What would be the military effect of a cessation of the bombing? "Answer: (A) The major result of a bombing halt would be the enemy's increased capability to position and maintain large ground forces north of the DMZ in close proximity to our U.S. and ARVN forces deployed to defend the I Corps. He could concentrate his artillery, armor, air forces, and air defense forces in direct support of these ground forces and place them in a position to initiate a large-scale invasion of South Vietnam with minimum warning time. (B) We can expect the enemy to develop forward logistic complexes. (C) The enemy will devote a maximum initial effort to reconstruction of his lines of communication south of the 19th parallel. (D) Airfields south of the 19th will return to service. A bombing pause would permit the North Vietnamese Army to make fuller use of land lines in communication. Country-wide, the North Vietnamese Army presently devotes an estimated 80,000 troops to his air defense mission." Now, these are two good figures: [with emphasis] "The North Vietnamese Army devotes an estimated 80,000 troops to his air defense mission." "Plus, perhaps 110-200,000 laborers. Complete bombing cessation would allow the North Vietnamese Army several options, any of which would increase the threat to American forces in or near South Vietnam.
"Question number three: Since March 31"--that was my speech--"what is the average number of trucks destroyed and trucks damaged per week? What is the average number of trucks sighted in the panhandle per week? What is your best estimate of the total number of trucks sighted and unsighted that flow through the panhandle each week and the proportion of this total that we're not getting? Answer: The enemy's day movements of trucks has been virtually halted. As a consequence of night attacks against the above areas, the enemy has ceased moving in convoys and has been unwilling to allow his trucks to wait behind crossing points. As a result, most of his trucks have been kept north of Route Package 1, moving out singly under the cover of darkness. Consequently, fewer kills have been possible. In the week of July 14-20, an average of 508 trucks per day were sighted from all sources. After that period, there was a steady decrease in truck traffic as the enemy felt the full weight of our interdiction bombing campaign concentrated at key traffic choke points. In the week prior to Typhoon Bess on September 4, the sightings had decreased from 508 trucks per day to 151 per day. Since September 4, truck kills and damages have averaged 32 per week as a consequence of nearly complete blockage of his [unclear] choke point.
Question four: What is the estimate of military casualties we inflict on the enemy each week in the bombing of North Vietnam? We believe the military casualties resulting from intensive air strikes since mid-July 1968 have increased significantly. As in our previous submission, casualties on the order of five to ten thousand per month do not seem unreasonable.
Question number five: Is there any possibility of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties America would take if we stopped the bombing in North Vietnam? Answer: I have reviewed the factors considered in my response to this question. Further examination of the results of the air interdiction campaign convinces me that my estimate at that time remains valid. In summary, a cessation of offensive action north of the DMZ would enable the enemy to amass personnel and equipment along the DMZ. It would facilitate his infiltration and logistics support across and around the DMZ. It would increase the air, artillery, and ground threat to our forces located in northern I Corps. I must emphasize the adverse effect of a cessation without reciprocity on the morale of the officers and men of my command, as well as those of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces, who would be exposed to increased enemy pressure from a newly created sanctuary. Conversely, a complete bombing cessation would raise the enemy's confidence and his aggressiveness. It will validate his doctrine of the insurgency war. It would confirm his unrealistic view of the military, political, and psychological posture[s] of the warring parties. It would portray to him increased strength on his part and growing weakness on ours. It will demonstrate to him that he is winning. Above all, it will convince him that he must continue or increase the current tempo of the war to gain the ultimate victory. Militarily and psychologically, a complete bombing cessation will shift the balance significantly toward the enemy." Unquote. Now, that's today.
Nixon: That's just today.
President Johnson: That's today. Now, we have not given that to the Vice President. He has not asked for it. We will give it to him if he does ask for it.
Nixon: Sure.
President Johnson: I didn't call him [unclear comment by Nixon], because I don't want to be coaching in this campaign. I'm trying to run the war.
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: The position that I think is safe--
Nixon: Yeah, what is it? [Nixon chuckles]
President Johnson: --is the position that the President—and there's just one President—the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador Bunker∇, and General Abrams are responsible for that situation in Vietnam. They're going to be responsible until a new President is elected. Therefore, that you're not going to try to look over their shoulders without all the information and tell them what is best. You have to have some confidence in the professional army, and in the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense. And you believe that every American wants peace, but you're not, in order to win a campaign, not going to be in a position of trying to overrule all of these men without any information that would justify your doing it.
Nixon: Well, that's what I've been saying. Of course, I think on this, too, I can just say what I have said previously, that as I understand it, it is the position that if there's any evidence that there would be--that a bombing pause could take place without endangering our men, we'll go ahead and do it. Isn't that really our position?
President Johnson: Well, not necessarily. We have said we favor the stopping of bombing if it doesn't endanger our men. And--
Nixon: You name those three things.
President Johnson: --of course, then we want them to close that DMZ. We don't want them to take advantage of us.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: That's San Antonio. We said we don't want them to take advantage if they'll assure us.
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: We said don't shell the cities.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: The most important thing though, Dick--
Nixon: Is the recognition of the government [of South Vietnam].
President Johnson: We've got to--well, not necessarily--yes, just letting them hear, just let them sit in.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: We've got a million men there.
Nixon: I know.
President Johnson: Now, if they pull out, we're in one hell of a shape. We've lost everything.
Nixon: [Unclear.] We're done. That's right.
Well, I hesitate to bother you, but I appreciate--
President Johnson: No, I think that--
Nixon: I just want to be sure that I was up-to-date on everything.
President Johnson: I think that--I think that--
Nixon: This is the kind of [unclear]--
President Johnson: --the least you can get into tactics and strategy, the better any candidate is. And I say that to American Party, Republican Party, or Democratic Party. And I'd put that responsibility on somebody else until I had to assume it myself and was elected.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: And then I would just say to them that you believe that the Joint Chiefs, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense have made our position clear at Paris, and that you're not going to overrule that position unless you have more information than you have.
Nixon: Right. Right.
President Johnson: OK.
Nixon: That's what I'm going to continue to say.
President Johnson: Thank you, Dick. Bye.
Nixon: [chuckles] Appreciate your time. Bye.
President Johnson: Bye.
Vietnam bombing halt. Humphrey's speech. Abrams' assessment.
WH6810-01-13501
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Everett Dirksen
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Editorial Note: The State Department Office of the Historian transcribed this conversation and published an excerpt of the transcript in: FRUS, 1964-68, 7: Document 42. The version published here has been revised and updated by the Presidential Recordings Program.
President Johnson: Hello?
Everett Dirksen: Yeah. Are you at liberty to make some comment on Hubert's [Humphrey] speech last night?
President Johnson: Except in the greatest confidence—
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: I would just say that it depends a lot on your interpretation of it.
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: [with Dirksen acknowledging] He did not discuss it with our people, [Dean] Rusk∇ or [Walt] Rostow∇, or anybody that we're aware of. The first I knew about it was when the press called me and pointed up that it was on the ticker. So it was prepared without our knowledge or without our advice. It . . . interpreted, I think--a literal interpretation would show there's no great difference in it and our present policy. I think his intention is to try to do that without . . . and still leave the impression that there is. Do you get what I mean?
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: [with Dirksen acknowledging] Well, here is our present policy: we're ready, anxious, willing, eager to stop the bombing just as we are eager to stop the war. But we just can't stop one side of it. The other side's got to stop something too. We found that when we stop and they don't stop, it kills more men. So we have said to them, "If we did stop the bombing, what would you do?" They're now considering that. They have not given us a firm answer.
Now, one of the things we've said to them, "If we stop the bombing, would you de-militarize, would you reinstitute the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone]?" Up to now they've said, "No." Now, Hubert's speech, the way I read it--and I emphasize "I"--the way I read it says that before taking any action, he would have to have direct or indirect—[by] deed or word—that they were re-instituting the DMZ. Now if that is a fact, that's all right, that's important.
Now, the second thing that we feel we ought to have--we think that we can't go to this--make a peace for that area like [Adolph] Hitler and [Neville] Chamberlain did without Czechoslovakia being present--we don't think you can make peace for that area [aside, Johnson tells someone to "come on in"] without the elected government having its voices heard, anyway. We don't object to their bringing whoever they want to--NLF, anybody. We've always said their voice could be heard. But they refuse to have anything to do with this government that's elected and has a million-man army that's doing a lot of the fighting. We don't ever report it and don't give them credit for it, but they're losing more everyday than we lose, and they are just 14 million and we're 200 [million].
So that is a second consideration. They must talk to the GVN [Government of (South) Vietnam]. Now, if they don't, and this group walked out from under us, we'd really be left--we'd stand to lose a lot. And the thing that both [Ellsworth] Bunker∇ and [Creighton] Abrams, the two best men we have, are more concerned about than anything else is something that would make them wobbly and make them distrust us and make them think we'd sell them out. Now that's GVN.
Now, Hubert's speech says that they'd have to negotiate "in good faith." Now, if he means by "good faith" talking to the GVN, which he could, that's what we think ought to be done. He doesn't say that, though, spell it out. He just says they'd have to negotiate "in good faith."
The third thing: if I stop the bombing, and they shelled Saigon tomorrow and Danang tomorrow and kill thousands as they did during Tet, everybody in this country and all the soldiers there would certainly demand that I do something about it. So, I would have to reinstitute the bombing. Now, if you're going to reinstitute it, there's no use stopping it. So we ought to know that they wouldn't shell the cities. Now, the only way he would know it is to have some understanding with them that they "act in good faith," that's the phrase that's used.
Now, both [former UN∇ Ambassador George] Ball and [former UN Ambassador Arthur] Goldberg∇ think that you ought to stop the bombing, just quit bombing. [Clark] Clifford thinks you've got to have conditions to it. Bunker and Abrams think you've got to have conditions to it. All the Joint Chiefs think you've got to have conditions to it. Now, Bunker is a liberal, progressive fellow and a hell of a good diplomat, the best in the service. But he's an old Republican businessman before he ever got in the service, although he's progressive. And he just says, "You'll lose everything if you don't have this government present." Rusk feels very strongly about it. And needless to say, I do. Now, up to now, the Vice President has pretty generally agreed with us. I can't interpret his speeches any more than I can interpret [Richard] Nixon's. But if he means by his statement that "direct or indirect" that they have to give him before he takes action assurance on the DMZ, well, that would be very appealing. But, of course, Rusk thinks that Hanoi will knock it down today. They've never been able to tell us that. We don't know why they'd tell him that next January. Do you follow me there?
Dirksen: I do.
President Johnson: So, I would think that Nixon's position that he would take would be that these conferences are going on, that he doesn't have all the information, that he's not in touch with them, that he's not responsible, that he doesn't want to do anything that would appear divided in this country, and therefore it's the Democrats' responsibility, period. And not get into the war thing any more than he has to. I would think that would be the best thing for Hubert, but apparently he was trying to get the [Eugene] McCarthy vote. Now, the way I see the thing, there are 43 percent of the people for Nixon, there are 28 for Hubert, and there are 21 for [George] Wallace. So when you take 43 and 21, Wallace and Nixon, there's 64 percent. Now, there are only 8 percent undecided. Now, let's assume all of those are McCarthy people. That doesn't do him any good. If he puts 8 percent with his 28, he's just got 36. So he's got to do something to get some of the Nixon people back or some of the Wallace people back. And I wouldn't think that this kind of a speech would get either of them. I may be wrong. I believe he's been losing because they have been doubtful on Vietnam, and a lot of the Democrats, particularly in our section of the country, have been going to Wallace. That's my judgment.
Dirksen: Yeah. Well, that's the way I size it up.
President Johnson: So, I have said all along, and Nixon has said all along, that's how . . . we've just got one government and we've got to stop [politics] at the water's edge, and we can't play politics with the war.
Dirksen: No.
President Johnson: And we just cannot ignore Bunker and ignore Abrams, our commander in the field; we cannot ignore all of our Joint Chiefs--there are four of them; we can't ignore our secretary [of defense]; we can't ignore the secretary of state; and we can't ignore the President, who have all the information involved. So that's the way we see it.
Dirksen: Yeah. Well, thanks much.
President Johnson: Now, what do you know?
Dirksen: I don't know a damn thing.
Pause.
President Johnson: I see the folks . . . well, I'll talk to you after you get through, today or tomorrow. I've--I was--I had a note here on this fellow Kidd, who is the man you suggested that--
Dirksen: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: Yeah, they've got some problems. He's a very young fellow out there, and they don't think he'd be a very good commissioner.
Dirksen: Oh, I see.
President Johnson: So we ought to look at that.
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: There's a Republican vacancy on the [Office of] Economic Opportunity. I want to recommend these folks, and I want who you-all want.
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: The best one we have found is a negro--
Dirksen: You mentioned that [unclear].
President Johnson: —in Philadelphia. Well, there's here too. But there's one now in Philadelphia. The Philadelphia organization objected to him because he's a Republican in Philadelphia. But you might talk to Scott about him if you get a chance. He was a former law partner, a fellow named [A. Leon] Higginbotham [Jr.]. I forget his name, but I'll get it up to you today.
Dirksen: OK.
President Johnson: And if I can get--if I can override the organization we ought to send him up, because I think he'd be good for you, and we need a man on that place.
Now, are you going to cause any trouble on [James Russell] Wiggins∇ [for] the United Nations?
Dirksen: No, sir.
President Johnson: I understood [Karl] Mundt was fussing around about "captive nations."
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: [with Dirksen acknowledging] Wiggins retired from the post, and he was up in Maine. I called him. Rusk is going to be up there most of the time. I'm going to rely on Rusk. But I just thought it was the best way. But I saw Fulbright∇ was fussing a little yesterday, because he says Wiggins had supported us on Vietnam. I had never thought the Washington Post had been too strong for me, but he seemed to think they'd been a great champion of mine and that I was paying him off. He's never been in my office but once since I've been President, and then came to talk of District of Columbia council. But--
Dirksen: I mentioned him around and I got no particular flak on him.
President Johnson: All right.
Now, I gather you're not going to get your votes--you're not going to cut off cloture.
Dirksen: No.
President Johnson: All right. Then what we going to do?
Dirksen: Well, I don't know. [chuckles] Then it's up to Mike [Mansfield∇].
President Johnson: Well, I mean, though, what--can you--do you think it ought go on over there until January?
Dirksen: Yeah, I don't think you've got a show now. So the [unclear] will just be a stalemate.
President Johnson: Well, suppose [Earle] Warren doesn't serve. Suppose you just send another name up?
Dirksen: Well, then you've got that problem.
President Johnson: Well, if you got a good man you wouldn't have a problem, would you?
Dirksen: Oh, I wouldn't think so.
President Johnson: Let me ask you this. Now, I don't want you to mention this to another human. Can I talk to you that way about it?
Dirksen: Yes, sir.
President Johnson: What if we sent Tom Clark up there to act, as Chief Justice?
Dirksen: Well, he's served before. There was no heat on him at any time, as far as I know. And the very fact that he's off doesn't make any difference; he just goes right back on.
President Johnson: What I thought was, you see--I don't know if this would ever work out, but if the Republicans--he wouldn't serve too long, you see.
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: But I think it would unify the country and wouldn't look like you-all are playing politics trying to get a justice. You're going to get [Hugo] Black--he's 84--and he can't go on, and nobody on the court really wants him to act because they don't know the stability there; they've got a problem.
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: You've got [William] Douglas, who's got bad heart. You've got [John Marshall] Harlan, who's got eye trouble. So you got three right there.
Dirksen: That's right.
President Johnson: But a lot of folks feel that the [Robert] Griffin effort [against Abe Fortas] was a pure political effort, particularly in the light of what you said. And he said nobody should serve--that lame ducks shouldn't appoint anybody.
Dirksen: Yeah, right.
President Johnson: Now, if we took Clark, who just retired on account of his son and sent him up there as Chief [Justice] instead of letting [Earl] Warren go on acting . . . The Southerners all urge me to name Clark as Chief because of his crime record and so on and so forth. [John] McClelland and [James] Eastland and them thought that he would be good.
Dirksen: Yeah.
Preisdent Johnson: I would have to get me a new attorney general.
Dirksen: Well, I think [James?] Sewell.
President Johnson: But I could do that for a month, two months.
Dirksen: Right.
President Johnson: But I would not want Clark to get butchered, and . . . but he served with great distinction, and I think all the conservatives like him. It'd be pretty hard for a Democrat to be against him--
Dirksen: Definitely.
President Johnson: —because he's really on the court now; he just stepped aside on account of his son.
Dirksen: That's right. Yeah. [Unclear.]
President Johnson: Could you support Clark?
Dirksen: I could.
President Johnson: Don't say that to a human.
Dirksen: I won't.
President Johnson: I haven't talked to Mansfield. But I'll talk to you later about it.
Dirksen: All right.
President Johnson: And I'd think that that would be better than us messing around here and letting them think we're playing politics with the [Supreme] Court.
Dirksen: Yeah.
President Johnson: OK.
Dirksen: It's under the hat.
President Johnson: Right. OK.
Vietnam bombing halt. Humphrey's speech. Supreme Court.
WH6811-04-13723-13724-13725
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Editorial Note: The State Department Office of the Historian transcribed this conversation and published the transcript in: FRUS, 1964-1968: 7: Document 207. The version published here has been revised by the Presidential Recordings Program.
Operator: Yes, sir?
President Johnson: Operator, I had to come to another phone—I was eating dinner—and go ahead and put Mr. [Richard] Nixon on.
Operator: Fine. There you are.
President Johnson: Hello?
Richard Nixon∇: Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes, Dick?
Nixon: How are you? Did I interrupt your dinner? [Unclear.]
President Johnson: That's all right.
Nixon: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: I was eating with some folks, but I came in another room. That's why I didn't want to talk [unclear].
Nixon: Oh, well, that's too bad.
President Johnson: No, it isn't.
Nixon: I'm just sitting here with your old friend [Bebe] Rebozo∇.
President Johnson: Oh, give him my love. I think he's one of the finest persons I ever knew.
Nixon: Yeah, well, when we've finished, I want you to say hello to him.
President Johnson: I would love to.
Nixon: He is a great admirer of yours. [Unclear]--
President Johnson: He's been awfully sweet to me.
Nixon: Let me say this that--
President Johnson: I'm glad that you've got a Rebozo because he gave me a lot of comfort when I needed it lots.
Nixon: Yeah. Right. I had a nice visit with the Vice President today.
President Johnson: Good.
Nixon: And [Senator Edmund S.] Muskie [D-Maine], and they went on down to the Virgin Islands. And I want you to know how much we appreciated your wire and also Lady Bird's call to Pat [Nixon]. That was awful nice.
President Johnson: Yeah. It was.
Nixon: And then, as I understand it, we've worked it out now that it won't inconvenience you. We'll see you Monday at 1:30 [P.M.] up at the White House.
President Johnson: That's good. That's right.
Nixon: Good.
Now, getting to the one, the key point: is there anything I could do before that on this business of South Vietnam? If you want me to do something, you know I'll do anything, because we're not going to let these people stop these peace things, if you think I can do something.
President Johnson: Dick, I told [Senate Minority Leader Everett M.] Dirksen [R-Illinois] last night I thought it'd be better to do it that way than to be calling on the trips. I think this: These people are proceeding on the assumption that folks close to you tell them to do nothing until January 20.
Nixon: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: Now, we think--
Nixon: I know who they're talking about, too. Is it [Senator] John Tower∇ [R-Texas]?
President Johnson: Well, he's one of several. Mrs. [Anna] Chennault is very much in there.
Nixon: Well, she's very close to John.
President Johnson: And the Embassy is telling the [South Vietnamese] President [Nguyen Van Thieu] and the President is acting on this advice. He started doing it back about October 18, following our talk on the conversation on October 16. I had two bad breaks in the month of October. The first one came from the other side. Hanoi felt that because of what Bundy had said--Mac Bundy—
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: --that to withdraw troops, and what Humphrey had said that he wouldn't--
Nixon: They could wait.
President Johnson: Well, he just said, "I don't--I will stop the bombing, period, I don't mean comma or semi-colon." So, Hanoi picked up the next day and went home for two weeks. We had it all wrapped up there and then for the meeting. Now, I don't know what'll come out of the conference. But that was the way it was. They went off. In the meantime, these messages started coming out from here that Johnson was going to have a bombing pause to try to elect Humphrey and that they ought to hold out because Nixon will not sell you out like the Democrats sold out China. And we have talked to different ones. I think they've been talking to [Vice President-elect Spiro] Agnew. I think they think that they've been quoting you indirectly, that the thing they ought to do is to just not show up at any conference and wait until you come into office.
Nixon: Right. [Unclear.]
President Johnson: Now, they started that, and that's bad. They're killing Americans everyday. I have that documented. There's not any question but what that's happening. Now, I said to you in that last talk that I don't believe you know it or you're responsible for it. And I said, you know, when I talked to all three of you that time.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: But I said we have problems. I looked over that transcript the other night. We have problems. I think we can work them out. I believe Thieu will ultimately come, but there are problems. Now, there are problems because these people are telling them that. Now, I think the wise thing to do from the standpoint of your country and from the standpoint of your presidency--and I hope you believe me.
Nixon: Oh, I do.
President Johnson: And I want to help you. I want to help you. I don't want to trick you or deceive you.
Nixon: Oh, I know that.
President Johnson: I want peace. And I don't want to get some Democrat in a favorable position over you. But I think they ought to go to that conference. Now--
Nixon: Let me ask you this: is there anything we can do right now?
President Johnson: Yes. I think you ought to have whoever you trust the most in Washington, whoever you're--
Nixon: Talk to the [South Vietnamese] Ambassador?
President Johnson: Yes, sir. Go to the Ambassador and say to him, [unclear comment by Nixon] "I told the President when he proposed these three points, number one, he assured me that he would not be for a coalition government."
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: "The President has assured me that."
Nixon: That's right.
President Johnson: "The President assured me he'd never recognize the NLF [National Liberation Front]. So I have those assurances from him."
Nixon: Right. Right.
President Johnson: "The President's going to be as strong on this as I am, but the President thinks that if we are to support South Vietnam through the years ahead that we must be willing to meet at a conference table."
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: "Now, that's all we're asking. Now, you cleared that on [October] 7 and on [October] 16 and on the [October] 28. At least that's what the South Vietnamese did--they all cleared it."
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: [with Nixon acknowledging] "Therefore, Mr. Ambassador, I think you ought to tell the President [Thieu] that I support our President on going to the conference, and I think you ought to go. And if they try to sell you out, you don't have to agree. But you ought to go because the [J. William] Fulbrights and the [Mike] Mansfields and even the [Everett] Dirksens will not go along with anybody that won't go to a conference table." Now, that's where they are tonight.
Nixon: Let me ask you this about the Ambassador--I met him about 5 or 6 months ago--does he have any influence with that government?
President Johnson: Yes. He is giving them these signals and--
Nixon: OK.
President Johnson: --he is telling them that he has just talked to New Mexico, and he has just talked to the Nixon people, and they say, "Hold out. Don't do anything. We're going to win. We'll do better by you." Now, that's the story, Dick. And it is a sordid story. I told you that Sunday when I talked to you.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: You remember when I talked to [George] Smathers and Dirksen?
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: Now, I don't want to say that to the country because that's not good.
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: [with Nixon acknowledging] But they're playing that game. I don't think you're playing it, and I'd get off that hook. I'd just say to them, "You go to that conference, and you protect your country, and I'm going to support our President as long as he doesn't agree to a coalition government, as long as he doesn't agree to recognize the NLF, as long as he stands on the conditions he does, and we're united, and don't depend on me to give you a better deal."
Nixon: Right. We'll do that.
Now, let me ask you this: who would be the best one to--who do you think the Ambassador--who should I have talk to him? Have you got anybody in mind that--?
President Johnson: No, I don't.
Nixon: Could Dirksen do it?
President Johnson: Yeah. I don't know whether Dirksen has any contacts or not. I trust Dirksen. I think Dirksen is--
Nixon: [Unclear.]
President Johnson: He's not for any Communist take-over, and at the same time he's intelligent.
Nixon: What I might--well, also, he's considered to be a . . . why don't we--let me try this out. Why don't I get--see if I can get Everett to go over to the Ambassador and lay it on the line with him?
President Johnson: That's what I--
Nixon: And say that this is--that he speaks for Nixon and Johnson. [Unclear comment by Johnson]
Now, let me say this, Mr. President, that there's nothing that I want more than to get these people to that table.
President Johnson: Yeah.
Nixon: And as a matter of fact, as I told you on the phone and I've said publicly, I'll even go out there if necessary to get them there. I think that would be a grandstand stunt, however, and it would not be the best way. But if you think the Ambassador has influence, I'll have Dirksen talk to the Ambassador, or I could do it myself, if you think that'll help.
President Johnson: I think it would help. I'd just call him on the phone and say, "I want you to know this: I don't want your people to get off-key. I'm talking to the President every day."
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: "And the President has assured me he's not going to do anything that we don't understand."
Nixon: Oh, I know that.
President Johnson: "And you tell your President that he better get his people to that conference and get them there quick. And what he does there is a matter for his judgment, but he oughtn't to refuse to go to a room and meet."
Nixon: OK, we'll work on it.
President Johnson: OK, Dick.
Nixon: Now, let me ask you this. One other thing. Tell me about [CIA Director Richard] Helms. What do you think of Helms? How do you [unclear]?
President Johnson: I think he's a career, former UPI∇ man I never heard of. I appointed an Admiral [William Raborn, Jr.] when [CIA Director] John McCone left—
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: —because I wanted to be sure I didn't get a patsy or a soft guy in there, and we had too many of them here. The Admiral took it over and this Helms was the deputy. I consider him--
Nixon: Let me ask your candid opinion. Would you continue him?
President Johnson: Yes, I would. Yes, I would. If I were you, I'd continue him, and if I were taking over from you, I'd continue him. He's objective.
Nixon: Good.
President Johnson: He's a reporter. He was an old UPI man. He's fair. He's not an advocate.
Nixon: Oh, I know.
President Johnson: He's anti-Communist.
Nixon: When I met him out at the LBJ Ranch, I was very impressed by him, and I remember [unclear]. You feel that way, do you?
President Johnson: Well . . . Yes. I never heard of him until I appointed him. He was a deputy to this Admiral that I had, and he is extremely competent. He's succinct. He tells you as it is. And he's loyal. He's just--
Nixon: Let me ask you to do this as a personal [unclear]. Would you mind to, you know—I think it would be a nice way to work the transition if you could tell him sometime before we meet on Monday that we've talked and that while I don't want to say it now--that we're planning to continue him. Would you do that?
President Johnson: Oh, yes, yes. I'll be glad to.
Nixon: That's [unclear]. Because I think it's good that we have a, you know, a good transition.
Now, on this fellow, the ambassador, he speaks English pretty well, if I recall.
President Johnson: Yes, yes.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Well, we could talk to him. I'll--I don't think we ought to do it on the phone, though. Maybe I ought to . . . but I don't want him to come down. Maybe I could see him when I come up to Washington. That might be a better thing. And . . . No, I might get to him before that, though. Maybe Dirksen is the best one to . . .
President Johnson: I would write out whatever I said, and what I would say—Rusk said yesterday—
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: —and Rusk is the best adviser you can have until you get a man you have that much confidence in.
Nixon: I know that. I have great confidence in him.
President Johnson: He'll play as fair with you--and I'll bet my life on it--as he will with me. He's a good man. Rusk said, "if I were Nixon I would write out one sentence, and I'd say: 'I support the President of the United States"—
Nixon: Good.
President Johnson: —"in going to the conference as soon as you can, and there discussing the problems at issue, and we are united on that."
Nixon: Good.
President Johnson: "Now, the President has given me assurances that he's not for recognizing the NLF as an independent entity and he's not for a coalition government, and that's what you say you want too. So you go on and talk it over, and if you can settle it, I'll be the happiest man in the world. If you can't, when I come in, I'll assure you that the President will work with me at trying to settle it."
Nixon: Actually, if we can get them to talking before that, it'll be much better, though.
President Johnson: It certainly will, because you won't--
Nixon: This 60 days is the best time to get the damn thing [unclear].
President Johnson: You won't have ten men in the Senate support[ing] South Vietnam when you come in if these folks refuse to go to the conference.
Nixon: Absolutely. Well, I'll get on it. As a matter of fact . . . we'll try to get--I'll try to get Dirksen on the phone now, and see if we can arrange to have this fellow--well, I'll work it out. You don't need to worry about that. We'll try to get to him, and I can just put it quite directly that we want him to go to the conference, period, and that you and I agree completely on what ought to be done. [Unclear.]
President Johnson: And I would do it. I'd say we'll be in touch each day, and--
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: --that he can be sure--that he can tell his President that this government's going to operate as one, before and after.
Nixon: Right. [Unclear.]
President Johnson: And I'm not going to make any decision there that will adversely affect those people without talking to you and without talking to them.
Nixon: Well, of course. The point is--
President Johnson: I haven't stayed in this thing five years to throw it away in the last five weeks.
Nixon: The whole point is, too, that you've always--your position has always been, basically, as I told you, you've taken the position which was extremely unpopular and which was right, and so therefore I want to support you on it, and we're going to do it. And there's no question about that. I want you to know that.
President Johnson: Thank you, Dick. Thank you.
Nixon: Now, if—the only difficulty is--now, does Rusk think this ambassador--I don't know the fellow well enough, I met him in New York about, oh, in April or May, and he's--
President Johnson: Rusk told me last night that Nixon ought to do one or two things, said, "I'll go see Nixon if you want me to."
Nixon: Yeah.
President Johnson: I said, "I think that will highlight a problem and there'll be a lot of press around."
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: "It'll embarrass Nixon and embarrass you." And he said--
Nixon: So he thinks I should just talk to the ambassador?
President Johnson: He said that we ought to do one or two things. You ought to pick out whoever you are going to have as secretary of state or whoever your closest friend is--
Nixon: We don't have that.
President Johnson: --to go tell him, or you ought to say in writing just two sentences that, "I want you to know"--pick up the phone and tell him--"I want you to know that I believe your country ought to go to this conference. It's going to make it hard for all of us if you don't."
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: "And the President talked to me about it before we had the conference, and he's going to talk to me about what happens at the conference, and you don't need to feel insecure. We're going to stay with you and be fair. And I can give you that assurance." And you ought to tell them that they're going to hurt themselves, though, if Fulbright and Mansfield--
Nixon: Oh, yeah. Oh there'll be no doubt that the country will not support--
President Johnson: Mansfield's coming in to me tomorrow to say to them to go straight to hell and go on and negotiate--or get out--with Hanoi. That's what he's coming. He's the Leader of the Senate.
Nixon: You can't do that because we--
President Johnson: No.
Nixon: --we've got to--that way you'd leave all those boys out there alone.
President Johnson: I sure can. Or pull them out and leave them there alone.
Nixon: That's what I mean. Yeah.
President Johnson: But if this damn fool just sits back and says--today, he says that he wants to go and head the United States delegation and tell us what to do, and under our Constitution, I couldn't do that.
Nixon: No, that's right.
President Johnson: So--
Nixon: All right--
President Johnson: What he's doing, Dick--these people--they thought that we were going to trick you and try to pull a bombing halt to defeat you. So their judgment was that they ought to take out insurance and get them to screw the thing up where no good would come. Now, we're not trying to do that, and I'm not. And I think that American boys are being killed every day. We ought to tell these folks to go to the conference, and we're going to support South Vietnam after the election just like we did before.
Nixon: And if they go, then there's a better chance for them than if they don't go.
President Johnson: Oh, of course.
Break in the recording as it changes to a new dictabelt (tape).
—it is.
Nixon: Because otherwise they'll be deserted. OK, I'll get on it.
President Johnson: Of course, all right. You let me know what you do and what you say so I'll know there.
Nixon: What time is . . .
President Johnson: If I were you, I'd call him right now and I'd just say, "I have just talked to the President, period. I want you to know that I think your President should send a delegation there next week, period. I can assure you that I have assurances that this government, before and after January 20, is going to play it straight and fair with you. But you will lose if you don't get a delegation there and soon, period, because Hanoi and the NLF are having a propaganda field day." Rusk told me tonight that the great social charm in Paris is the NLF woman [Nguyen Thi Binh].
Nixon: Oh, God, yes. She's horrible.
President Johnson: And they're just sitting back and saying that the U.S. can't even deliver.
Nixon: Right. Right. OK.
President Johnson: And that's what I'd say to him. There's nothing dangerous about it--that--you've said that publicly.
Nixon: I believe it, too.
President Johnson: "I support the President. I support the government." And I'd just say, "Mr. Ambassador, there's some people who've raised the question, and I just think you ought to tell your President that I have an agreement with our President that we're going to act in unison"—
Nixon: Right.
President Johnson: "—just as two partners."
Nixon: Right. Right. We'll do it.
President Johnson: OK.
Nixon: Bye.
Bombing Halt. Anna Chennault. Vietnam negotiations.
WH6812-03-13832
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, Edward Kennedy
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
In a bid for a leadership role within the Democratic Party, Senator Edward Kennedy intended to challenge Senator Russell B. Long (D-Louisiana), the incumbent, for the position of assistant Democratic leader of the Senate, a post often known as the Whip. Kennedy claimed to have the support of Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Maine), the Democratic candidate for Vice President in the 1968 election. The move was widely seen as a maneuvre to position himself for the 1972 presidential campaign, and most observers predicted that Kennedy would find it difficult to unseat Long.
Kennedy had tried unsuccessfully earlier to get hold of President Johnson; in this call, Johnson is returning Kennedy's call.
President Johnson: Hello?
Edward Kennedy: Oh, Mr. President?
President Johnson: Yes, Ted?
Kennedy: Oh, how are you?
President Johnson: Fine.
Kennedy: Well, you’re awfully good to call back. I—
President Johnson: Sorry I wasn’t here when you called today.
Kennedy: Well, I was sorry to bother you.
I wanted to call you early this morning. I’ve given some thought to this leadership position in the Senate, and I wanted to just bring you abreast of the developments in my own thinking, because I know you’ve been terribly interested in the, you know, the developments in the Senate. And I wanted you to at least know what was happening before hearing about it on the wires or news services.
And I’d given some thought to—during the last two or three days I had some of my colleagues speak to me about the possibility of running as—for—as Whip, and I had indicated to them that Ed Muskie had been my choice, and I was willing to speak for him, and talk for him, and help in any way that he thought I could. And Ed had indicated to me that he had given it some thought but had decided not to for a variety of different reasons. And then during the course of about 18 to 24 hours, I made some calls. And I wasn’t interested in getting in it if, you know, the horses were out of the barn. But in speaking around, I thought we could make a creditable showing. And I think it’s a difficult and, you know, an uphill fight, but I’ve been very much encouraged by the general reaction from the colleagues in the Senate. And I just wanted to, sort of, keep you abreast, and, as I say, I know, you know, how interested you are in, you know, following these events in the Senate. And that was really the [report?] of the call this morning.
I think it’s—you know, Russell [Long] is a very able fellow, and he’s, aas Chairman of the Finance Committee, of course, and all his other responsibilities, he’s stretched pretty thin there. And as far as, sort of, the Whip’s position, and I thought with the, you know, new administration and all, it might be of some value in being in that position.
So, I—as I say, I’ve known over the period that I’ve been there that you have been very interested in what’s been happening there, and I wanted to, sort of, bring you abreast and see whether you might have any other kinds of ideas or suggestions. I know it would be the kind of thing you’d probably want to, you know, stay away from, but at least I wanted, you know, raise it anyway as a [unclear].
President Johnson: Well, Ted, I’m glad. I appreciate your calling me. I haven’t talked to anybody. No-one has talked to me about it. I don’t think it’s a matter that the President ought to interfere with. They raised a question two or three days ago on the [Morris] Udall∇ thing in the House, and I told my press secretary to just say to them that the only time that I remember that a president had openly indicated what he’d like to see done was [President Franklin D.] Roosevelt in the [Senator Alben W.] Barkley [D-Kentucky] campaign, when he won by one vote, but he lost a great deal because the divisions were so deep in the Barkley-[Senator Byron P.] Harrison [D-Mississippi] fight that the Harrison group and the Southern group never did go along with Barkley, although he was a gallant leader and a great man. He only won by one vote, and he divided the party, so that Roosevelt won the argument but really lost the sale. And I didn’t think that the House, or the Congress would want the President indicating preference, particularly when he wasn’t going to be President. [laughs]
Kennedy: Yeah.
President Johnson: And, so he has said that, and I wouldn’t take a position to try to dictate to either the House or the Senate. I think it’s up to every man to do what his conscience tells him he ought to do for the best of interests of his country and his party. And I don’t know what the situation is in the Senate. Not a single Senator has talked to me. I haven’t talked to a one of them. And I just came in tonight and they told me that you were calling me, and I picked up the phone this--
Kennedy: Sure.
President Johnson: But I think that it’s—
Kennedy: Well, I appreciate it, you know, very much. What I really, you know, intended by the, you know, the call, was really to, you know, to bring you up to date as to--
President Johnson: Good. Well, I—
Kennedy: --what was [unclear] here. And as, as I say, I know you’re interested. And this was really the, sort of, you know, the [unclear] and I, you know, I [unclear].
President Johnson: Well, I appreciate very much your calling me, Ted.
Kennedy: [Unclear] I think it's--you know--as I—all of us know, I think you've got a, you know, special kind of interest in the Senate, and I know you’ve maintained it, and so this is something that's up and around [unclear] see how it [unclear]. I’ve taken the liberty of touching base with [Senator Richard] Dick Russell [D-Georgia] and [Senator James] Eastland [D-Mississipi] and also with [Senator] John Stennis [D-Mississippi] and [Senator] John Sparkman [D-Alabama]. I’ve called my colleagues before it got out in the newspaper--as well as Russ Long. In fact, I talked to Russ Long, you know, this morning, about six or seven hours before this, you know, got on out, just to bring him up to date on, you know, where, at least what my thinking was. I’m afraid he’s been busy on the phone ever since.
Both laugh.
Kennedy: That’s the way it goes, and we’ll—I think it’s—we’ll try and, sort of, keep it as low tempo as possible.
President Johnson: That’s good. When is the—
Kennedy: It's on Friday. Friday morning.
President Johnson: When do you meet? That’s Friday. Well, I’ll be back Friday night. I’ll hear the news when I get back.
Kennedy: All right. Very good.
President Johnson: All right. Thank you, Ted.
Kennedy: Thanks, Mr. President.
The Senate Democratic Caucus voted on 3 January 1969. Kennedy scored an upset win over Long by 31 votes to 26.
Wh6804-01-12909
Participants:
Lyndon Johnson, John Stennis
Download Audio Files:
MP3
Download Audio Files:
FLAC
Operators connect the call.
President Johnson: Senator?
John Stennis: Yeah, good morning, Mr. President.
President Johnson: How are you?
Stennis: Oh--
President Johnson: By God, you're a hard man to find. Had to get the FBI∇ after you.
Stennis: Yeah, I took a little--a trip through town down there just to get the feel of things.
President Johnson: Uh uh.
Stennis: God bless you in all your efforts everywhere. I wrote you a note.
President Johnson: Where are you?
Stennis: I'm at my office. I'm here alone.
President Johnson: Would you mind riding down here and visiting with me a little bit with General [William] Westmoreland?
Stennis: Oh, I'd be delighted to, of course.
President Johnson: All right. I'll leave word. I'll leave word. You come to the Treasury gate. That's the gate next to the Treasury [building]. Come in the back of the White House, that diplomatic entrance, where you come in. Come on up to the Mansion. We're sitting here talking with Dick Russell, and he'll probably be gone [by] the time you get here.
Stennis: Yeah. Yeah.
President Johnson: He's got to go, but we'll visit and have a cup of coffee.
Stennis: All right. Thank you so much. That's the southwest gate?
President Johnson: No, it's the one near the Treasury. You know where if you come right down Pennsylvania Avenue and the first one you run into.
Stennis: Oh, yes. I know. All right.
President Johnson: But I'll tell them anyway, and--
Stennis: All right.
President Johnson: OK.
Stennis: I'll be there. Thank you.
Washington riots. Stennis visit to White House
